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Abstract
This thesis provides a reevaluation of Herbert Marcuse's philosophy of technology. It argues that 
rather than offering an abstract utopian or dystopian account of technology, Marcuse's philosophy of 
technology can be read as a cautionary approach developed by a concrete philosophical utopian. 
The strategy of this thesis is to reread Marcuse's key texts in order to challenge the view that his 
philosophy of technology is abstractly utopian. Marcuse is no longer a fashionable figure and there 
has been little substantive literature devoted to the problem of the utopian character of his 
philosophy of technology since the works of Douglas Kellner and Andrew Feenberg. This thesis 
seeks to reposition Marcuse as a concrete philosophical utopian. It then reevaluates his philosophy 
of technology from this standpoint and suggests that it may have relevance to some contemporary 
debates. 
Marcuse's writings on technology are the primary focus of this thesis, together with a range of 
major secondary sources. My discussion is accordingly narrow, although its implications are 
sometimes extensive. 
Chapter one introduces the problem to be addressed and locates it in the relevant secondary 
literature. It explains the strategy and the structure of the thesis as well as the limits of the enquiry. 
Chapter two reevaluates the influence of Marxian theory on Marcuse's philosophy of technology 
and shows he appropriated it as a critical-analytical approach to modern society. Chapter three 
emphasises how Marcuse's critique of the decline of the 'second dimension' of critical reason gives 
a specific cast to his thought whilst drawing out the implications of his distinction between technics 
and technology. This chapter also acknowledges the early influence of Marcuse's Heideggerian 
formation. Chapter four shows that Marcuse's philosophy of technology may have more relevance 
to contemporary debates about the philosophy of technology than might be expected. It does so by 
giving a critique of the current emphasis on perpetual economic growth from the perspective of the 
kind attributed to Marcuse. Chapter five defends Marcuse's concept of nature from a number of 
prominent contemporary criticisms and suggests that, despite its apparent concerns, it remains 
relevant to the determination of issues common to philosophers of technology and the environment. 
Chapter six defends Marcuse’s philosophy of technology from contemporary ‘instrumental’ 
accounts, and chapter seven undertakes the same task in relation to autonomous accounts of 
technology. 
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The thesis concludes that dismissals of Marcuse’s philosophy of technology as abstractly utopian 
and pessimistic are one sided and in some respects precipitate. Moreover, there may be something 
still to be learnt from his approach to this area of research. His philosophy of technology is arguably 
more valuable than the existing literature suggests because it has concrete philosophical features 
that can then be applied to developments since his death. This is not to suggest that Marcuse’s 
claims can be made out or that his theorising is free from serious problems, it is to correct the record 
in certain limited respects. 
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Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν· ὁ δέ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον 
ἐκπίπτει. 
Nature's wealth is restricted and easily won, whilst that of empty convention runs on to infinity.1 
1 Epicurus, 'Leading Doctrines',  15, The Philosophy of Epicurus, translated by G.K. Strodach, (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press), p.54. 
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General Introduction
This thesis will offer a new interpretation of Herbert Marcuse's philosophy of technology. As the 
treatment of Marcuse's work in the decades since his death have been scant as well as sometimes 
one-sided, this thesis will argue that Marcuse still has much to offer in regard to the shared grounds 
of philosophy of technology and philosophy of the environment. It will be the aim to argue that 
Marcuse offers a cautionary approach to modern technology from which risks facing the human 
future can be seen to be the result of the edifice of technoscientific production being increasingly 
motivated and directed toward monetary, rather than strictly technical incentives. As such, problems 
of crucial, practical exigency – specifically those of an environmental nature – tend to become ever-
more contingent upon the a priori convention of profit-motives and economic growth. As it will be 
the aim to argue, the extent of biospheric destabilisation already unleashed as a consequence of this 
historically unprecedented arrangement comes at a most inopportune time for civilisation; modern 
technologically-augmented  humanity may be  far  less  stable  than  is  commonly considered,  and 
therefore technology requires radical caution.  
History arguably shows the essential  ambiguity of technology – since the industrial  revolution, 
technoscientific development had allowed for dramatic rises in living conditions, education, health, 
life-expectancy and affluence. Yet, Marcuse was intimately aware of its destructive powers and the 
consequences – both intended and unintended – that could be unleashed with recourse to modern 
technoscience. However, although he addressed environmental problems late in his career, Marcuse 
would likely not have predicted the extent to which civilisation under the sway of the "technological 
mode of production" could come to be endangered by its own success. As a result of technological  
and  industrial  proliferation  and  increased  numbers  of  humans,  species  diversity  has  dwindled, 
crucial resources are being speedily depleted,  various forms of pollution have contaminated the 
waters and atmosphere, rates of salination and desertification grow, and various biospheric cycles 
are  now considered  to  have  been destabilised.  Furthermore,  technoscientific  advance  itself  has 
yielded certain novel, historically unprecedented threats; as advancement grows, so too it seems 
does the capacity for very few to cause great harms. 
However,  despite  this  situation,  governments,  industry  representatives,  the  large  majority  of 
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economists  and a  good deal  of  the  public  remains  faithful  to  the  cure-all  of  improvements  in  
efficiency,  logistics,  distribution and of course,  economic growth. This is  hardly surprising and 
betrays  an  understanding  of  technology  that  reflects  historical  convention:  technological  and 
scientific development play an integral role in social development, in extending and augmenting 
human capacities, in creating opportunity. Yet, as Marcuse continually argued, technoscience is not 
isolated from the socio-economic mode of production – in this case – capitalism. 
For Marcuse, it is both technological rationality and capitalist relations of production which 
constitute advanced capitalist  societies, and his analysis  implies that capitalist  imperatives 
structure  technological  rationality  while  technological  rationality  in  turn  helps  structure 
advanced capitalism.1 
If not completely dependent upon an imperative of perpetual growth, virtually all forms of this 
mode have been accompanied by it, and its modern defenders claim with clockwork regularity that 
its direction of the means and relations of production provides the solution to virtually all social and 
now environmental  ills.  Yet  this  is  based  on  a  misnomer  –  the  material  resources  technology 
ultimately relies upon on are finite – but the growth imperative is theoretically infinite. In order to 
address this contention, this thesis will therefore aim to expand upon Marcuse's argument that it is 
not technics or technology per se that has led to the current environmental predicament, but the 
incentives that tend to prevail under capitalism.  
Strategy
The major aim of this thesis will therefore be to delineate, expand upon, and defend Marcuse's view 
of  technics  and technology,  as  well  as  adding emphasis  to  his  call  for  qualitative  change with 
recourse to both the environmental problems facing the human future, as well as new and novel 
threats of a wholly technoscientific nature. Although Marcuse himself only began to address such 
issues at a late stage of his career, it will be argued here that their current prominence adds to the 
urgency of readdressing his approach in order to provide a critique of the direction of technology 
under  the capitalist  mode of  production.  Unlike many other  thinkers  concerned with the topic, 
Marcuse not only recognised the necessity for a philosophy of technology to account for its social, 
anthropological and agential underpinnings, his approach allowed for its essential ambiguity and its 
necessary  connection  to  a  theory  of  nature.  As  it  will  be  the  aim  to  argue,  Marcuse's 
1 D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 196.
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multidimensional approach resisted taking explicit sides of the various common dichotomies that 
continue  to  feature  in  both  academic,  journalistic,  public  and  philosophical  discussions  of 
technology. Marcuse avoided reducing technology to either inherently good or bad, determining or 
determined, self-governing or under human control.  Whilst  Marcuse was specifically concerned 
with the extent to which technics had come to be deployed as a means of mass social control, for 
Marcuse,  technoscientific  advance  in  itself  remained the tool  of  liberation.  Assuming continual 
development which is itself encouraged under capitalism, he believed the opportunities it opened up 
were of foremost significance, as within them lay the seeds by which the socio-political status quo 
could be qualitatively improved. 
The  following  approach  will  therefore  aim  to  extend  Marcuse's  critique  by  drawing  specific 
attention to the environmental implications of the directive incentives of modern technology. It will 
be argued in general that modern technoscientific production can be distinguished from merely 
'technical' modes of production on the basis of its dual purpose; to function 'internally', (i.e. for the 
hammer to be produced so as to function adequately as a hammer), and for the same hammer to 
function as a vehicle of profit for its producer. Although it is acknowledged that profit-making and 
the concept of money are hardly new features of technical mediation, the extent to which they 
influence modern production today is historically unprecedented, and marks a pronounced shift in 
the incentives driving production as a whole.  Furthermore,  the consequences of the differences 
between the directional incentive of profit and practicality will be critically analysed. As such, it  
will be argued that as the conventional nature of the former admit of no intrinsic maximums, they 
are inappropriate as the sole directive incentive of production on the grounds of the preconditional 
status  of  a  relatively  stable  biosphere.  Given  this  contention,  it  will  be  argued  that  Marcuse's 
philosophy of  technology can be read as a  warning concerning the extent  of  the influence the 
imperative of perpetual economic growth plays within technical mediation, by revealing that the 
practical intentions that formerly animated production are today largely driven by an inexhaustible 
convention. As such, practical instrumentality comes to be blurred and all the more contingent upon 
economic value, as what Marcuse referred to as the "end of technological rationality"2 is transferred 
to the limited evaluations of the market-mechanism. 
This thesis will encompass theoretical and empirical contexts and will be informed throughout by 
the concrete, practical concern of environmental overshoot. However, it should be acknowledged 
that within the context of the shared ground of the philosophies of technology and environment, the 
2 See H. Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 5.
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theoretical and practical are hardly causally isolated categories. For example, a widespread belief or 
collective attitude that considers technoscientific development as inherently ethically and socially 
positive  will  obviously  tend  to  foster  advance,  just  as  conversely,  alternative  socio-political, 
religious,  or  cultural  proclivities  may  tend  to  restrict  certain  types  of  development,  or  even 
development  per  se.3 In  other  words,  the  direction  and shape  of  technology will  be treated  as 
ultimately socially determined and historically specific, but, in line with the Marcusean approach, 
this is not to rule out technology having an equally important role in shaping and informing social 
habits, and its role in making the world intelligible. This subject will be specifically dealt with by 
contrasting Marcuse's  'compatibilist'  approach to technology from instrumental  and autonomous 
accounts, which, in varying ways, will be argued to undermine the integral role of human agency 
and responsibility over the direction of technological development. 
Just as Marcuse's approach to technology not only illuminated the ways in which it had ushered in 
"new forms of control" under modern capitalism,4 he never ruled out the prospect of human agency 
effecting liberatory change, and to restore what he took to be technology's primary role in human 
life:  minimising  the  need for  arduous  or  dangerous  labour,  opening  up opportunity,  increasing 
health,  and  diminishing  suffering.  Yet  Marcuse  argued  that  such  a  view  of  technological 
development in the advanced industrial  societies was no longer reflective of reality;  despite his 
belief  that  technical  and  scientific  capacities  had  become sufficiently  advanced  to  bring  about 
authentic qualitative change to civilisation, the rationality of the current "technological mode of 
production"  contained  and obscured  the  potential  which,  for  Marcuse,  essentially  characterised 
human life. The critical role of reason which had formerly functioned as a basis to question the 
given and effect social and political change where possible had been increasingly subsumed into a 
"one-dimensional"  society,  mechanically ordered  by a  technological  rationality characterised by 
quantification and efficiency. As Marcuse believed, above all else this arrangement functioned to 
maintain and reproduce the psycho-behavioural and technical "status quo". 
The major point of critique can be described as follows in relatively simple terms – if confined to a 
single  planetary  resource  base,  sooner  or  later,  it  must  not  be  ignored  that  even  a  species  as 
innovative as humanity cannot expand in number or in resource acquisition indefinitely. There are 
relatively few options in this context; either undertake a symbiotic arrangement with the biosphere, 
3 Any number of histories of technological development take up this topic. For a recent "New" world-historical 
approach, see D.R. Headrick, Technology: A World History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
4 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), pp. 3-20.
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explore resources off-planet, or face serious existential risks. Far from recognising this seemingly 
sensible contention,  the treatment of nature as not merely a store of resources,  but a source of 
profitable plunder continues and even grows, to a point at which it now come to perceptibly disturb 
the biosphere. This represents a fundamentally practical concern for civilisation, yet to reiterate, as 
long as the means of production are directed by the ancillary prerogative of economic growth and 
responsibility is abdicated to market forces, praxis arguably diminishes. In summary, rather than 
offering  an  abstract  utopian  account  of  technology's  role  in  creating  an  authentically  liberated 
society, Marcuse's critical analysis will be interpreted as an incisive critique of advanced industrial 
society by a concrete philosophical utopian. 
Literature Review
The interconnection between economic growth and technological production is well accepted in the 
economic literature, and the shared grounds between technology and the environment have also 
been long recognised in ecophilosophy. However, with the salient exceptions of Herbert Marcuse, 
Lewis Mumford, and Karl Marx, many recent philosophical efforts to engage with technology and 
its social ramifications have arguably pursued other concerns.5 Most prominently, these range from 
technology's ontological status,6 the nature of its development or "evolution",7 the extent and role of 
agency within technical mediation,8 the social  and environmental 'impacts'  of specific  technical 
5 See L. Mumford, (1934), Technics and Civilization, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963); The Myth of the  
Machine, vol. 1: 'Technics and Human Development', (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967) and vol. 2: 
'The Pentagon of Power', (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970). For a classic early 'philosophical' approach 
to technology, see the works of Marx, especially 'The Labour Process and the Valorization Process', vol.1, chapter 7 
of Capital, (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 283-291. On definitions of technology in general, see R. Li-Hua, (2009), 
'Definitions of Technology', in A Companion to the Philosophy of Technology, edited by J.K.B. Olsen, S.A. Pedersen 
and V.F. Hendricks, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 18-22.
6 Martin Heidegger's, 'The Question Concerning Technology' remains one of the most prominent and influential 
works in the 'humanities' tradition of the philosophy of technology. See Heidegger, Basic Writings, edited by D.F. 
Krell, (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1977), pp. 287-317. Secondary works on Heidegger's philosophy of 
technology are far too numerous to list in detail here. For a basic introduction, see D. Ihde, 'Heidegger's Philosophy 
of Technology', in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, edited by V. Dusek and R.C. Scharff, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 277-292. For a prominent reinterpretation of the Heideggerian ontological approach 
to technology, see B. Stiegler, Technics and Time v1: The Fault of Epimetheus, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994). For an alternative collection of essays on the ontological status of technology, see The Artificial and the  
Natural: An Evolving Polarity, edited by B. Bensaude-Vincent, and W.R. Newman, (Boston MASS: The MIT Press, 
2007). 
7 On technological evolution see B. Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What it is and How it Evolves, (New York: The 
Free Press, 2009); J.M. Ziman, Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); G. Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 
and R. Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, (New York: Penguin, 2005). See also 
the work of B. Barnet, 'Do Technical Artefacts Evolve?’ in Technicity, edited by A. Bradley and L. Armand, (Prague: 
Litteraria Pragensia, 2006), pp. 103-114 and 'Engelbart's Theory of Technical Evolution', Continuum Journal,  
vol.20, issue 4, (December, 2006), pp. 509-521.
8 On 'autonomous' and deterministic theories of technology, see L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics Out of  
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systems and artifacts, or on the other hand, the diverse social interests and procedures which inform 
design processes.9 The task of critically engaging the influence of economic growth in technical 
mediation and its resulting environmental implications have of course been taken up by thinkers 
from diverse backgrounds,10 but Andrew Feenberg's statement that "economics cannot explain but 
rather follows the trajectory of technological growth",11 arguably serves as a general indication of 
the  attitude  of  much  contemporary philosophical  discussion  of  technology in  the  "humanities" 
tradition.12 It will therefore be the chief task of this thesis to question this apparent lacuna, and its 
implications for the crucial concerns emanating from the modern environmental crisis. In order to 
do so, Marcuse's critique of consumerism and his concepts of "technological rationality", the "one-
dimensional society" and the "technological mode of production" will be drawn upon and defended 
from a variety of rival contemporary views of technology.13 
Control as a Theme in Political Thought, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1977); B. Bimber, 'Three Faces of 
Technological Determinism', and other essays in Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological  
Determinism, edited by L. Marx and M.R. Smith, (Boston MAS: The MIT Press), pp. 79-100; R. Heilbroner, (1967) 
'Do Machines Make History?' in Scharff and Dusek, (eds.), op.cit.  (2005), pp.398-404; as well as the 1994 follow-
up essay, 'Technological Determinism Revisited', in Smith and Marx, (eds., 1994), pp. 67-78. Works which explicitly 
conceive technology as autonomous or deterministic include J. Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: 
Vintage, 1964); Ellul states his case concisely in 'The Technological Order', in Philosophy and Technology, edited by 
K. Mitcham and R. Mackey, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 86-105; M. McLuhan, (1964), 
Understanding Media, (New York: Routledge, 2007), and, as it will be argued here, R. Kurzweil, The Singularity is  
Near, (New York: Penguin, 2005). For a critique of what he refers to as 'substantivist' approaches  to technology, 
(which includes technological determinism), see Feenberg, Questioning Technology, (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
Other critiques of technological determinism include M. Goldhaber, 'Is Technology Autonomous?', in Controlling 
Technology: Contemporary Issues, edited by W.B. Thompson, A. Light, and E. Katz, (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 1991), pp. 195-203; T.J. Misa, 'Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from Technological Determinism', in 
Smith and Marx (eds., 1994), pp. 115-141.
9 See for example D. Ihde, 'The Designer Fallacy and Technological Imagination', in Philosophy and Design: From 
Engineering to Architecture, edited by P.E. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light and S.A. Moore, (Amsterdam: Springer, 
2008), pp. 51-59. Recent contructivist work in sociology and elsewhere has had a significant influence on other 
philosophical approaches to technology, especially the work of Feenberg. See for example his Questioning 
Technology, (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 78-89. On the social constructivist approach to technology, see W. 
Bijker and T. Pinch, 'The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts: or How the Sociology of Science and the 
Sociology of Technology might Benefit Each Other', in Social Studies of Science, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 399-441. For a 
critique of the social constructivist program, see L. Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and 
Finding it Empty' in Dusek and Scharff, op.cit.  (2005), pp. 233-242. For a critical response to Winner, see M. Elam, 
'Anti Anticonstructivism or Laying the Fears of a Langdon Winner to Rest', in Dusek and Scharff, (eds.), op.cit.  
2005), pp. 612-616.
10 See for example, B. Commoner, The Closing Circle, (New York: Bantam, 1971); Making Peace with the Planet, 
(New York: Pantheon Press, 1990);  See also E. J. Mishan, The Costs of Economic Growth, (London: Staples, 1967); 
J. Porrit, Capitalism: As if the World Matters, (London: Earthscan Publishers, 2007), and N. Georgescu-Roegen's 
The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, (Lincoln: Iuniverse, 1971); B. McKibben, The End of Nature,  
(London: Penguin-Viking, 1990); Eaarth: Making Life on a Tough New Planet, (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2010). For a 
summary of environmental-economic criticisms of the growth imperative, see P. Hay, Main Currents in Western  
Environmental Thought, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), pp. 204-210.
11 Feenberg, op.cit.  (1999), p. 79.
12 The distinction between "humanities" or continental and "engineering" or analytic philosophy of technology was 
first posited by C. Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology: The Path Between Engineering and Philosophy,  
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994). See also M. Franssen, 'Analytic Philosophy of Technology', in Berg 
Olsen et al, op.cit.  (2009), pp. 184-188.
13 What follows will aim to defend Marcuse's thought from selected aspects of the views of contemporary philosophers 
of technology such as Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde, and other accounts from Steven Vogel, Jürgen Habermas, 
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Since this thesis is by no means intended to offer a 'complete' account of Marcuse's critical-social 
theory, the influence of thinkers such as Hegel, Freud Lukács, Weber and Heidegger, whom, along 
with his Frankfurt School colleagues played influential roles in the development of his thought,14 
these sources will only be attended to in passing in order to emphasise the primary influence, that of 
Marx. 15 Hence, beginning with Marcuse's early essay on the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844,16 the majority of my critical attention will focus on the middle to late period 
of his career in which the topics of technology and nature come to increasing prominence.17  The 
and Ray Kurzweil. 
14 Weber's concept of the 'iron cage' and 'rationality' is critically addressed by Marcuse's 'Industrialization and 
Capitalism in Max Weber', in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, 2nd ed., edited and translated by J.J. Shapiro, 
(Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 201-226. For Marcuse's early and influential account of Hegel, see his 1932 work, 
Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1987). The similarity of the 
views of Marcuse and Martin Heidegger, especially the latter's approach in 'The Question Concerning Technology' 
and Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man are considerable. On this topic, see chapter 6 of Feenberg, op.cit.  (2005), pp. 
115-133; 'From Essentialism to Constructivism: Philosophy of Technology at the Crossroads,' in Technology and the 
Good Life, edited by E. Higgs, D.Strong, and A. Light, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 294-315. 
See also I. Thomson, 'From the Question to Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology: Heidegger, 
Marcuse, Feenberg', Inquiry, vol.43, issue 2, (Summer, 2000), pp. 225-234. For Marcuse's own thoughts on 
Heidegger and the influence he played on his thought, see 'Heidegger's Politics: An Interview' with Frederick 
Olafson', in Abromeit and Wolin, (eds.), op.cit.  (2005), pp. 165-175. On the philosophical and political legacy of the 
thought of the Frankfurt School, as well as the influence Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and other critical 
theorists played on Marcuse's thought, see M. Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), and R. Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).  
15 Arguably, the most comprehensive single account of Marcuse's thought is D. Kellner's Herbert Marcuse and the 
Crisis of Marxism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Andrew Feenberg's works, particularly his 
Questioning Technology, (1999) and Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History, (New 
York: Routledge, 2005) are also of great importance. Early works on the broader aspects of Marcuse's critical-social 
theory include M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1980), which was subjected to a critical review by Kellner in 'Schoolman on Marcuse', in New German 
Critique, no.26, 'Critical Theory and Modernity', (Spring-Summer, 1982), pp. 185-201. Secondary works and edited 
volumes discussing Marcuse's thought roughly up to the point of the publication of One-Dimensional Man include J. 
Habermas, (ed.), Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968); J. Fry, Marcuse: Dilemma and 
Liberation, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974). More recent discussions include J. Bokina and T.J. Lukes, (eds.), 
Marcuse: From the New Left to the Next Left, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994); C. Reitz, Art,  
Alienation, and the Humanities: A Critical Engagement with Herbert Marcuse, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2000); J. Abromeit and W.M. Cobb, (eds.), Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, (New York: Routledge, 
2004); and C. Fuchs, Emanzipation! Technik und Politik bei Herbert Marcuse, (Aachen: Shaker, 2005). Arguably, 
the most comprehensive guide to works both by and on Marcuse can be found at the 'Herbert Marcuse Homepage' 
operated by his son, Harold Marcuse, which can be found at: http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/index.html (viewed 
10.10.2012). 
16 Marcuse, 'New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism', in R. Wolin and M. Abromeit (eds.), 
Heideggerian Marxism, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 87-121. 
17 A sample of Marcuse's work in which technology features as a major concern include the following: (1941), 'Some 
Social Implications of Modern Technology', and other works in Technology, War and Fascism: The Collected 
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.1, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 41-65; (1960), 'De 
l'ontologie à la technologie: les tendences de la société industrielle' ('From Ontology to Technology: Fundamental 
Tendencies of Industrial Society'), translated by M. Ishay, in Critical Theory and Society: A Reader, edited by N. 
Bronner and D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 119-127; (1961), 'The Problem of Social Change in 
Technological Society', in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.2, 
(New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 37-57; (1964), One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced  
Industrial Society, (New York: Routledge, 2002); (1965), 'The Containment of Social Change in Industrial Society', 
in Kellner, (ed.), op.cit. (2001), pp. 82-93; (1966), 'The Individual in the Great Society', in Kellner ibid., (2001), pp. 
64-65; (1967a), 'The End of Utopia', in Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia, translated and edited by 
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early academic reception to Marcuse's broader social philosophy was often hostile.18 Despite 
attaining global celebrity status in the 1960s, interest in his thought quickly declined after his death 
in 1979 only to enjoy something of a resurgence in the 1990s when a number of philosophers 
revisited his views on nature and technology.19 Yet before this, at the height of his fame, a variety of 
critical works emerged which tended to "either grossly simplify his thought, reduce it to an easily 
digestible commodity, or, on the other hand, abruptly dismiss it in polemics that (were) often 
politically motivated."20 It could be said of course that Marcuse's multidimensional approach to 
technology was somewhat receptive to misinterpretation; on the one hand the strong pessimism of 
One-Dimensional Man was often taken as a form of technological determinism in which human 
agents were reduced to the mere effects of deeper technological causes.21 Marcuse's relentless search 
for sources of resistance and "qualitative" social change also saw his theory branded as utopian by 
other critics.22    
 
Dichotomies such as these are hardly rare within contemporary philosophical discussions of 
technology and the environment. Technology, we are told, either plays a determining or liberating 
role in society;23 it is considered inherently benevolent by some and malevolent by others;24 it is said 
J.J. Shapiro and S.M. Weber, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 62-81; (1967b), 'Liberation from the Affluent 
Society', in Art and Liberation: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.4, edited by D. Kellner, (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2007); (1967c), 'Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society', in Schapiro (ed.), op.cit.  
1969), pp.248-268; (1970), 'Charles Reich – A Negative View' in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers  
of Herbert Marcuse, vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (London & New York: Routledge), pp. 46-48; and An Essay on 
Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). On the “new technology” see 'Nature and Revolution' in 
Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972a); and (1979), 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern 
Society', in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3:3, (Copyright © 1992 by Peter Marcuse), pp. 29-48. Works exploring 
the relevance of Marcuse's thought to contemporary environmental thought include, A. Light, 'Marcuse's Deep-
social Ecology and the Future of Utopian Environmentalism', in Abromeit and Cobb (eds.), op.cit.  (2004), pp. 227-
235; A. Feenberg, 'The Liberation of Nature?', in Western Humanities Alliance Special Issue, Nature, Culture,  
Technology, edited by A. Feenberg-Dibon and R. McGinnis, vol. LXIII, no. 3, (Fall 2009), pp. 96-107; and T. Luke, 
'Marcuse's Ecological Critique and the American Environmental Movement', in Abromeit and Cobb, (eds.), ibid.,  
(2004), pp. 236-239. 
18 Critiques of Marcuse's work by Alasdair MacIntyre, Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty are subjected to strong 
scrutiny by W.M. Cobb in his 'Diatribes and Distortions: Marcuse's Academic Reception', in Abromeit and Cobb, 
(eds.), op.cit. (2004), pp. 163-187.
19 These works are noted in detail below. On the topic of the rising interest in Marcuse's work, see D. Kellner, 'A 
Marcuse Renaissance?', in Bokina and Lukes, (eds.), op.cit. (1994), pp. 245-267.
20 Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 378. A sample of the critical works which arguably misinterpreted Marcuse's views for 
political or other reasons include R. Marks, The Meaning of Marcuse, (New York: Ballantyne, 1970); A. MacIntyre, 
(1970), Marcuse, (London: Fontana Modern Masters Series, 1973), H. H. Holz, Utopie und anarchismus. Zur Kritik  
der kritischen Theorie Herbert Marcuses, (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1968); and E. Vivas, Contra Marcuse, (New 
York: Delta, 1972). 
21 Examples of this tendency include R. Steigerwald, Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg, (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 
1969); A. Toffler, Future Shock, (London: Pan, 1970), p.291; Schoolman, op.cit. (1980), and arguably Winner, 
op.cit. (1977). 
22 Marcuse has been regularly mispresented as a "historicist or essentialist, a bleak pessimist or a starry-eyed utopian, 
an elitist individualist or a blatant irrationalist." Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 374.
23 See reference 4, above.
24 Arguably the most prominent recent example of technoscientific utopianism is Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005). For the 
other side of the discussion, see for example, B. McKibben, Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age, (New 
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to embody 'ethics', 'politics' or 'ideology', or it is considered neutral;25 and to reiterate, some take it 
as an autonomous actant in history, whilst others see it as as completely under the control of human 
agents.26 Marcuse's approach arguably follows a middle road between such dichotomies, offering 
not only hope for human responsibility to effect change in the direction of technical development in 
the future, but also acknowledging its determining features in the present. As such, it offers a 
considerable philosophical-anthropological foundation and argument for a dramatic reassessment of 
the modern technological order. Yet, Marcuse's theory of nature – a necessary interlink in any 
rethinking of the technological project – remains problematic and controversial, partly due for 
conceptual reasons.27 Criticisms of Marcuse's 'romanticism'; his supposed advocation of a "fraternal 
relation" to nature; and the coherence of his concepts of a "new science" and "new technology" 
from his Frankfurt School colleague and friend, Jürgen Habermas, have given rise to a number of 
important works of relevance to contemporary ecological and technological issues.28 It will be 
argued in this thesis that the major positions that have emerged from this debate tend to overlook 
significant aspects of Marcuse's approach to technology. It will also be argued that Feenberg's 
York: Owl Books, 2004) and B. Joy, 'Why the Future Doesn't Need Us', in Wired, issue 8, no.4 (April, 2000). For 
examples of the neo-ludditism characteristic of certain representitives of the 'anarcho-primitivist' movement, see D. 
Jensen, Endgame vol.1: The Problem of Civilization, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006); M. Zerzan, Running 
on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization, (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2002); and as editor, Against  
Civilization: Readings and Reflections, (Port Towsend, WA: Feral House, 2005).
25 For a novel discussion of the 'ethics' of technological 'actants' such as automatic doors, see B. Latour, ‘A Door Must 
be either Open or Shut: A Little Philosophy of Techniques’, in Feenberg and Hannay, (eds.), op.cit. (1995), pp. 272-
281. See also L. Winner, 'Do Artifacts have Politics?', in The Whale and the Reactor, (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1986), pp.19-39. See also Feenberg, 'Can Technology Incorporate Values? Marcuse’s Answer to the Question 
of the Age' transcript of a paper given at the conference on The Legacy of Herbert Marcuse, University of 
California, Berkeley, (November 7, 1998); Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), pp. 101-129; and Ihde, op.cit. (2008).
26 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, book 6, iv, (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), p. 208. 
27 Marcuse's discussions of nature (which includes both human, female, and wild or 'first' nature), include Marcuse, 
op.cit. (1941). His critique of the instinct theory and depth psychology of Freud receive their clearest expression in 
his 1955 work, Eros and Civilization: a Philosophical Enquiry into Freud, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). Other 
texts in which Marcuse lays the groundwork for a novel – if sometimes confusing – concept of first nature include 
Marcuse, op.cit. (1964; 1969b; 1972a; and 1979). The role of art and aesthetics would play in the liberation of 
society are arguably laid down in both his first and final major works. See Marcuse, (1922), 'The German Artist 
Novel: Introduction', translated by C. Reitz, in Art and Liberation: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.4, 
edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 71-80; and The Aesthetic Dimension, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1978). On problems emanating from Marcuse's view of nature, see the subsequent note. 
28 This discussion arose from Jürgen Habermas's criticisms of Marcuse's concepts of the "new science" and "new 
technology". See Habermas, 'Technology and Science as Ideology', in Toward a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1970), pp. 81-122. Further work emanating from this debate includes S. Gandesha, 'Marcuse, Habermas, and 
the Critique of Technology', in Abromeit and Cobb, (eds.), op.cit. (2004), pp. 188-208; Feenberg, 'Marcuse or 
Habermas: Two Critiques of Technology' in Inquiry, vol.39:1 (Elmont, NY: 1996), pp. 45-70. The debate is retraced 
in Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), pp.154-180; see also S. Vogel, 'New Science, New Nature: The Habermas-Marcuse 
Debate Revisited', in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge, edited by A. Feenberg and A. Hannay, (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 23-42; as well as Vogel's extended treatment of the debate in Against Nature:  
The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), pp. 101-143. See also R.B. Pippin, 'On the 
Notion of Technology as Ideology', in Feenberg and Hannay, op.cit. (1995), pp. 43-61; (1992), D. Kellner, 'Marcuse, 
Liberation and Radical Ecology', in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol.3, no.3, (September), pp. 43-46; and C. Fred 
Alford, Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
1985). Feenberg answers his critics in 'Constructivism and Technology Critique: Replies to Critics', in Inquiry, Issue 
1., (Summer, 2000), pp. 16-29.
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appropriation of Marcusean philosophy of technology does not take the economic incentives 
motivating technological deployment with sufficient seriousness, especially the environmental 
implications of the "growth fetish".29 
It is the major contention of this thesis that the primary importance of Marcuse's approach lies in the 
distinction he placed between technics and technology, and that this distinction can be illuminated 
by emphasising the particular economic imperative which arguably plays the most significant role 
in  motivating and guiding the  political,  corporate,  economic and technological  'status  quo';  the 
utopian aim of perpetual growth.30 It is just this factor of Marcuse's critical theory which has been 
largely  unaccounted  for  or  underexplored  on  the  part  of  both  his  critics  as  well  as  his  chief 
expositers; yet in hesitating to countenance this crucial and defining aspect of modern technological 
production,  the primary incentive driving and guiding its advance is left  unaccounted for, or in 
certain and prominent accounts of technological mediation, almost completely ignored.31 Without 
taking  the  ensemble  nature  of  technics,  economics  and  the  environment  into  consideration  as 
Marcuse attempted to do, any radical critical approach to either domain in isolation appears doomed 
to failure. Hence, as the current configuration of technology appears as a danger to the environment, 
it appears as a danger to the future of human flourishing; a betrayal of the "end of technological  
rationality",  or in  other  words,  the essential  role  of  technics  in securing and expanding human 
capacities, rather than threatening their long-term continuation.32
29 This term is owed to C. Hamilton, Growth Fetish, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003).
30 Marcuse inherits the distinction from Mumford, op.cit. (1934). Marcuse appears to be quoting the 1936 edition in 
'Some Social Implications of Modern technology'. See Kellner, (ed.), op.cit.  (1998), p. 41.
31 'Autonomous' theories of technology undermine human agency, but 'instrumental' theories arguably overstate its 
efficacy in technical mediation. Hence, an analogy between modern metaphysical accounts of the problem of free 
will or determinism can be applied to the question of technological determinism, in which Marcuse's theory offers a 
"compatibilist" middle road. accounting for both certain elements of determinism without relinquishing the 
possibility of a change in the overall direction of technoscientific development brought about by human agency.




Utopia and the Problem of Method
Marcuse is a utopian thinker. He conceives of a redeemed technological rationality in a 
liberated society, much as Plato, at the end of the Gorgias, imagines a reformed rhetoric that 
would serve good ends.1 
Part one of this thesis will emphasise the importance technology played in his vision of qualitative 
social change. The discussion will begin with a brief introduction to Marcuse's thought and 
methodology, before moving to delineate his approach to technology with specific reference to its 
philosophical-anthropological foundations in concepts derived from the philosophical-
anthropological thought of the young Karl Marx. Subsequently, Marcuse's philosophy of technology 
will be described in detail in order to establish the relevance of his critique to the current direction 
of technological development and proliferation under modern capitalism. 
Throughout his career, Marcuse's thought was driven by a conviction and belief in the possibility of 
radical social change which he considered necessary to overcome the iniquities of the capitalist 
mode of production. Marcuse's concept of qualitative social change forms the central base from 
which his philosophy of technology and critique of capitalist society emerge,2 and the concept of 
utopia was "at the core of his ideas",3 yet his use of this latter concept was neither in its traditional 
definition as a semi-mythical ideal, nor did it play a purely theoretical or regulative role in his 
thought.4 Indeed, from an analysis of his work it becomes evident that he believed in its concrete 
1 A. Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
p. 88.
2 See H. Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society' in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3:3 (1979), p. 30.
3 A.Y. Davis, 'Marcuse's Legacies', in in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by J. Abromeit & W.M. Cobb, 
(New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 45.
4 See for example, S, Bundschuh, 'The Theoretical Place of Utopia: Some Remarks on Marcuse's Dual Anthropology', 
in Abromheit and Cobb, (eds.), ibid. (2004), pp. 152-162. 
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possibility, given the advanced stage of technoscientific and intellectual capacities already  reached 
in the mid to late twentieth century.5  
All the material and intellectual forces which could be put to work for the realization of a free 
society are at hand. That they are not used for that purpose is to be attributed to the total 
mobilization of existing society against its own potential for liberation. But this situation in no 
way makes the idea of radical transformation itself a utopia.6 
Marcuse's vision of a qualitatively different society emerged as a result of the advance and 
proliferation of technoscientific capacities, and remained a prominent fixture of his thought from its 
beginning to its end. For Marcuse, the nature of such a society did not merely denote a life richer in 
material advantages, money, or 'certainty' regarding the future, but one “...which is as much as 
possible free from toil, dependence, and ugliness”, lived “in accordance with the essence or nature 
of man”.7 For Marcuse, the 'essence' or 'nature' of individual humans and their society consisted in 
the capacity to pursue their potential. Technology was therefore of the utmost importance to his 
concept of social change, as in its most basic definition it plays the major formative, material role in 
diversifying and extending human capacities.8 As Marcuse summarised the thesis of his 1966 
'Political Preface' to Eros and Civilization: 
...the title expressed an optimistic, euphemistic, even positive thought, namely, that the 
achievements of advanced industrial society would enable man to reverse the direction of 
progress, to break the fatal union of productivity and destruction, liberty and repression – in 
other words, to learn the gay science (gaya sciencia) of how to use the social wealth for 
shaping man's world in accordance with his Life Instincts, in the concerted struggle against 
the purveyors of Death.9
The basic problem was that rather than being turned toward the goal of increasing human capacities, 
at the height of its advancement in the modern period, Marcuse contended that technology had 
instead come under the sway of quite different incentives. In short, technology no longer could be 
5 Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 5.
6 Marcuse, (1967a), 'The End of Utopia', translated by J.J. Shapiro and S. M. Weber, in Five Lectures:  
Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 64.
7 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p.130.
8 See for example, N. Bostrom, 'A History of Transhumanist Thought', in The Journal of Evolution and Technology,  
v.14, (April, 2005), p. 1.
9 Marcuse, (1966) 'Political Preface' to Eros and Civilization, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 11. 
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said to truly function in the collective interest of humanity, but in the interest of sustaining the 
capitalist mode of production. Some examples: increased automation could potentially entail less 
need for arduous, mindless or repetetive labour and therefore open the scope for increased free time; 
instead of superior technical 'know how' leading to permanence and endurance of design and 
functionality, the affluent world had pioneered techniques such as "built-in-obsolescence", and had 
come to be saturated in a multitude of surplus products – many of which differ in brand name or 
packaging alone – could not be said to augment human capacities, but merely produce waste and 
surplus. Marcuse characterised the affluent society as comprising: 
...an abundant industrial and technical capacity which is to a great extent spent in the 
production and distribution of luxury goods, gadgets, waste, planned obsolescence, military or 
semimilitary equipment – in short, in what economists and sociologists used to call 
“unproductive” goods and services; a rising standard of living, which also extends to 
underprivileged parts of the population; a high degree of concentration of economic and 
political power, combined with a high degree of organization and government intervention in 
the economy; scientific and pseudoscientific investigation, control, and manipulation of 
private and group behavior, both at work and at leisure (including the behavior of the psyche, 
the soul, the unconscious, and the subconscious), for commercial and political purposes.10
In general, Marcuse uses the terms 'advanced industrial society' and 'affluent society' 
interchangeably. What he had in mind were liberal democracies – specifically the United States – 
under the economic conditions of consumer-capitalism of the mid-to-late twentieth century.11 Under 
this arrangement, Marcuse believed that possibilities for change were either left in abeyance, 
rendered irrelevant to a population gaining in affluence and material wealth, or summarily 
dismissed as utopian, all seemingly in the overwhelming interest of the preservation of the status 
quo. Today, specifically due to the state of the environment, the stakes of this debate have arguably 
risen considerably. In short, Marcuse went beyond the work of Karl Marx by contending that 
capitalism had largely contained the sorts of 'contradictions' which Marx saw as leading to its 
eventual dissolution. Although the successes of capitalism in the advanced industrial nations saw to 
rises in affluence and 'disposable income' along with an ever-more diffuse array of new gadgets, 
commodities and products to purchase with it, for Marcuse, these appeared to be mere distractions 
10 Marcuse, 'Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society', in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1967), p. 248.
11 See Marcuse, (1967b), 'Liberation from the Affluent Society', in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers  
of Herbert Marcuse, vol.3., edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 77. Marcuse left Germany in 
1933, arrived in the United States in 1934 and was granted citizenship in 1940.  
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from what he considered were the more worthwhile and meaningful goals of authentic satisfaction 
and fulfillment which would emerge from a qualitative revaluation of values and a "great” or 
“absolute refusal" of the “false”, as opposed to “true" needs often promoted by consumer 
capitalism.12 In over three decades since his death, and despite increasing evidence that growth for 
the sake of growth poses significant threats to the natural environment, such change has not 
emerged. Indeed, despite various tremors and shocks such as the 1970s oil crisis and the more 
recent, much reported 'uncertainty' which continues to plague the modern market system, capitalism 
per se appears as secure and unquestioned as it ever did. Nonetheless, rather than relinquishing the 
possibility for the sort of liberatory change called for by Marcuse, it will be argued in this thesis that 
change is no longer a theoretical or philosophical option for the supposed betterment of society, but 
a practical necessity if civilisation is to continue to flourish into either the short or long term future. 
Added to the various antinomies that Marcuse described as inherent to the current arrangement, 
technology as a whole can no longer be defined as merely the primary means by which humans 
secure themselves against nature's dictates, but has emerged as a threat to the relative stability of the 
biosphere – and therefore ourselves. Restoring an exploited and decimated environment for the 
welfare of future generations therefore appears to entail a reassessment of the capitalist direction of 
technology, and what is more, this requires a philosophical approach to the subject which is not 
merely concerned with the development or nature of technics or its various 'impacts', but one which 
acknowledges the implications of its commodity status. As it will be the aim to show, this was a 
defining element of Marcuse's philosophy of technology which contributes to its continual 
relevance to questions pertaining to the human technological mediation of the environment. 
Marcuse tracked the implications of technological development through its major period of advance 
from the industrial revolution through to the twentieth century, a time in which the reciprocal 
relation between technology, science and economics became all the more integrated, and eventually 
"bent to the requirements of capitalism."13 During the mid-twentieth century onwards, the appeal of 
Marxism as an approach to history and politics began to diminish in public and political domains 
and then later in the academy, fuelled chiefly by the poor examples provided by "actually-existing 
socialism",14 that "enemy who would have to be invented if he did not exist".15 As Marcuse 
believed, actually-existing-socialism provided few practical or ethical alternatives, but instead 
served to stabilise and enforce the moral righteousness as well as the budgets of capitalist society. 
12 See for example, Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 7.
13 Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972a), p. 60.
14 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 193.
15 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 84.
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By the mid-twentieth century, capitalism's increasing dominance of technological development had 
paved the way to a notion of the Good Life in which happiness increasingly came to be defined in 
terms amenable to the 'technologically rational' values of quantification and efficiency, and the 
overwhelming quantities of material goods made available in the twentieth century provided 
obvious lubrication for the dismissal of such calls as Marcuse's "Great Refusal" to utopian 
speculation.16 For example, in an early essay which discussed the differences between the dominant 
positivist philosophy of the time and critical theory, Marcuse commented that the latter derived 
...its goals from present tendencies of the social process. Therefore it has no fear of the utopia 
that the new order is denounced as being. When truth cannot be realised in the established 
social order, it always appears to the latter as mere utopia (…) critical theory preserves 
obstinacy as a genuine quality of philosophical thought.17 
Despite his revisionary Marxian approach to such questions, looming environmental problems have 
now arguably provided reason to ask them once again. Although he paid significant attention to 
humanity's anthropological status in relation to productive activity, Marcuse himself only began to 
discuss the status of the environment to any significant extent late in his career.18 Yet due to the lack 
of scientific evidence at the time that global biospheric limitations were in danger of being 
breached, this should not necessarily be seen as a shortcoming. Today, economic growth at the 
national, international, as well as individual and regional levels cannot continue at present rates into 
perpetuity; to consider otherwise itself appears highly utopian if all faith is placed in offsetting its 
environmental impacts with rises in green innovation and efficiency. Hence, this fundamental 
problem – the overshoot of the planetary resource base – will form the background to this thesis, as 
it inescapably implicates technology both as cause and potential cure, therefore adding practical 
necessity to the already significant list of reasons Marcuse already provided to countenance 
alternatives. The welfare of the biosphere must be understood in terms of its preconditional status as 
the fundamental ground of economics, politics, human and non-human life in general, yet the 
current manifestations of capitalist systems – to the extent it they are dependent upon the "growth 
imperative", appears not merely oblivious, but even antithetical to this foundational contention. For 
Marcuse, liberatory change was possible and necessary now; authentic qualitative change could 
occur come the establishment of “essentially different forms of human existence, with a new social 
16 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 259.
17 Marcuse, op.cit. (1937), p. 143.
18 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b); 'Nature and Revolution' in Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), pp. 59-78; The Aesthetic 
Dimension, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), and Marcuse, op.cit. (1979).
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division of labour, new modes of control over the productive process, a new morality, etc.”19 As he 
wrote: “...without an objectively justifiable goal of a better, a freer human existence, all liberation 
must remain meaningless – at best, progress under servitude.”20 Hence, Marcuse long contended 
that the goal of liberation was a practically feasible prospect despite his otherwise pessimistic 
description of the current arrangement, one which he characterised in typically strong terms:  
We live and die rationally and productively. We know that destruction is the price of progress 
as death is the price of life, that renunciation and toil are the prerequisites for gratification and 
joy, that business must go on, and that the alternatives are utopian. This ideology belongs to 
the established societal apparatus; it is a requisite for its continuous functioning and part of its 
rationality.21 
Despite  his  clear  insistence  that  the  preservation  of  the  established  system  necessitates  any 
alternatives to itself be considered or treated as utopian, the following will contend that even in his 
most pessimistic writings, Marcuse held out hope for the possibility of  actual  alternatives to the 
current  economic,  socio-political  status  quo  and  that  the  possibility  of  change  was  not  just  a 
“theoretical medium of critique”,22 but, in his own words: “the negative, unwritten, unenforceable 
right of transcendence which is part of the very existence of man in history”.23 Again, the practical 
problems resulting from the environmental crisis only serve to underline the necessity for change, 
for  they  stand  to  undermine  the  potential  for  civilisation  to  continue  to  flourish;  Marcuse’s 
explanation for this arguably shows that the traditional ends ascribed to technics are reversed under 
their current direction, no longer necessarily oriented toward the long-term future, but the short-
term present; no longer  aimed toward securing life in an indifferent nature, but exploiting both for 
profits.  Of  course,  Marcuse's  vision  of  qualitative  change  was  distinctly  socialist  in  political 
orientation, which takes the discussion to the influence Marxian theory played upon his thought, 
specifically that of the concept of human nature illustrated by the young Marx in the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts  of  1844,  which Marcuse claimed represented a “crucial  event in the 
history of Marxist studies” and placed the “discussions about the origins and original meaning of 
historical materialism, and the entire history of 'scientific socialism', on a new footing.”24 Therefore, 
19 Marcuse, (1961), 'The Problem of Social Change in the Technological Society', in Towards a Critical Theory of  
Society: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse vol.2, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 37. 
20 Marcuse, op.cit. (1967b), p. 76.
21 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 149.
22 Bundschuh, op.cit. (2004), p. 157. 
23 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 71.
24 Marcuse, (1932), 'New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism', in Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism,  
edited by R. Wolin and J. Abromeit, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 86.
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the discussion which follows aims to describe the roots of Marcuse's theory of technology in Marx's 
anthropological  theory  of  human  nature  which  the  latter  contended  was  founded  in  human 
instrumental,  productive activity.  Through such activity,  the  potential  of  humanity comes  to  be 
objectified in material-social reality, giving shape and form to ideas, plans and intentions that – 
without their objective instantiation, remain inert and ideal. For Marx – as well as for Marcuse – 
technology appeared as the literal embodiment of human instrumental potential, however, for better 
or worse, the cost such a stance consists in the reduction of the natural environment or 'first nature'25 
to  a  mere  instrument  for  human  manipulation,  and  the  relegation  of  labour  to  preconceived 
routines.26 Although this appears characteristic of the views of Marx, Marcuse himself took a quite 
different approach by offering a philosophical means by which first nature might come to be treated 
as another subject.27 Before more can be added to this contention, the philosophical-anthropological 
foundations of the Marxian theory in which labour plays a central role in constituting the human 
condition  will  be  described  before  moving  to  discuss  the  concept  of  the  alienation  that  both 
Marcuse and Marx concluded were the necessary accompaniment of capitalism. In general,  the 
Marxian theory will be understood in accordance with Marcuse's understanding of the term as a 
critique and "analysis – political, sociological, and economic – of capitalism".28
25 For a discussion of Marx's distinction between "first" and "second nature", see P. Hay, Main Currents in Western  
Environmental Thought, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), pp. 20-21.
26 On Marcuse's view of the "continuity of domination" in the work-world, see Feenberg, op.cit. (2002), p. 88.
27 See chapter 2 of Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a). 
28 Marcuse, (1969c), 'Interview with Dr. Herbert Marcuse by Harold Keen', in The New Left and the 1960s: The 
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p.128. See also F. 




The Marxian Foundations of Marcusean Philosophy of Technology
This chapter will articulate the Marxian foundations of Marcuse's philosophy of technology. It will 
stress that rather that viewing Marx's work as a science of history and or a "materialist" account of 
inexorable social changes, Marcuse utilised it reflexively as a methodology which remained 
applicable to the critique of advanced industrial society.  
Labour and Nature: Marxian Philosophical Anthropology
Amongst the various figures who played a prominent influence on the wider aspects of Marcuse's 
thought, in the context of technology and nature, his chief influence arguably remains the work of 
Marx. It is important to note that Marcuse was hardly an 'orthodox' Marxist thinker, nor a 
'communist', so a few words on his revisionary approach to the Marxian theory will now be 
provided. 
Whilst Marcuse identified himself primarily as a Marxist thinker, he drew on many other influences 
– from Hegel and Freud, Lukács, Weber and Heidegger – to his Frankfurt School colleagues in 
forming the wider system of his 'neo-Marxian' social philosophy. Marcuse remained unconvinced 
by the fashionable dismissals of the validity of many of Marx's central contentions. In a little-
known paper, he systematically defended his adherence to what he took as the five key elements of 
the theory: 
1. In capitalism the social relationships among men are governed by exchange value rather 
than use value of the goods and services they produce, that is to say their position is 
governed by their marketibility.
2. In this exchange society, the satisfaction of human needs occurs only as a by-product of 
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profitable production.
3. In the progress of capitalism, a twofold contradiction develops: between (a) the growing 
productivity of labour and the ever growing social wealth on the one side, and their 
repressive and destructive use on the other; and (b) between the social character of the 
means of production (no longer individual but collective instruments of labour) and their 
private ownership and control.
4. Capitalism can solve this contradiction only temporarily through increasing waste, luxury 
and destruction of productive forces. The competitive drive for armament production profit 
leads to a vast concentration of economic power, aggressive expansion abroad, conflicts 
with other imperialist powers and finally to a recurrent cycle of war and depression. 
5. This cycle can be broken only if the labouring classes, who bear the brunt of exploitation, 
seize the productive apparatus and bring it under the collective control of the producers 
themselves. I submit that all these propositions with the exception of the last one seem to be 
corroborated by the factual development. The last proposition refers to the advanced 
industrial countries where the transition to socialism was to take place, and precisely in 
these countries, the labouring classes are in no sense a revolutionary potential.1
Despite Marcuse's contention that the most "fundamental notions" of Marx's analysis had been 
"validated", he was hardly so blinkered as to ignore history's pendulum, which had swung heavily 
against the purported scientific validity of the view by the early to mid-twentieth century. It was this 
ultimate concern with practical socio-historical reality that led him to revise certain aspects of 
Marx's view: for example, the degradation and brutality of the majority of communist states by the 
latter half of the twentieth century appeared to invalidate Marxism as an approach to revolutionary 
politics, and the amelioration of the affluent working classes of the liberal democratic, capitalist 
societies had appeared to sharply diminish the fervor for revolutionary action. Hence, Marcuse 
recognised no single “class” or group as the gravediggers of capitalism, and – to his credit – 
rejected perhaps the most fatal mistake of actually-existing-socialism, the “seizure of power” or 
"dictatorship of the proletariat" brought on by a particular revolutionary group, almost all past 
attempts at which had resulted in mass-slaughter, starvation, terror, or combinations thereof.2 
1 Marcuse, (1967d), 'The Obsolescence of Marxism?' in Marx and the Western World, edited by N. Lobkowicz, (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp.409-410. (Emphasis added). 
2 See for example Douglas Kellner's introduction to the second edition of One-Dimensional Man, p. xxv.
29
Therefore, despite holding out hope for a "world-historical" revolution, Marcuse himself admitted 
that, in the absence of a revolutionary class consciousness, “...strategy is no longer guided by this 
notion.”3 This crisis prompted some Marxist thinkers toward increasingly militant, dogmatic, or 
extraneous reactions, with some leaning toward textural orthodoxy, and others toward the so-called 
"cleavage thesis" supposedly constituted by the “epistemological break” separating the thought of 
Marx into two distinct periods, the philosophical discussions of his youth, and the more 
scientifically inclined political-economic works such as Capital later in his career.4 Contrary to such 
views, Marcuse's approach to Marxism may be called 'instrumental'. He apprehended it as a 
methodological approach to history, a set of conceptual tools which could continue to be utilised in 
the critique of capitalism. For Marcuse then, Marxism was neither an economic, nor predictive, nor 
... a scientific theory, a system of truth whose significance lies alone in its correctness as a 
knowledge, but a theory of social activity and historical action. Marxism is the theory of 
proletarian revolution and the revolutionary critique of bourgeois society.5 
Marcuse's work can therefore be understood as an “extremely critical, speculative and idiosyncratic 
version of Marxism” which attempts to “restore its liberating promises and hopes” as well as to 
“preserve its emancipatory possibilities in the face of its failure as a theory of revolutionary 
politics.”6 Having briefly articulated Marcuse's approach to the Marxian theory in general, the 
discussion now turns to a more specific theme, that of the philosophical-anthropological view of the 
'young' Marx as presented in the Economical and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,7 and the 
continuing influence they played over the duration of Marcuse's thought on technology and nature. 
The technological implications of the Marxian influence will be made evident shortly, but the 
consequences of this influence for Marcuse's theory of nature will be dealt with later on. 
As it should be noted, in the works of his maturity, Marx tended to drop such ontological terms as 
'essence' (Wesen) from his discussions in favor of a more 'scientific' or materialistic tone, yet 
Marcuse's view of the Manuscripts of 1844 (a work which he was amongst the first to publish a 
3 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 79.
4 L. Althusser, (1965), For Marx, translated by Ben Brewster, (London: Allen Lane, 1969). See also Kellner,op.cit.
(1984), p. 79.
5 Marcuse, quoted in D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), p. 39.
6 Kellner, ibid. (1984), pp. 4-5. 
7 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, in E. Fromm, (1961), Marx's Concept of Man, (New York: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 78-150.
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lengthy review),8 appeared to confirm his suspicion that the presence of such concepts remained in 
Marx's later works by implication.9 In the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx provided a philosophical-
anthropological approach to human nature by arguing for the centrality of productive activity 
(specifically labour). As Marcuse's Frankfurt School colleague, Erich Fromm wrote, “Marx did not 
believe, as do many contemporary sociologists and psychologists, that there is no such thing as a 
nature of man; that man at birth is like a blank sheet of paper, on which the culture writes its text.”10 
Broadly put, Marcuse shared with Marx the idea that the concept of 'human nature' was neither an 
abstraction, nor a conceptual or social construct, deployed as a justification or legitimisation of 
power and authority.11 Nor for either thinker was the concept of human nature confined to purely 
“scholarly” or theoretical interest, but was a topic of the utmost practical importance.12 Marx's 
philosophical-anthropological description of human nature in the 1844 Manuscripts illustrates an 
agent cognisant of its productive capacities which play the primary role in building its world, but 
this is not to reduce the human to Homo fabre, whose activities are thereby compounded into either 
purely instrumental or economic activities. Nor on Marx's account can human nature be viewed as 
existing apart from that of the material environment it is confronted with – on the contrary – as an 
early devotee of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species,13 he was well aware of the role environmental 
exigencies had played in the development of humanity, as well as the significance of labour in 
coping and adapting to them. Hence, for Marx, it is through the imposition of the pre-existing 
exigencies of first nature that humanity is spurred to realise its fundamental means of objective 
expression, with this constituted in what begins as an intermediary medium the human places 
between herself and the indifferent dictates of a generally hostile environment. Much later in human 
history this 'buffer' or "technological membrane"14 will come to encompass the globe almost in its 
entirety, appearing to place the starkness of first nature at a distance from increasingly many 
8 Marcuse, (1932) 'New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism', in Heideggerian Marxism, edited by J. 
Abromeit and R. Wolin, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 87-121. 
9 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p.95. See also E. Fromm, (1961), Marx's Concept of Man, (New York: Continuum, 2004), 
pp. 41-42.
10 Fromm, op.cit. (2004), p. 23.
11 As it will be seen, this aspect of Marx's view – largely uncritically adopted by Marcuse – opens up various 
problems. See for example, S. Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996). 
12 See Marx's 'Theses on Feuerbach' part II, in J. Elster (ed.), Karl Marx: A Reader, (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Press, 1986), p. 21.
13 As Frances Wheen writes, "Marx and Darwin were the two most revolutionary and influential thinkers of the 
nineteenth century; and since they lived only twenty miles apart for much of their adult lives, with several 
acquaintances in common, the temptation to search for a missing link is hard to resist." Friedrich Engels was also 
apparently convinced that "Just as Darwin discovered the law of evolution in human nature, so Marx discovered the 
law of evolution in human history." See F. Wheen, Karl Marx, (London: Fourth Estate, 1999), p. 364. For an early 
discussion of Marx and Darwin, see the 1909 pamphlet by A. Pannekoek, 'Darwinism and Marxism', translated by 
N. Weiser, (Chicago: Copyright Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1912). 
14 The term is owed to A. Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1945).
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humans, but for the moment it is sufficient to note that both Marx and Marcuse understood that the 
origins of technical mediation lay in the expediency and pragmatism characteristic of a distant 
epoch of human development, not yet conditioned by the convention of exchange value. It therefore 
appears that the early foundations of Marx's theory of human nature are not merely economic, but 
technical and anthropological. As Morton Schoolman notes in his description of Marcuse's early 
reaction to the 1844 Manuscripts: 
Marx's theory is improperly understood if its basis is thought to be economic. Marx, Marcuse 
is claiming, did not intend a theory of historical or economic determinism, nor would Marx 
have approved of any politics rooted in such a theory. Historical materialism is not crude 
historicism. It is not, in other words, a theory that maintains that history develops according to 
rigid economic laws that establish socialism as its necessary and inevitable outcome. Marx's 
theory, in fact, has a philosophical foundation that opposes all such interpretations of 
materialism.15 
As Marx later elaborated, with the exception of societies undivided by class, individuals come to be 
ordered under particular historical forms of social organisation based upon social labour and 
communicative relations and emerges “within a given framework of specific, historically 
determined, social relations of production... 
These social relations of production determine in the last analysis all other social relations, 
including those of social communication. It is social existence which determines social 
consciousness and not the other way around.16 
Whilst Marx's inversion of the Hegelian dialectic and the significance of labour as a central 
category for both thinkers will not be entered into here,17 what should be noted is that Marx 
conceived of history as being comprised by a number of different modes of production which 
“characterise the articulation, within a given historical period, of social relations and forces of 
production.”18 In the Marxian theory, tools, factories, assorted technical artifacts, human and non-
15 M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse, (New York: The Free Press, 1980), 
p. 22.
16 E. Mandel, 'Historical Materialism', in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman, (eds.), Marxian Economics, (London: 
1990), p. 4.
17 Marcuse explores these themes and others in his Reason and Revolution: An Introduction to the Dialectical thinking  
of Hegel and Marx, 2nd ed., (New York, Humanities Press, 1954).
18 D. Macey, The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory, (London: Penguin, 2000), p. 257.
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human labour constitute the 'means of production', with the 'relations of production' defined as the 
totality of relationships which individuals must necessarily enter into in order to maintain and 
reproduce their ways of life. The concept of the mode of production therefore encompasses both 
labour-power, the means of production and the social and technical relations of production which 
are shaped by the particular form the mode may assume, with the 'shape' itself being strongly 
contingent upon technoscientific advance and proliferation, environmental exigency, and so on. As 
Schoolman continues, in the historically specific context of modern capitalism, “it is within the 
context of an analysis of alienated labour and private property in the 1844 Manuscripts that 
Marcuse demonstrates that labour as such is the central category of Marx's theory.”19 By 'central 
category' what is meant is that – according to Marx – all productive activity ultimately derives from 
individual and communal instrumental activity, but that this very activity is shaped and informed by 
the particular mode of production in place. The mode of production cannot be changed 
qualitatively, but only quantitatively through piecemeal adjustment from within. Yet, the mode can 
be rendered obsolete if faced with contradictions arising through the growth and / or advancement 
of the productive forces it may (or may not) foster and permit. Even today, examples of this 
tendency are quite evident. As it only seems fair to acknowledge, technoscientific advance (or at 
least, many forms of it) is widely encouraged under consumer-capitalism, and some indications 
point toward it being the only force always one-step ahead of the power to direct it. With the rise of 
accessible, affordable and increasingly powerful arrays of networked computers, digitisation, etc., 
certain forces have recently emerged that – without banning the internet per se – appear to be 
beyond its means of containment.20 In the same way, Marx argues, the social relations which 
typically held under certain forms of feudalism became largely redundant through the onset of 
industrialisation; “the relationship between lord and vassal, which implies both servility on the part 
of the vassal and obligations on the part of the lord, thus gives way to social relations based upon 
the exchange of labour-power for a wage.”21   
Embodied in the productive activities of self-conscious agents, the significance and distinctiveness 
of human nature is worked out or “objectified” in instrumental practices (i.e. labour).22 As Marcuse 
19 Schoolman, op.cit. (1980), p. 22. It should be noted that – human labour and productive capacities appear to be of 
sufficient importance to Marx (and ipso facto Marcuse) to constitute an ontological distinction between the 
instrumental capacities of human and non-human animals. See Marx's comments in 'The Labour-Process or the 
Production of Use-Values', in Capital, (1867), vol.1, part 3, chapter 7, (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 284.
20 For an overview of implications of the internet for copyright infringement, intellectual property, etc., see J. Clough, 
Principles of Cybercrime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
21 Macey, op.cit. (2000), p. 183.
22 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932b), p. 102. Marcuse is quoting Marx's 'First Manuscript'; op.cit. (1932), p. 84.
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understood, Marx's concept of human nature was intended to be a naturalistic, humanistic one,23 
one in which “the naturalism of man and the humanism of nature” are “brought to fulfillment”.24 To 
reiterate: for Marx, human history itself is constituted in what begins as a series of generally 
isolated struggles with first nature, and as technical capacities advance, the possible modes and 
relations of production alter and widen in scope. Just as this approach cannot be reduced to 
economic activity in isolation, neither can it be reduced to technological determinism, as in the final 
analysis, technology ultimately remains the tool of human agents, even if the industrial revolution 
of Marx's time conferred most of the control and ownership of the means of production to the 
bourgeois capitalists. Hence, the totality of relations and interactions ultimately emerge from the 
necessary exertion of human labour power: 
...labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, through 
his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between himself and nature. 
He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He sets in motion the natural forces 
which belong to his own body, his arms, legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate the 
materials of nature in a form adapted to his own needs.25
Far from nature being a social construct, as Marx and Marcuse appear to contend, humanity initially 
only imposes its manipulative powers on nature as a result of our own (natural) instinct toward 
survival. It is not humanity that constitutes nature, but first nature that (originally) constitutes 
humanity; like other species we are compelled to act on it out of expediency. A seemingly basic 
point that will become crucial both to Marcuse's philosophy of technology as well as the current 
argument is this ensemble understanding of productive activity which Marcuse appropriates from 
Marx. Although it may appear a trivial point, given its anthropological basis, technical mediation 
cannot be separated from the actions, whims and intentions of its human creators, despite Marcuse's 
admission that “at the present stage (humanity) is perhaps more powerless over his own apparatus 
than he ever was before,” but nor can it be understood in isolation from its contingent 
environmental base.26 In the context of the young Marx's early approach to technics, productive 
capacities are not just linked to human nature, they constitute its objective embodiment, and are 
founded out of the basic necessity for survival. For Marx and Marcuse as much as for Marshall 
McLuhan, technical artifacts are not simply instruments, but augmentations or extensions of human 
23 Marcuse, ibid. (1932b), p. 97.
24 Marx, cited in P. Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), p. 264.
25 Marx, (1867), Capital vol.1, part 3, chapter 7:1. (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), p. 283. 
26 Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 240.
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physical and cognitive powers, ideas and intentions, in effect, the crystalisation of labour.27 Yet 
neither Marx nor Marcuse went so far as McLuhan and others in attributing autonomy to the 
technical phenomenon, a topic that will be taken up later in this thesis.28 On the contrary – Marx and 
Marcuse offered an arguably more nuanced, semi-archaeological approach; technics are not the 
free-floating, 'hyperreal' entities certain philosophers of a postmodern persuasion have claimed,29 
rather, their 'meaning' can be apprehended from knowledge of their functional workings; as Daniel 
Dennett wrote, “a wagon with spoked wheels carries not only grain or freight from place to place; it 
carries the brilliant idea of a wagon with spoked wheels from mind to mind.”30 Contrary to some 
accounts of technics that will be critically discussed later in this thesis, much can be told about the 
intentions, capacities, and even psychological, cultural or religious inclinations of a society through 
their instantiation in technical artifacts. As such, just as the archaeologist “reads” from ancient 
remains in order to gain a semblance of an understanding of the culture that produced it, for Marx 
and Marcuse, the means of production and the intentions and determinants which shaped their 
production are similarly legible. As Marx wrote in the 1844 Manuscripts “It can be seen that the 
history of industry and industry as it objectively exists is an open book of the human faculties, and a 
human psychology which can be sensuously apprehended”.31 In Capital, he adds: “...relics of 
bygone instruments of labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economic 
forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals.32 
For Marx and Marcuse then, technical capacities are not merely one amongst other human faculties 
that may discern them from non-human animals, but are fundamentally constitutive of what it 
means to be human. They are integral not just in production, but in making the world intelligible 
and therefore manipulable in manifold fashions. Marx inherited from Hegel the view that labour is 
“the act of man's self-creation”;33 hence, labour is the essential human activity, as through its 
27 For McLuhan's views, see his 1964 work, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (London: Routledge, 
2007).
28 For discussions of 'autonomous technology and technological determinism, see R. Heilbroner, (1967) 'Do Machines 
Make History?' in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, edited by R.C. Scharff & V. Dusek 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 398-404; L. Winner (1977), Autonomous Technology: Technics Out of Control as a  
Theme in Political Thought, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press). For a critique of Marx as a technological 
determinist, see B. Bimber, 'Three Faces of Technological Determinism' and the other essays collected in Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, edited by M.R. Smith and L. Marx 
(Boston: The MIT Press, 1994), pp. 79-100. Chapter seven of this thesis will undertake a critique of autonomous 
theories of technology 
29 See J. Baudrillard, 'Simulacra and Simulation' in Selected Writings, edited by M. Poster, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 166-184. 
30 D.C. Dennett, Darwins's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, (London: Penguin,1995), p. 348.
31 Marx, op.cit. (1932), p. 109.
32 Marx, op.cit. (1867), part 3, chapter 7:1, p. 286. 
33 Quoted in Fromm, op.cit. (2004), p. 32.
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engagement, the “Promethean drive”34 of humanity is made manifest in the operations of the means 
of production. “Man” (i.e., human agents, persons), thereby reveals itself as a “species being (…) a 
being that has the “species” (his own and that of the rest of being) as its object”.35 As a species 
being, humans have the ability “... to relate to the 'general' aspect of objects and to the possibilities 
contained therein. Specifically human freedom has its roots in man's ability to relate to his own 
species; the self-realization and 'self-creation' of man.”36 Technology is therefore not simply cast as 
a determinant of human life, but in its essence is a liberating force, a creator of opportunity and a 
means of freeing humanity from toil and hardship. Through engaging in technical mediation, the 
individual species being
...is not limited to the particular, actual state of the being and his immediate relationship to it, 
but he can take the being as it is in its essence beyond its immediate, particular state. He can 
recognize and grasp the possibilities contained in every being. He can exploit, alter, mold, 
treat, and take further (“produce”) any being according to its “inherent standard”.37 
As Marcuse regularly reminds us, at the earliest stage of human development and the latest, it 
remains a truth that technics appears ideally aimed toward the betterment of life and human 
flourishing. However, late in the history of the development of its productive potential, the end of 
the “prehistory” of humanity;38 a world no longer defined by necessary labour becomes 
conceivable, specifically due to increases and advances in technological automation, a point of 
particular importance to Marcuse. At this point, humanity seemingly cannot help but realise its 
essential activity and goals, which it does by making the world and others available to itself as 
object; “by using his 'essential powers' to produce an 'external,' 'material,' objective world”.39 Once 
again, this view broadly dovetails with the high value Marcuse placed in human potential. In the 
intentional, planned instrumental manipulation of the environment, humanity does not just 'make its 
way' through the world, but makes this activity itself into its essential project, conducting its work 
amid and within the natural environment in ways which both imitate the capacities of many non-
human animals, but also exceed them to the extent that an exposed, naked and comparably fragile 
primate now utterly dominates the planet in its entirety. As a result, human beings appear to resist 
34 This term is owed to A. Wood, who uses it in his discussion of Marx's philosophy in The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, edited by T. Honderich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 524.
35 See Abromeit's 'Glossary' in Abromeit and Wolin, op.cit. (2005), p. 186.
36 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 96.
37 Marcuse, ibid. (1932).
38 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 45. Marcuse is referring to Marx's comment in 'Preface to a contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy', (1859), translated by T.P. Bottomore, included in Fromm (2004), p. 169.
39 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 94
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fitting themselves into specific environmental niches, instead they engage in what John Livingston 
referred to as “self-domestication”:40 they adapt the niches in accordance with their own standards 
and intentions rather than the other way around; humans do not simply 'see' or 'witness' the object or 
other “in-itself” as a closed prospect, but in the context of immediate practicality, they do not care, 
nor need to. For example, the human sees in a fallen stick the potential for assisted walking or for 
delving into crevices one may not wish to place a hand or finger in, or in terms of its potential as a 
weapon, or its aesthetic value. To be sure, the Chimpanzee may envision something similar, but, 
through their comparative propensity for cognitive abstraction, only modern H. sapiens have 
assigned their technical artifacts monetary or exchange value. The development of human technics 
can therefore be conducted under the incentive of a symbolic convention rather than immediate 
instrumental necessity. It is precisely this evolutionarily 'novel' capacity that has now extended to 
order technology on a truly global scope, and will be of the utmost importance in this thesis.  
Although exploring the topic in detail is beyond the scope of the current thesis, it should be 
acknowledged that Marx's approach (and subsequently, Marcuse's) carries with it the strong 
implication of human-exceptionalism. Of course, in Marx's time, anthropocentric views were hardly 
uncommon, nor necessarily insensible, but a strong resistance to such views is very common in 
modern ecophilosophy, despite the arguments of various critics.41 Although he later discussed the 
differences between human and non-human labour and technical capacities (i.e., their apparently 
instrumental manipulation of external nature),42 for example, by arguing that “the animal is one with 
its life activity. It does not distinguish the activity from itself. It is its activity. But man makes his 
life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness...”, that Marx's well-documented 
anthropocentrism does not necessarily entail that the human technical mediation of the environment 
40 See J. Livingston, Rogue Primate: An Exploration of Human Domestication, (Ontario: Key Porter Books, 1994). 
41 Discussions of 'ecocentrism' and anthropocentrism form a significant part of various schools of modern 
environmental philosophy, especially Deep Ecology and more radical approaches such as anarcho-primitivism. 
Whilst a complete list of this debate is beyond the current scope, a historical overview of the debate is offered by G. 
Sessions, (1991), 'Ecocentrism and the Anthropocentric Detour', in Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, (London: 
Shambhala, 1995), pp. 156-183. Some prominent critiques of anthropocentrism arguably include A. Leopold V. 
Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, (London: Routledge, 1993); D. Foreman, Confessions of an Eco-
Warrior, (New York: Crown, 1993), and R. and V. Routley, (1980), 'Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics', 
in Environmental Philosophy, edited by D.S. Mannison, M McRobbie and R. Routley, (Canberra: ANU Research 
School of Social Sciences, 1980), pp. 96-189. On the other side of the debate, see for example Livingston, op.cit.
(1994); 'The Fallacy of Wildlife Conservation', (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1981); and more recent 'Gaian' 
approaches such as J. Lovelock, The Revenge of Gaia: Why the Earth is Fighting Back – and How We Can Still  
Save Humanity, (Santa Barbara: Allen Lane, 2006); and The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning, (London: 
Allen Lane, 2009). 
42 Some may object to my use of the term 'instrumental' in the context of bodily and external (i.e. 'technical') 
behaviours carried out by non-human animals. Nevertheless, the  modern scientific approaches – from physiology to 
ethology – apprehend nature in the language of 'technical' functionality; hearts are 'organs' which 'function' to 
circulate blood, wings are 'designed' to assist flight, etc. On this topic, see T. Lewens, Organisms and Artifacts:  
Design in Nature and Elsewhere, (London: Routledge, 2005). 
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is not novel and unprecedented in an evolutionary context.43 Marcuse elaborates this position in his 
essay on the 1844 Manuscripts:
...man relates to himself and to the object of his labour; he is not directly one with his labour 
but can, as it were, confront it and oppose it (through which, as we shall see, human labour is 
fundamentally distinguished as 'universal' and 'free' production from the 'unmediated' 
production of, for example, the nest-building animal).44  
In its productive activities, humanity is not just compelled to produce on the basis of the binding 
incentives of nature's indifference; “...man cannot simply accept the objective world or merely come 
to terms with it”,45 but reflects, reacts, and imagines. Within the context of at first glacial, and then 
in very recent human history, an explosive 'globalised' expansion of technics and human life across 
geographical and temporal divides; the objectification and instrumentalisation of first nature has 
greatly increased in its extent, so much so that, in many of the advanced industrial nations, 'second 
nature' almost completely obscures the first, physically, culturally and intellectually.46 Yet, before 
the implications of this contention can be explored in more detail, it is sufficient at this point to note 
that Marcuse avoids both dogmatic adherence to an interpretation of the the Marxian texts as a 
sophisticated form of technological or economic determinism. Instead, he chose to utilise them as 
methodological and conceptual tools; an array of critical methodologies and 'decisive concepts' 
rather than a “dogma or system of absolute knowledge”. As such, Marcuse's utilisation of the 
anthropological basis of Marxian theory arguably represents a formidable theoretical and practical 
toolkit by which to investigate the modern technological condition.47 His willingness to critically 
reform the Marxian project in response to changing social and historical conditions appears to be 
strongly influenced by his reading of the 1844 Manuscripts which, while not attempting to 
constitute a totalised, 'grand narrative' approach to the human condition, nevertheless remains a 
multifaceted, versatile, and revisable “synthesis of philosophy, political economy and revolutionary 
social theory”48 which could be brought to bear on modern social reality – especially the topics of 
technology and the environment – given they are sufficiently fluid to invite revision in line with 
changing circumstances:   
43 Marx, op.cit. (1932), p. 84.
44 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 94.
45 Marcuse, ibid. (1932), p. 96.
46 Evidently, Marx was already of this opinion even in the nineteenth century. See the comments in Hay, op.cit.(2005), 
pp. 21-22. For a more extreme version of this view, see B. McKibben, The End of Nature, (London: Penguin-Viking, 
1990); and Eaarth: Making Life on a Tough New Planet, (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2010). 
47 Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 5.
48 Kellner, ibid. (1984), p. 77.
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Because the Marxian concepts are historical, all of the concepts used to describe eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century capitalism cannot obviously be used to describe twentieth-century 
capitalism; consequently, for Marcuse, Marxist theory and practice require constant 
reconstruction to keep in touch with the changes in the historical situation.49
This is not to say that Marx's philosophical-anthropology – and its largely implied theory of nature 
– are devoid of problems.50 This particular topic will be dealt with in a later chapter, prior to this, 
the implication that the construction of the life world – 'second nature' – must be apprehended as a 
form of objectification, and the primordial form of “alienation”. Although there have been, and may 
yet be alternative modes of production which provide different means and relations of production, 
according to Marx's philosophical-anthropological account, a certain level of alienation and 
objectification per se are unavoidable conditions of humanity's essential “species nature”. Humans 
can only but live out their collective intentions in material, sensuous forms, and this necessarily 
requires apprehending first nature in instrumental terms. As Hay summarises: “'First' nature was 
'prior' nature, unmediated nature, and it was this upon which human labour worked to produce 
'second' nature, which can thus be defined as the product of social interaction with first nature.”51 
This original form of estrangement cannot be overcome or sublated; only a particular historical 
form of objectification – alienation – can and, according to Marx and Marcuse – ought to be 
overcome.52 As will be described in more detail below, the source of Marcuse's pessimism regarding 
the advanced industrial societies can arguably be drawn out by focussing on the particular 
incentives that guide and motivate the means of production. In other words, almost the entirety of 
Marcuse's career is defined by his continual critique of the mode of production of capitalism and its 
dominant influence over the means and relations of production which both he and Marx held to be 
not simply an unjust or unethical arrangement, but a peculiarly alienating scheme. It is to this topic 
that the discussion will now briefly turn, before moving away from Marx to delineate Marcuse's 
thought on technology in more detail. 
49 Kellner, ibid. (1984), p. 297. 
50 On this topic, see Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996). 
51 Hay, op.cit. (2005), p. 21. 
52 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 97.
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Alienation 
Having noted Marx's philosophical-anthropological view of the human as a technical, labouring 
being, the means by which humanity comes to be displaced and "alienated" from their "essential 
species activity" must be addressed. To begin, the concept of alienation will be delineated in 
relation to Marcuse's critical-social theory, which will preface a discussion of Marcuse's philosophy 
of technology in detail. What follows will also aim to preliminarily distinguish Marcusean 
philosophy of technology from rival views on the basis of its sophisticated grasp of the position of 
human agency in relation to both technology and first nature.   
   
In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel conceived of alienation in terms of the “unhappy 
consciousness”, a stage in the freedom of self-consciousness that emerges subsequent to the master-
slave relation.53 The unhappy consciousness is said to consist in a misunderstood Christian 
religiosity and a penchant for the ideal, which experiences the human self as empty and worthless, 
its value contingent upon an other-worldly, supernatural beyond. In characteristic fashion, Marx 
upended this contention, by attempting to place it in the lived experience of concrete social 
conditions by arguing that alienation was a direct and necessary result of the capitalist mode of 
production.54 It remains possible for the human being's essential position in relation to the prosthetic 
life-world to undergo a decisive shift in orientation, a shift that leads the prosthesis itself to appear 
“...as a precondition of (human) being that does not belong to his being, that is beyond his control, 
and that is 'overpowering'”.55 The reciprocal, naturalistic material arrangement of human productive 
capacity and nature is broken, fragmenting into an oppositional configuration, antagonistic to the 
unfolding of authentic human potential. Once again, this is not to be understood as some sort of 
simplistic technological determinism by which an enigmatically non-agential, self-governing 
artifice inexorably draws human agents into its compliance, but a shift representing a deeper 
betrayal of human potential than could be alleviated with piecemeal political reform or 
redistributions of income alone. The concept of alienation thus denotes for Marx and Marcuse an 
abandonment – a convenient forgetfulness of the human prospect due to the continued dominance 
53 See G.W.F. Hegel, (1807), The Phenomenology of Spirit, B: IV, A and B, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
pp. 111-118. 
54 See Marx's 'First Manuscript', in Fromm, (1961), pp. 78-89.
55 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 98.
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of profit motives now embodied in the reified conditions of one-dimensional society.56 Marcuse's 
position here builds on György Lukács theory of reification, which has been summarised as the 
process by which “commodity fetishism, the capitalist labour system, the market, bureaucracy and 
mass media – as well as science and technology – tend to promote conformist modes of thought and 
behaviour which eradicate individuality and freedom.”57 The subsequent reification describes a 
peculiar form of objectivity associated with modern capitalism which would (later) inform the 
Frankfurt School critiques of instrumental reason and technological rationality. In short, humanity's 
essential, and characteristic productive capacity comes to be turned away from its self-augmentative 
role to a form of external domination and social control. 
In the 1844 Manuscripts, Jonathan Wolff argues that Marx described the alienation of labour in four 
forms: 
First, from the product, which as soon as it is created is taken away from its producer. Second, 
in productive activity (work) which is experienced as a torment. Third, from species-being, 
for humans produce blindly and not in accordance with their truly human powers. Finally, 
from other human beings, where the relation of exchange replaces the satisfaction of mutual 
need.58 
According to Marx, to make a living, the vast majority of modern workers must submit to goals that 
do not belong to themselves, but to external, 'alien' sources, in other words, the owners of the means 
of production. The worker is compelled to participate within this process to earn a sufficient sum of 
money in order to meet necessary needs of food, warmth, shelter, etc., with the surplus value she 
creates being acquired by the propertied classes.59 In a direct sense, the worker is forced to 
prostitute themselves through selling the only commodities they possess: their labour power and 
time, and to this extent at least, they become commodities themselves. In contrast to the “immediate 
producer's enjoyment of production as a confirmation of his or her powers,”60 the worker sells her 
labour to avoid destitution, and falls victim to the capitalist's extraction of the maximum surplus 
56 The concept of reification articulated by György Lukács continued to be a significant influence on Marcuse's critical 
social theory, but tracing its influence on his thought is beyond the present scope. Lukács illustrates the theory in his 
'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class Consciousness, (London: Merlin, 1971). 
For the influence of Lukács' on Marcuse, see Feenberg, op.cit. (2002), chapter four, and Kellner, op.cit. (1984), 
chapter two. 
57 Kellner, ibid. (1984), p. 40.
58 J. Wolff, 'Karl Marx', in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (2010). 
59 See E. Mandel, (1990), Karl Marx, chapter 7, in Marxian Economics, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate & P. 
Newman, (London: Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 1-38.
60 Wolff, op.cit. (2010).
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value permitted within the competitive fray of the “free” determinations of the market. In Marx's 
time, the worker was kept just on the boundary of providing for themselves, a position from which 
she barely had any power to extricate herself. However, were she to do so, she could be assured that 
an immense “industrial reserve army” is available to replace her – as it is not her but her labour 
which is valued as capital. Today, as such thinkers as Marcuse and Gorz note, the conditions of 
most workers (in the advanced industrial societies at least) had significantly altered for the better, 
but their increased affluence and security, their "social and cultural integration", had served 
(instrumentally) to obviate any complaints she may have had concerning her status as an 
"instrument".61 In having to sell her labour to the controlling interests of the capitalist, the worker is, 
in turn, alienated from her species-being and from relations with others which increasingly come to 
be ordered by the demands of an abstract force; instead of working together for the betterment of 
civilisation as a whole, the local community or municipality, labour (and the rest of the means and 
relations of production) are absorbed and subsumed by businesses and corporations which 
themselves compete against each other on the market for profits. The former fundamentally 
meaningful status of labour is thereby reduced to mere "work" or jobs, a system of "wage slavery" 
uncritically lauded by all sides of mainstream politics, often divisive in its competitiveness, often 
characterised by dull repetition, and oftentimes questionable in terms of its actual usefulness aside 
from generating profits for the property owners / corporate shareholders.62 
The slave is sold once and for all; the proletarian must sell himself daily and hourly. The 
individual slave, property of one master, is assured an existence, however miserable it may be, 
because of the master's interest. The individual proletarian, property as it were of the entire 
bourgeois class which buys his labour only when someone has need of it, has no secure 
existence.63 
So as to thrive, individual businesses, small or otherwise isolated capitalist enterprises come to trade 
within the international / global marketplace, all 'unified' in their division as they compete for 
profits, each driven by the preconditional necessity of turning a profit:64 “Each individual becomes a 
61 See for example Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 26; 29, and Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1972a), p. 14. 
62 See chapter 7 of Marx's 1861-63 draft manuscript: Theories of Surplus Value, 'Early Critique of the Bourgeois-
Liberal View of the "Freedom" of the Labourer', (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1923). On "wage slavery", see 
chapter 3 of André Gorz's Critique of Economic Reason, 2nd ed., (London: Verso, 1989), and M. J. Sandel, 
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy, (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1998). 
63 F. Engels, (1847), 'The Principles of Communism', in Selected Works, vol. 1, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), 
p. 83.
64 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 9.
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mere fragment or atom in the coordinated mass of the population which, separated from control of 
the means of production, creates the global surplus value,” and in the twentieth century, the 
previous gaps between “white” and “blue-collar work” are blurred if not entirely dissolved; “the 
intelligentsia plays a vital role not only in the process of material production, but also in the ever 
more scientific manipulation and regimentation of consumption and 'productive' behaviour.”65 As 
Marx put it, "...because bourgeois political economy does not have human beings and their history 
in its conceptual scheme, it is in the deepest sense not a “human science”, but is a non-human 
science of an inhuman world of things and commodities.”66 Marx 
...imagines modern machinery as a giant automaton (…) a soulless mechanism that has no 
regard for the human relations between society and nature, or for the proportions between 
body and spirit. Capitalist technology appears here as a personified and artificially reanimated 
dead body with monstrous powers.67 
“For Marx" as Fromm noted, "alienation in the process of work, from the product of work and from 
circumstances, is inseparably connected with alienation from oneself, from one's fellow man and 
from nature.”68 The human species-essence is not just founded in terms of its individual contribution 
to production, but in its communal relations with others, and its mediation of the natural 
environment. As nations industrialised, individuals came to work for causes external to themselves, 
work that continued – despite increases in automation and efficiency that could potentially lessen 
the need for labour under necessity – that today, produces not only mountains of waste, pollution 
and pointless surpluses, but is – with characteristic 'rationality' – directed toward the largest (not 
necessarily the neediest) of appetites, who also happen to be the locus at which the most profits can 
be made. The requirements of the genuinely needy therefore typically appear to come second to the 
profits that can be derived from the already wealthy.     
Alienation means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the acting agent in his 
grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, others, and he himself) remain alien to him. 
They stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own 
creation. Alienation is essentially the experiencing of the world and oneself passively, 
65 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p.12. There will be more to say about the workings of this relatively recent aspect of 
capitalist development below.
66 Marx, (1932), quoted in Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 80.
67 T. Kemple, Reading Marx Writing: Melodrama, the Market, and the “Grundrisse”, (Stanford University Press, 
1995), p. 27
68 Fromm, op.cit. (2004), p. 43.
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receptively, as the subject separated from the object.69
Marcuse continues the motif of cold, impersonal mechanisation to accentuate the tragic 
instrumentalisation of the individual, whose fundamental potential is betrayed in lieu of her 
reproduction into the form of a functional object. Infamously characterising capitalist society as a 
form of highly efficient totalitarianism, he wrote “(T)he enlarged universe of exploitation is a 
totality of machines – human, economic, political, military, educational”; the leaders and managers 
of which are “all operating in the overriding interest of the capital of the nation as a whole – the 
nation as capital, imperialist capital,”70 not in the interests of human autonomy, but under the 
misapprehension that a deferred incentive – that of profit-making – will be sufficient to 
exhaustively cater to all genuine needs. Although this makes for a quantitatively, materially rich 
society, there remains at the bottom of the social strata “ruthlessly repressed minorities”, whereas a 
comparatively small group enjoy extraordinary benefits:
At the base of the pyramid atomization prevails. It converts the entire individual – body and mind – 
into an instrument, or even part of an instrument: active or passive, productive or receptive, in 
working time and free time, he serves the system. The technical division of labour divides the 
human being itself into partial operations and functions, coordinated by the coordinators of the 
capitalist process. This technostructure of exploitation organizes a vast network of human 
instruments which produce and sustain a rich society. For unless he belongs to the ruthlessly 
suppressed minorities, the individual also benefits from this richness.71 
Characteristically, the established status quo is cast by Marcuse as an “affluent monster” and 
"obscene":
...in producing and indecently exposing a stifling abundance of wares while depriving its 
victims abroad of the necessities of life; obscene in stuffing itself and its garbage cans while 
poisoning and burning the scarce foodstuffs in the fields of its aggression; obscene in the 
words and smiles of its politicians and entertainers; in its prayers, in its ignorance, and in the 
wisdom of its kept intellectuals (…) Obscene is not the picture of a naked woman who 
exposes her pubic hair but that of a fully clad general who exposes his medals rewarded in a 
war of aggression; obscene is not the ritual of the Hippies but the declaration of a high 
69 Fromm, ibid. (2004), p. 37.
70 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 13.
71 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 14.
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dignitary of the Church that war is necessary for peace.72
Secondly, markets and businesses – especially in the affluent nations – came to be subject to 
manifold stimulatory measures emanating from the state (i.e., the taxpayer) which preserve and 
replenish the dominant status quo. This hardly represents a shift from 'consumer' to 'state 
capitalism', but the integration of each aspect into a giant unified system in which the "executives of 
the modern state" represent merely a "committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie."73 In short, work for the sake of work equates to and underpins production for the sake 
of the enlargement of production, a scheme and a social ideology that arguably fosters, produces 
and provides for the increase of more of the same; i.e. the reproduction of the capitalist system 
itself. The worker's everyday existence and aspirations come to be colonised by what Marcuse 
would later call “technologically rational” incentives, which entail instrumental values and 
quantification above all others in the technical domain which then comes to be applied to the social, 
ironically resulting in an effectively nihilistic, stultifying arrangement, ill-prepared for the potential 
biospheric consequences which continue to build as a consequence of the capitalist mode of 
production itself. Marx's description of the human as an alienated object of labour; its value limited 
to the surplus value that may be extracted from its instrumental performances, cancels other means 
of evaluation and replaces them with capitalist profit incentives of “gain, work, thrift and sobriety”74 
which, in Marx's words, “pervert” those values which defined a recently repressed, suspended 
second-dimension of social criticism.75 As he famously commented in The Communist Manifesto,  
bourgeois capitalism 
...has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash 
payment'. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous 
enthusiasm, or phillistine sentimentalism, in the icy waters of egotistical calculation.76 
The emergent "one-dimensional society" comes to be characterised by a technological / economic 
rationality reaching the peak of its efficiency. For Marcuse then, the alienating features of 
capitalism, its false appeal to individuals to work hard for themselves when really it is the 
preservation of the overall system that is crucial, becomes a normative social, political and cultural 
ideology which is quite literally transmitted and embodied in the machines, techniques and devices 
72 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 8.
73 Marx and Engels, (1848), The Communist Manifesto, (London: Pelican Books, 1967), p. 82. 
74 Marx, op.cit. (1932), p. 116.
75 Fromm, op.cit. (2004), p. 43.
76 Marx and Engels, op.cit. (1848), p. 82.
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of the existing society and in the nature of the work they demand, as well as in the social relations 
which derive from them. As Andrew Feenberg notes, the innovation of the assembly line is a 
particularly clear example of this contention 
...because it achieves traditional management goals, such as deskilling and pacing work, 
through technical design (…) However, the assembly line appears as technical progress only 
in a specific social context. It would not be perceived as an advance in an economy based on 
worker's cooperatives in which labour discipline was more self-imposed than imposed from 
above. In such a society, a different technological rationality would dictate different ways of 
increasing productivity.77 
Feenberg's point follows Marcuse insofar as alienation appears to be literally 'encoded' or 
incorporated into machinery, commodities, and the social production of certain interests and 
attitudes in 'consumers' themselves. Whilst it is not the case for Marcuse that this arrangement is 
beyond redemption or immune to qualitative changes, it is through a "new" form of technological 
rationality (or more specifically, the reorientation of the direction of technical development away 
from the artificial preservation [i.e., growth] of the capitalist system to the authentic “end” of 
technological rationality), that will suffice for the task. It is not so much a 'new science' that 
Marcuse is concerned to instigate,78 (as this would presumably arise post the advent of qualitative 
change), but a new directive impetus of technical production, a radical revision of the prevailing 
technological rationality. In any case, the shape of the means, instruments and techniques is 
considered contingent upon the nature of the prevailing mode of production; “technological 
rationality is not merely a belief, an ideology, but is effectively incorporated into the structure of 
machines. Machine design mirrors back the social factors operative in the prevailing rationality.”79 
Unfortunately, further forms of alienation can also be countenanced, firstly, the dangerous prospect 
that it may be operative in a temporal sense. For societies under the opinion that whatever resources 
exist in close proximity to them are rightfully their 'property', 'birth right' or 'inheritance', this 
appears to restrict their value to the current generation residing in that locality, province, state or 
77 Feenberg, 'Subversive Rationalization', in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge, (Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), p.11. (Emphasis added). In illustrating his position, Marcuse quotes Daniel Bell's Automation and 
Major Technological Change: Impact on Union Size, Structure, and Function, (Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO, 
Washington, 1958).
78 On this topic, see S. Vogel, 'Marcuse and the New Science', in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by J. 
Abromeit and W.M. Cobb, (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 240-245.
79 Feenberg, op.cit. (1995), p. 11.
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nation. Hence, as generations yet to be born, (who, at least conceivably – barring calamity – may 
come to vastly outnumber all the people who have ever lived),80 will themselves suffer due to the 
past and contemporary carelessness and propensity toward short-term plunder, a prioritisation of the 
immediate as well as the local.81 In other words, a prevailing concern to continue with "business as 
usual" legitimates perpetual production growth as a matter of mainstream economic and 
government policy, and as such, the long-term interests of the human species (which must be 
understood as contingent upon relative biospheric stability), appear to be regularly undermined or 
ignored altogether in the name of economic growth. Not only this, the strong evolutionary and often 
culturally-endorsed impulses toward the locality, the family, the proximal and immediate, etc. which 
were honed in the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness” (EEA) come to be exploited by the 
so-called "compliance industries"; the mechanisms of advertising, public relations and marketing, 
which function to engineer desires, to get the consumer to identify with commodities, thus 
encouraging and legitimating ever-escalating levels of consumption.82 Hence, as Marcuse's 
multidimensional approach arguably reveals, the social, individual and work-related consequences 
of alienation are directly linked to the exploitation and plunder of the natural environment. 
It was not until organic community relations (...) dissoved into market relationships that the 
planet itself was reduced to a resource for exploitation. This centuries-long tendency finds its 
most exacerbating development in modern capitalism. Owing to its inherently competitive 
nature, bourgeois society not only pits humans against each other, it also pits the mass of 
humanity against the natural world. Just as men are converted into commodities, so every 
aspect of nature is converted into a commodity, a resource to be manufactured and 
merchandised wantonly (...) The plundering of the human spirit by the market place is 
paralleled by the plundering of the Earth by capital.83
Yet despite this arrangement, the optimism of both Marcuse (and Marx) allowed both to envisage a 
very different ordering, and this can be understood in reference to yet another form of alienation, 
that which concerns the appropriate place of technology in human society, or what Marcuse called 
80 Some critiques of this contention include J. Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human 
Extinction, (London: Routledge, 1996); M. Rees, Our Final Century? (London: Vintage, 2004), J. Gray, Straw 
Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, (London: Granta, 2002), and Lovelock, op.cit. (2009).  
81 The tendency toward immediate, short-term plunder as opposed to securing the future of civilisation is illustrated in 
detail by J. Collier, The Plundered Planet, (London: Allen and Unwin, 2010).
82 On the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, see S.J.C. Gaulin and D.H. McBurney, Evolutionary Psychology,  
2nd ed., (London: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 25-56. The term “compliance industries” is owed to S. Ewen's PR! A 
Social History of Spin, (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
83 M. Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, (Oakland: AK Press, 2004), p. 24-25.
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“the 'end' of technological rationality”.84 Rather than exploiting and 'violating' nature as one would 
feel freer to do if it were continually taught to be little more than inert, “value-free matter”: 
A free society may well have a very different a priori and a very different object; the 
development of the scientific concepts may be grounded in an experience of nature as a 
totality of life to be protected and 'cultivated'; and technology would apply this science to the 
reconstruction of the environment of life.85 
Marcuse is arguably reiterating the point alluded to previously; that technology had long been the 
chief means by which opportunity and freedom could not just be extended to assist individuals in 
their labours, but that the opportunities it afforded were akin to a natural right in virtue of the 
pursuit of transcendence that Marcuse – not to mention various existentialist thinkers – contended 
characterized human life.86 Yet, under the current socio-economic status quo, the development of 
technics came to be applied to the reproduction of the given – not a means of challenging or 
questioning it – hence, even this most basic understanding of the appropriate place of technics 
arguably comes to be subject to the alien motive of arresting certain forms of development that may 
be considered deleterious to the reproduction of the status quo.     
Before leaving Marx and moving to discuss the basis of Marcuse's thought in more detail, the ways 
in which his critical-social theory departs from the Marxian theory should be mentioned briefly. 
Three major interrelated distinctions are arguably of most import here: 1. the theory of capitalist 
crisis, 2. the decreasing affluence of the working class, and 3. the consequent tendency toward 
radical “class consciousness”. Putting it simply, Marx contended that capitalism would eventually 
stagnate on the basis of overproduction.87 This would have the effect of further immiserating 
workers as wages consequently fell below the value of labour power, reducing the worker's capacity 
to provide for themselves as the rate of extraction of surplus value rises. Following historical 
circumstance, Marcuse contrasted Marx's so-called 'immiseration thesis' with a theory of expansion, 
or “counterrevolution”, in which capitalism moves to contain such tendencies through the increased 
integration of the worker (not to mention her consumption habits) into the service of the 
84 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 5. There will be more to be said on this topic in the discussion of Marcuse's concept 
of technological rationality in chapter 3. 
85 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 61.
86 See for example J.P. Sartre, (1943), Being and Nothingness, part 2, chapter 3, (London: Routledge, 1998).
87 Marx illustrates this contention in chapters 2 and 13 of Capital, vol.3, (New York: New International Publishers, 
1967). 
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reproduction of the system itself, both physically and mentally.88 Where Marx had considered that 
as real wages reduced, the increasing impoverishment of the worker would lead to a proportional 
growth in radicalisation, Marcuse instead emphasised quite the opposite by contending that 
increasing levels of affluence amongst workers had come to have an ameliorating, placatory effect, 
suppressing revolutionary fervour and rendering it largely irrelevant. What is more, the disasters 
that emerged from a number of communist experiments served to ramify this point in the minds of 
the majority of the public and the ruling authorities. Hence, in what he referred to as the “one-
dimensional society”, the actual impoverishment described by Marx is transformed into relative 
impoverishment, and the ideology of an imperative toward perpetual economic growth comes is 
activated and integrated within virtually every social strata. 
Thus far, a sketch of the Marxian background to Marcuse's theory of technology and social critique 
provides a view of production that situates it ideally as the natural, essential condition of human 
life. This consists in the instrumental appropriation and objectification of nature by human beings, 
who in turn make themselves and their society. The more successful and advanced human technical 
capacities become, the more first nature appears to shrink from the built, 'artificial' world which 
increasingly  comes  to  dominate  the  everyday  lived  experience  of  individuals.  The  role  of 
technology – for so long at the service of humanity – came to appear to Marx and Marcuse as an 
alienating, even monstrous force, a force by which the owners of the means of production could  
augment their powers of control, and to which modern individuals were compelled to submit, rather  
than utilise in accord with their liberty and species-nature. As it has been shown, it is too simplistic 
to attribute these events to autonomous technology, the 'logic of domination', or to civilisation itself. 
Rather, what Marcuse believed was at fault was the specific  direction  of technical advance and 
proliferation under capitalism. Although the resultant forms of alienation that Marx and Marcuse 
contended were the necessary consequence of this system arguably continue to persist, a further, 
more pressing form of alienation – that between human agents and the natural environment – now 
arguably entail the most considerable indictment of modern consumer-capitalism. As it will be the 
aim to argue throughout the current thesis, in light of this evolutionarily novel situation, Marcuse's 
vision of qualitative change now appears as an increasing practical necessity rather than a naïve 
hope. Yet capitalism appears thoroughly instantiated in its domination of the means of production 
both currently,  and into the future.  Therefore,  the discussion now moves to  describe Marcuse's 
analysis and critique of the ideology of advanced industrial civilisation in more detail. 
88 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a). 
49
50
Chapter 3  
One and Two-Dimensional Thought 
This chapter will discuss the historical underpinnings of Marcuse's 'multidimensional' critique of 
advanced industrial society and the decline of the 'second dimension' of critical reason so as to 
provide the background from which his thought on modern technology is derived. The crucial 
distinction Marcuse placed between technics and technology will be specifically addressed, as well 
as his thoughts on the proper and appropriate end of technological rationality. 
From Liberation to Control
Like his Frankfurt School Colleagues, Marcuse was concerned with the prevalence of instrumental 
reason in modern advanced industrial societies (i.e. the affluent, consumer-capitalist / state-
capitalist societies), that he believed had come to play a dominant and deleterious influence on the 
life-world.1 Marcuse claimed that the world of “man and nature” had come to be “organized as 
things and instrumentalities”,2 and that the liberties enjoyed by a privileged few had become subject 
to erosion and replaced by a "hedonic treadmill" of ever-escalating consumerism.3 Marcuse's 
critical-social theory and philosophy of technology grew from a concern for the plight of the 
individual in the context of the “one-dimensional society”; an oppressive constellation comprising 
the governments, corporations, the population at large, economics and technology, in which the 
potential of both first and human nature – as well as critical reason itself – became subject to 
1 See M. Horkheimer, (1941), 'The End of Reason' in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, edited by A. Arato, and 
E. Gebhardt, (New York: Urizen, 1978), pp. 26-48. See also Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, (1944), Dialectic of  
Enlightenment, (London & New York: Verso, 1997).
2 Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 62.
3 The theory of "hedonic adaptation" was originated by P. Brickman and D.T. Campbell in their 1971 essay, 'Hedonic 
Relativism and Planning the Good Society', in Adaptation Level Theory: A Symposium, edited by M.H. Apley, (New 
York: Academic Press, 1971), pp. 287-302. It was later refined and referred to as the "hedonic treadmill" by the 
psychologist, Michael Eysenck in such works as Happiness: Facts and Myths, (Hove: Psychology Press LTD, 
1990).  
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increasing rationalisation and alienation due to an efficiently administered “mechanics of 
conformity”.4 According to Marcuse, this ordering was the necessary feature of the current 
productive / economic edifice, which assisted in diminishing and rendering irrelevant various forms 
of thought, protest and criticism considered antithetical to its cardinal values of efficiency and self-
reproduction. It will be the task of what follows to delineate these contentions in more detail. 
As Marcuse noted, "several influences had conspired to bring about the social impotence of critical 
thought:
The foremost among them is the growth of the industrial apparatus and of its all-embracing 
control over all spheres of life (…) The ever-growing strength of the apparatus, however, is 
not the only influence responsible. The social impotence of critical thought has been further 
facilitated by the fact that important strata of the opposition have long been incorporated into 
the apparatus itself – without losing the title of opposition.5
Marcuse is not just referring to the union movement or the academy, but is concerned to describe 
the situation in a broader philosophical-anthropological context.6 As business, government, the 
media, culture industries and the public mind itself fell deeper into conformance with largely 
economically and technologically rational incentives, a society had emerged that was arguably 
psychologically, philosophically and politically ill-prepared and ill-equipped to countenance even 
piecemeal alterations to the business of day-to-day life, let alone to give adequate consideration to 
the various consequences of its productive excesses. 
Marcuse's negative critique makes use of bipolar language and is often intentionally ironic. On the 
one hand, he speaks generally of the “rational irrationality”7 of the established capitalist status quo 
and its Orwellian tendency to associate itself with freedom and liberty amid the “waste and 
restriction of productivity; the need for aggressive expansion; the constant threat of war; intensified 
exploitation; dehumanization.”8 On the other, Marcuse unsettles the conformist silence of religion, 
4 D. Kellner, 'Introduction' to Technology, War, and Fascism: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.1, (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p. 5.
5 Marcuse, (1941), 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology' in Technology, War and Fascism: The Collected  
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.1., edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 41-65. 
6 See for example Marcuse, (1975), 'The Failure of the New Left?' in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected 
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 181-191. 
7 This term arises again and again in Marcuse, op.cit. (1964).
8 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 257.
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referring to it as “blasphemous”;9 whilst simultaneously not winning any friends in the business, 
government or corporate realms by critically commenting on their obsession to display a 
tailored, “plastic cleanliness”; appearing professional on the surface, whilst being engaged in 
“dirty deals” underneath.10 Today's superficial emphasis on the brand, the image, and the 
obsession with surface physical appearence (whilst strenuously denying the opposite) arguably 
continues the tendency to conceal the general "dirtiness" and facile nature of modern 
consumerism.11 In regard to technoscience; as has already been noted, Marcuse saw in it both 
the major means for qualitative change, but also the means by which such change was 
suspended and cancelled. On this basis, it seems little wonder that late in his career, he was 
taken on as something of a political 'guru' of sections of the radical student movements of the 
1960s and early 70s, which are now remembered by the somewhat ironic slogan of “flower 
power.” 
Marcuse's multi-dimensional approach to modern technoscientific civilisation therefore 
represents a form of thought that refused to uncritically accept the rational, sensible nature of 
"what is". This characteristic willingness to examine the other sides of conventionally 
prescribed wisdoms is perhaps most evident in Marcuse's unrelentingly visceral criticism of 
modern capitalist society and its power to contain alternatives to itself and indulge in violence, 
misery, and deception, whilst promoting the very opposite. He characterised the nature of capitalist 
society as one: 
1. which compels the vast majority of the population to "earn" their living in stupid, inhuman, 
and unnecessary jobs;
2. which conducts its booming business on the back of ghettos, slums, and internal and 
external colonialism;
3. which is infested with violence and repression while demanding obedience and compliance 
from the victims of violence and repression; 
4. which, in order to sustain the profitable productivity on which its hierarchy depends, utilizes 
its vast resources for waste, destruction, and an ever more methodical creation of conformist 
needs and satisfactions.12
9 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 62.
10 Marcuse, ibid. (1969b), p. 28.
11 Marcuse, ibid. (1969b), p. 36.
12 Marcuse, ibid. (1969b), p. 62.
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Yet, Marcuse's pessimistic assessment was balanced by a sense of optimism which emerged as a 
result of the consequences of these very prospects, an optimism which only grew in his later 
period.13 For example, he contended that the superior sophistication of the means of control and 
containment in under capitalism give away or imply the capacity to move toward alternative 
arrangements of society:
The level of productivity which Marx projected for the construction of a socialist society has 
long since been attained in the technically most advanced capitalist countries, and precisely 
this achievement (the “consumer society”) serves to sustain capitalist productive relations, to 
ensure popular support, and to discredit the rationale of socialism.14 
Marcuse's multidimensional approach explored certain aporiae of modern capitalism; on the one 
hand, the status quo widely encouraged immense levels of technoscientific advance and 
proliferation which theoretically imply the productive capacity to build a freer society, to ease 
suffering and hopelessness, and to enrich community, social relations, and allow for the long-term 
flourishing of first nature as well as its denizens (humanity included). On the other hand, Marcuse 
believed these enormous powers were instead diverted into the containment of exactly such 
prospects, stalling their practical application, and rendering them to theory. Rather than the Marxian 
vision of the gap between theory and practice being closed through pursuing the positive ends and 
implications technoscientific development opened up for the human future,15 modern society, 
Marcuse lamented, remained mired in a “repressive continuum”; a situation in which the prospects 
for change and liberation were and are available, but are instead directed into increasingly 
sophisticated, deceptively benign forms of social control and exploitation so that economic growth 
may continue. For Marcuse, the consequence is “a mutilated, crippled and frustrated human 
existence”; an existence “that is violently defending its own servitude.”16 
Although the beginnings of this critique and his concern with technics go back at least as far as his 
13 Marcuse's optimism increases markedly after the publication of One-Dimensional Man. See for example, Marcuse, 
ibid. (1969b); Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972a); and The Aesthetic Dimension, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1978).   
14 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 3.
15 Andrew Feenberg notes that Marcuse referred to the closure of this gap as "the noblest desideratum of 
philosophizing". See his Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of History, (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 89  
16 Marcuse, (1967), 'Liberation from the Affluent Society', in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers of  
Herbert Marcuse, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 80.
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1938 essay 'On Hedonism' and receive their most famous expression in One-Dimensional Man,17 
Marcuse's concern with twentieth century technological development, as well as early intimations 
of the theory of one-dimensional society are initially presented in his 1941 essay, 'Some Social 
Implications of Modern Technology',18 in which he describes the historical origin and encroachment 
of “technological rationality” through an analysis that contrasts it with a “second-dimension” of 
individual or critical rationality. 
Individual rationality (…) was won in the struggle against regnant superstitions, irrationality 
and domination, and posed the individual in a critical stance against society. Critical 
rationality was thus a creative principle which was both the source of the individual's 
liberation and society's advancement.19 
Marcuse argued that this second dimension of “critical reason” or “rationality” had its apogee in the 
middle-class revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,20 and from this historical 
standpoint, he gauged the growth of modern technological rationality in capitalist societies and its 
resultant “fetish of technique” from the early stages of its modern development into its 
establishment in twentieth century advanced industrial society.21 Prior to the eighteenth century, 
individual rationality was not just a theoretical ideal, but represented an extra dimension of society 
that carried out a practical / critical role in checking received reality and critically engaging with 
sources of authority to some effect. In this arrangement, “Truth”, as Marcuse claimed, was 
originally “homogenous”, but it came to be  
...split into two different sets of truth values and two different patterns of behavior: the one 
assimilated to the apparatus, the other antagonistic to it; the one making up the prevailing 
technological rationality and governing the behavior required by it, the other pertaining to a 
critical rationality whose values can be fulfilled only if it has itself shaped all personal and 
social relationships.22 
In this multi-dimensional ordering of society, rationality and reason were not limited to the received 
17 See Marcuse (1938), 'On Hedonism', in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 
159-200.
18 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941).
19 Kellner, op.cit. (1998), pp. 4-5. 
20 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), pp. 42-43. 
21 Note that Marcuse's understanding of technology and technique are quite distinct from the use of the terms presented 
by Jacques Ellul in The Technological Society, (New York: Vintage, 1964). 
22 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 50.
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dictates of authority, but stood as independent, critical forces – albeit with varying levels of 
practical potency. “In the emerging bourgeois ideology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the nascent liberal-democratic society was deemed the social arrangement in which the individual 
could pursue its own self-interest and at the same time contribute to social progress.”23 As Marcuse 
noted, this image of critically engaged reason 
...stood for values which strikingly contradict those holding sway over society today. If we try 
to assemble in one guiding concept the various religious, political and economic tendencies 
which shaped the idea of the individual as the subject of certain fundamental standards and 
values which no external authority was supposed to encroach upon. These standards and 
values pertained to the forms of life, social as well as personal, which were most adequate to 
the full development of man's faculties and abilities. By the same token, they were the “truth” 
of his individual and social existence. The individual, as a rational being, was deemed capable 
of finding these forms by his own thinking and, once he had acquired freedom of thought, of 
pursuing the course of action which would actualize them. Society's task was to grant him 
such freedom and to remove all restrictions upon his rational course of action.24
Marcuse goes on to describe how the enlightenment principles of autonomous thought, personal 
liberty, individual rationality and the courage to follow one's own reason, came to be subject to a 
general diminution which began to accelerate around the period of the industrial revolution, giving 
rise to social conditions that had the effect of stifling the critical dimension of various arenas of 
thought and discourse.25 Consequently, the self-evident worth of individual autonomy and liberty 
were sectioned off, mediated and drawn into conformance with that which “...holds good for the 
functioning of the apparatus and for that alone”.26 This amounted to a generally positivist, 
operationalistic approach to science and philosophy, which continues to be strongly represented in 
the dominant forms of economic theory. The recent prevalence of various strands of subjectivism 
and relativism in public discourse were also arguably convenient, for if all 'oughts' concerning how 
society should be governed, how the Good Life should be pursued, what equates to 'genuine' and 
'surplus' needs, etc. were rendered to preference under the thin pretensions of politeness and 
23 Kellner, op.cit. (1998), p. 5.
24 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 42.
25 Sapere aude ("dare to know", or more generally, "dare to be wise") is originally attributed to Horace's Epistularum 
liber primus (First Book of Letters), section 1.2.40, published in 20 BC. Immanuel Kant uses the phrase as his 
"motto" of Enlightenment or "man's release from his self-incurred tutelage", in his 1784 essay, 'An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?'. See I. Kant, Political Writings, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 54-60.   
26 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 49.
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impartiality, the directors of the means of production would be free to pay lip service to providing 
for them whilst drowning consumers in endless cycles of rehashed products so as to secure 
employment and economic growth. In Marcuse's estimation, this pervasive technological rationality 
called for “unconditional compliance and coordination (and) the subordination of thought to pre-
given external standards.”27  The rational, autonomous individual, now the subject of increasing 
psycho-social “adjustments” and administration as well as physical regimentation, made way for the 
twentieth century achievement of the “one-dimensional individual”; one who was not just defined 
primarily on the basis of her productive capacities alone, but by her ductility and pliability and her 
new sense of contentment and acceptance of the prevailing status quo which, Marcuse contended, 
included her being “unwilling and perhaps even incapable of comprehending what is happening and 
why it is happening.”28 Thus, the value of the “the human individual whom the exponents of the 
middle class revolution had made the ultimate unit as well as the end of society” gave way to the 
values of instrumentality and efficiency.29 The “higher culture”,30 which, Marcuse admits were 
enjoyed by only a privileged minority, came to be artificially restricted in the advanced industrial 
societies.31 As he noted in One-Dimensional Man, this did not necessarily always mean the death or 
annihilation of cultural values and traditions commonly bemoaned by other figures within the 
humanities tradition of philosophy of technology,32 but their productive utilisation (and their 
willingness to be utilised) by the dominant apparatus: 
Today's novel feature is the flattening out of the antagonism between culture and social reality 
through the obliteration of the oppositional, alien, and transcendent elements in the higher 
culture by virtue of which it constituted another dimension of reality. This liquidation of two-
dimensional culture takes place not through the denial and rejection of the “cultural values,” 
but through their wholesale incorporation into the established order, through their 
reproduction and display on a massive scale.33 
27 Marcuse, ibid. (1941), p. 49-50.
28  Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 148.
29 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 42.
30 By “higher culture” Marcuse means the second critical dimension and its conveyance through art and aesthetics. See 
Marcuse, op.cit. (1978). 
31 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 60.
32 The distinction between "humanities" and "engineering" philosophy of technology is owed to C. Mitcham, Thinking 
Through Technology: The Path Between Engineering and Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
For a brief sample of philosophers and other thinkers analyses what might be called the corrosion of culture by 
modern technology, see Ellul, op.cit. (1964); M. Heidegger, (1954), 'The Question Concerning Technology', in Basic 
Writings, edited by D.F. Krell, (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1977), pp. 287-317. See also N. Postman, Technopoly: 
The Surrender of Culture to Technology, (New York: Vintage, 1993), and A. Borgmann, Technology and the 
Character of Contemporary Life, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984).
33 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 60.
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The process Marcuse is describing is therefore not a destruction of traditional culture or values, but 
a process of absorption and integration. Oppositional elements are themselves constructively 
incorporated into the dominant culture and rationality for its own collective interest. In addition to 
the diminution of individual critical thought, rather than being used to lessen individual labour time 
and effort, technoscientific powers became ever-more geared toward attempts to contain and control 
their own inherent liberatory potentials. More and more, the design of technics and the labours of 
human agents came to follow distinctly more narrow and unified paths toward profit making, which 
increasingly represented the major incentive driving and guiding the means of production up until 
the present day. 
The concept of use value hardly escapes this predicament – rather it appears to define it.34 As the 
production of technological artifacts comes to be ever-more geared toward providing for and 
securing perpetual economic growth, the formerly manifold instrumental incentives which initially 
motivated their production and design became subject to the 'alien' presence of the commodity 
form, until there emerged a point – historically very recently – that exchange value came full-circle 
in its permeation of production as a whole.35 This process significantly accelerated in the twentieth 
century when world gross domestic product (GDP) quintupled, and the total industrial output in the 
twenty year period between 1953 and 1973 reputedly exceeded the totality of that achieved over the 
one hundred and fifty year period preceding it.36 Given other significant tendencies of twentieth 
century production such as Fordism, Taylorism, disposability, built-in obsolescence, and an 
explosion of mass-production and automation had emerged without parallel decreases in necessary 
labour time or the amelioration of income discrepancies, the constant reiterations of “progress”, 
“development”, “jobs” and more recently, “moving forward” came to sound ever more hollow. 
Hence, for Marcuse, a narrowing of the incentives guiding and impelling production from use value 
to exchange value had occurred, resulting in the commodification of the incentives behind technical 
development and proliferation. 
34 On use value and exchange value, see Marx, (1867), Capital vol.1, part 1, chapter 1: 'The Commodity', (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1990), pp. 125-177.
35 See Marx, ibid. (1867), chapter 1:4, pp. 163-177. See also Marx, op.cit. (1953), p. 165.
36 This was largely due to post World War II expansionism, especially in the United States. See for example, P. 
Bairoch, 'International industrialization levels from 1750 to 1980' in The Journal of European Economic History,  
vol.11, no's 1 & 2, (Fall, 1982), p.73. The innovation of the shipping crate was also important. See M. Levinson, The 
Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Small and the World Economy Bigger, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008).
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Marcusean Philosophy of Technology
Although he was certainly influenced by Adorno and even Heidegger, Marcuse was not the
romantic technophobe he is often taken for. To be sure, he argues that instrumental reason is 
historically contingent, but unlike Adorno and Heidegger, he thinks human action can change 
the epochal structure of technological rationality and the designs which flow from it. A new 
type of reason would generate new and more benign scientific discoveries and technologies. 
Marcuse is an eloquent advocate of this ambitious position, but today the notion of a political 
transformation of science has a vanishingly small audience and discredits his whole 
approach.37
Theories of technology entail various epistemological and conceptual difficulties, not least the 
problem of defining technology per se in anything but broad terms.38 Understandably, definitions 
range widely, but for the current discussion, two crucial points regarding Marcuse's definition need 
to be addressed. Firstly, Marcuse was a believer in the hardly controversial claim that technology 
was still developing, it is not a “fixed destiny.”39 This contention forms the background both to his 
philosophical anthropology as well as his philosophy of technology which considered technoscience 
to contain powers that, were they to be released in line with what he contended were its innate 
potentials, would be directed to provide for the augmentation of human capacities, to diminish the 
need for arduous or dangerous manual labour, to counter misery and sickness, and to restore the 
mutilated environment. Broadly, Marcuse's view implies that technological, natural and human ends 
ought be considered inseparable; the so-called “end” of technological rationality is not merely 
aligned with human potential in some arbitrary fashion – it is the concrete means by which this 
potential may be pursued, embodied and practically realised.40 
Utopian possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of advanced 
capitalism and socialism: the rational utilization of these forces on a global scale would 
37 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, (London & New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 153.
38 A summary overview of the more common definitions is provided by S.J. Kline, 'What is Technology?' in 
Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, edited by R.C. Scharff and V. Dusek (Oxford, Blackwell, 
2005), pp. 210-212. See also the volume edited by J.K.B. Olsen, S.A. Pedersen and V.F. Hendricks, A Companion to 
the Philosophy of Technology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).
39 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 1.
40 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 239.
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terminate poverty and scarcity within a very foreseeable future.41 
The second point concerns Marcuse's distinction between 'technics' and 'technology' which arguably 
becomes crucial in understanding his wider critique of advanced industrial society. Marcuse 
originally attributed the distinction to Lewis Mumford,42 but it appears to owe more to the Marxian 
distinctions between mode, means, and relations of production. Although in Marcuse's writings – 
not least 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology' and One-Dimensional Man – the 
distinction is not held scrupulously,43 it will be contended in this thesis that it persists throughout his 
work in an implicit manner and has specific relevance to questions pertaining to the shared grounds 
of technology and environment. 
For Marcuse, technics, or the “technical apparatus” denotes the totality of instruments, devices and 
artifacts that are commonly taken in English as 'technology' in general. In other words, the 
“apparatus of industry, transportation and communication”, individual technical artifacts, from tools 
and machinery to consumer products, engine parts, computers, and the mechanisms and techniques 
by which they are produced.44 Marcuse is less concerned to interrogate this element of the equation, 
as 'technics' (or the means of production) are “but a partial factor” of what he is most interested in: 
the mode of production which provides the incentive and impetus which underlies their production 
in the first place.45 In short, it is once again clear in 'Some Social Implications of Modern 
Technology' and later works that Marcuse remains concerned with the historically specific shift in 
the orientation of production from use-value to exchange value.46  This shift spans almost the entire 
gamut of the means of production, but also counts for the human relations of production, as in the 
affluent societies, well after subsistence needs had been met for the majority of the workforce, wage 
increases served as an incentive to continue to carry out work and to keep levels of consumption 
growing. For Marcuse, technical artifacts are socially contingent and ethically neutral; they can be 
used to “promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as 
well as the abolition of toil”.47 However, understood in Marcusean terms, 'technology' is a mode of 
41 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 4.
42 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 41.
43 See for example, J. Ocay, 'Marcuse's Critique of Advanced Industrial Society', Kritike vol.4, no.1, (June 2010), pp. 
56-57.
44 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 56.
45 Marcuse, ibid. (1941), p. 41.
46 Although One-Dimensional Man arguably provides the most cohesive and complete description of Marcuse's 
philosophy of technology, it's subtitle, “Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society” makes it clear that he 
is concerned to analyse technology in a wider social and political context.
47 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941).
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production.48 Hence, the neutrality of technics ought not blind the investigator to this 
preconditional, "basic historical factor":
One may still insist that the machinery of the technological universe is “as such” indifferent 
toward political ends – it can revolutionize or retard a society. An electronic computer can 
serve equally a capitalist or socialist administration; a cyclotron can be an equally efficient 
tool for a war party or a peace party. This neutrality is contested in Marx's controversial 
statement that the “hand-mill gives you a society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society 
with the industrial capitalist.” And this statement is further modified in Marxian theory itself: 
the social mode of production, not technics is the basic historical factor. However, when 
technics becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; 
it projects a historical totality – a "world".49
Marcuse's distinction thereby draws out the role that profit-making has come to play in motivating 
and guiding production, which in the advanced industrial societies tends to play the major influence 
in rationalising and legitimating the vast majority of technical forays. A distinction can therefore be 
made between the technological and the development and proliferation of the technical and 
technoscientific realms. Technology is not simply a 'form' or historical stage of technical activity, it 
is a "new rationality" containing "new standards of individuality"; a historically-specific "social 
process" operant at the level of ideas, opinion, government policy, and most especially business, 
and hence is inseparable from the collective choices, motives and decisions of agents. Given these 
contentions, it is unsurprising that Marcuse claims that he is not specifically interested in the 
"...influence or effect of technology or particular technical artifacts on human individuals as such, as 
(...) they are themselves an integral part and factor of technology, not only as the social groups 
which direct its application and utilisation."50 Again, as a mode of production, technology 
incorporates and directs – and is itself directed by – the instrumental rationality appropriate to 
machinery which comes to dominate the relations of production, i.e.: individual human relations to 
each other, as well as to first nature. 
Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances 
which characterise the machine age is thus at the same time a mode of organising and 
perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and 
48 See Marcuse, ibid. (1941), p. 41
49  Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 157-158. (Emphasis added).
50 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 41.
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behaviour patterns, an instrument of control or domination.51
Especially in its modern form, Marcuse contended that the technological mode of production is 
operant in both the individual and socio-cultural contexts, private and public, local, regional and 
international. In 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', he uses the example of 
"technocracy" utilised by the Third Reich in his native homeland to emphasise its incredibly broad 
scope and relevance, far transcending the realms of technics, mechanisation and industry, through 
the National Socialist's "ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the 
intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the organization of the 
governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy – all of which constitute the daily implements of 
terror – follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency."52 All of which Marcuse characterises 
as – to summarily paraphrase – anti-technological, as once again he viewed technology in its 
'essence' as a positive force for humankind, tending toward the decrease of unnecessary toil rather 
than its artificial increase, to the lessening of terror and suffering, rather than their extension. 
Although certainly not incapable of brute force, the use of technology within the liberal-democratic, 
advanced capitalist nations tended toward the what Walt Lippman referred to as the engineering of  
consent rather than its overt, terroristic enforcement.53 Yet, Marcuse was convinced that a 
technocratic totalitarianism remained an appropriate label for even these societies. As he wrote at 
the conclusion of the second edition of his study of Hegelian thought, Reason and Revolution, "The 
defeat of Fascism and National Socialism has not arrested the trend towards totalitarianism. 
Freedom is on the retreat – in the realm of thought as well as that of society."54 Indeed, the use or 
misuse of technology under consumer capitalism was not – as many advocates of the "free-market" 
continue to maintain – the direct opposite of the violence of such regimes as the Nazis, but related 
through both arrangement's use of technology as a means of social control. Marcuse did not see 
Fascism as a definitive break from liberalism, but instead demonstrated "...the continuities 
between liberalism and fascism and shows how liberalism's unquestioned allegiance to the capitalist 
economic system prepared the way for the fascist-totalitarian order and with it the abolition of 
liberalism itself.55 Marcuse again cites Mumford who was similarly critical of the contention that 
technological development under capitalism tended toward its natural 'end', noting that it was 
51 Marcuse, ibid. (1941).
52 Marcuse, ibid. (1941).
53 See W. Lippmann, (1922), Public Opinion, (New York: FQ Classics, 2007). The terms is now more well-known 
through its use by Noam Chomsky. See his Propaganda and Control of the Public Mind, (Boston: AK Press, 1998). 
54 Marcuse, 'Epilogue' in Reason and Revolution: An Introduction to the Dialectical Thinking of Hegel and Marx, 2nd 
ed., (New York, Humanities Press, 1954), pp. 433.  
55 Kellner, 'Herbert Marcuse and the Vicissitudes of Critical Theory', in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: The  
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.2., edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 8.
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neither the spirit of invention, nor the promise of innovation in increasing humanity's "essential 
powers" that fostered and motivated technological growth, "...but business, or power over other 
men. In the course of their development machines have extended these aims and provided a vehicle 
for their fulfillment".56 According to Marcuse, the growth of technology in the capitalist nations had 
therefore come to take on forms quite "different from and even opposed" to those which marked its 
temporal beginnings, the large duration of its existence, as well as its essential end.57 
It is hopefully already clear that the difference Marcuse placed between technics and technology 
only superficially resembles the more famous distinction proposed by Martin Heidegger.58 Marcuse 
is not aiming to provide an ontological theory or definition, but aiming to trace its concrete social 
manifestations in the practical context of everyday lived experience.59 Although his views of the 
modern context of this 'lived experience' of technics and technology are undeniably critical, there 
remains in Marcuse's account the potential prospect of human responsibility coming to play a far 
more significant role in technical mediation than it currently does, or that was allowed for under the 
pessimistic sway of such thinkers as Heidegger, Ellul, and to a lesser extent, Mumford.60 As has 
already been argued, given the necessary wherewithal, Marcuse's theory allows for technics and 
technology to be turned away from the profit motives of an already affluent few to the benefit of the 
non-affluent many and the recovery of first nature; the immense wealth that technoscientific 
production is the primary means of generating could be turned to feed the hungry and assist the sick 
on a global scale instead of being funneled to elite, affluent populations who live in comparative 
comfort but continue to bemoan their supposed economic “uncertainty”. Marcusean philosophy of 
technology is therefore hardly pessimistic in its entirety; as he wrote in response to critics that 
mistakenly attributed more than a mote of each of these views to his philosophy, “science and 
technology are the great vehicles of liberation, and it is only their use and restriction in the 
repressive society which makes them into vehicles of domination.”61 In emphasising how technics 
(and, in the modern era, technoscience) comes to be used, it should be noted that Marcuse is not 
56 L. Mumford, cited in Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 41.
57 Marcuse, ibid. (1941), p. 42.
58 See Heidegger, op.cit. (1954).
59 For a thorough discussion of the differences and similarities of Marcuse and Heidegger's views on technology see 
Feenberg, op.cit. (2005). See also I. Thomson, 'From the Question to Technology to the Quest for a Democratic 
Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, Feenberg', Inquiry, vol.43, issue 2, (Summer, 2000), pp. 225-234.
60 See J. Ellul, (1963), 'The Technological Order', in Philosophy and Technology, edited by C. Mitcham and R. 
Mackey, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 86-105, and Ellul, op.cit. (1964). 
61 Kellner, op.cit. (1984), pp.266-267, citing Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p.12. (Note that Kellner's initial reference to this 
quote [p. 21] appears to be incorrect). It should be noted that Marcuse's thoughts on the beneficence of technology 
are not always consistent. For example, see Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 172. Such critics include Alvin Toffler, who 
mistakenly described Marcuse, Lewis Mumford and Erich Fromm as “anti-technological” in his 1970 bestseller, 
Future Shock, (London: Pan, 1972), p. 291. See also M. Schoolman, op.cit. (1980). 
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only thinking about the 'end user'; the agent who purchases x in order to carry out a particular task. 
Instead, he can be said to be drawing attention to the collective 'function' of the entire edifice of 
capitalist-driven production, namely: the maintenance and recreation of itself. In this process, 
individuals, artifacts and first nature are drawn into conformance through being provided with 
monetary incentives in exchange for their participation and compliance as wage labourers – strictly 
speaking, they are not causally determined to do so, but offered a deal that they can hardly refuse. 
Marcuse's concern with use is also not a reiteration of the classical Aristotelian distinction between 
organisms and artifacts, which, as will be argued later, lacks sufficient depth to countenance the role 
of the individual in advanced industrial societies.62 Nor, as will also be discussed later is Marcuse 
offering a version of the 'unintended consequences' thesis, in which the original incentives 
informing technical designs are displaced by exactly the concern with the end user noted above.63 
Rather, Marcuse made the hardly radical proposition that the incentives of profit making cannot be 
separated from any discussion of the modern technical phenomenon, a contention mainstream 
economists would hardly disagree with. Indeed, the large majority of small and large-scale 
productive endeavours are not able to be accomplished without sufficient capital – either as a future 
expectation or as an a priori prerequisite. It is not necessarily the usefulness or the 'worth' of the 
technical endeavor that will decide on its ultimate success, but its 'value', or capacity for to make 
profits.64 However, it is also important to note that Marcuse is not arguing that technoscientific 
development nor the increases in affluence it has conferred are the causes of the one-dimensional 
society, but their consequences: 
The oppressive features of technological society are not due to excessive materialism and 
technicism. On the contrary, it seems that the causes of the trouble are rather in the arrest of 
materialism and technological rationality, that is to say, in the restraints imposed on the 
materialization of values. These restraints pertain to a particular period of civilization, to a 
particular organization of the struggle for existence. Their abolition, that is, the liberation of 
technology, would involve the entire material and intellectual culture of advanced industrial 
society.65
62 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book 6, iv, translated by J.A.K. Thomson, (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), 
p. 208 (emphasis added).  
63 For a highly readable account of this thesis, see E. Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of  
Unintended Consequences, (New York: Vintage, 1997).
64 As Marx commented after a quotation from John Locke, the "British writers" of the seventeenth century tended to 
refer to the use value of an artifact as its "worth", and its exchange value as its "value". As Marx notes: "This is quite 
in accordance with the spirit of a language that likes to use a Teutonic word for the actual thing, and a Romance 
word for its reflection." See Marx, (1867), Capital, vol.1, part 1, chapter 1. note 4, (London: Penguin Classics, 
1990), p. 126.
65 Marcuse, (1961), 'The Problem of Social Change in the Technological Society', in Kellner, (ed., 2001), pp. 37-57, p. 
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“Excessive materialism and technicism” are then not the causes of the affluent society, but the 
means by which the materialisation of values is artificially suspended. Although stimulated and 
prompted, and unable to avoid the necessity of a regular income, the individual is not simply the 
determined effect of “autonomous technology”, but is widely encouraged to be a proud contributor 
to the system. Instead of being brutally enforced as under (say) the dictatorial communist regimes of 
Stalin and Mao, public consent becomes an 'engineering project' for seemingly ever more intimately 
acquainted fusions of government departments and corporations, “spin doctors”, public relations 
and marketing firms, whose productive work – whether they are aware of it or not – tends to 
lubricate the reproduction of the overall arrangement. Marcuse is therefore hardly calling for 
technical development to be subdued, nor for its advance to be 'artificially' halted or suspended; 
indeed, it is just the latter that is the problem. As it will be ventured later, Marcuse may have been 
happily surprised to note that various recent technical capacities – especially the global spread of 
computers and the internet – show almost exactly the sorts of effects he was speaking of. If 
examples such as the “piracy” (i.e. sharing) of documents, software, video and audio and the 
radically open dissemination of information through such media as Wikileaks are any indication, a 
strong case can be made that the level of innovation modern capitalism encourages may grow 
beyond even its capacity to contain its potential consequences.66 However, before this contention 
can be elaborated further, what Marcuse called for was a redirection of technology away from the 
exploitative incentives that prevail in capitalist societies, or in other words, a new mode of 
production, which he contended could be actualised under a redefined, non-bureaucratised form of 
socialism.67 The current destructive capitalist direction of technology – Marcuse thought – was 
ultimately subject to change by human agents, and it must be changed, but this does not entail the 
simplicity of a return to more simple agrarian practices as many theorists amongst the left counter-
culture and certain sections of the environmental movement have called for, and for which they are 
continually criticised by their opponents.68 As he wrote: 
57.
66 In modern economic theory, such innovations are known as 'disruptive technologies'. Arguably, they were originally 
noted by Marx and Engels, and taken further by Joseph Schumpeter and his theory of "creative destruction". See 
Marx and Engels, (1848), The Communist Manifesto, (London: Pelican Books, 1967), pp. 85-86. The concept was 
exapanded on in Marx (1939), Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, (rough draft),  
notebook VII, (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 750. See also Marx (1863), Theories of Surplus Value: 'Volume 1V of  
Capital', 2., (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1969), pp. 495-406. Schumpeter's view is provided in his 1942 work: 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, part II: VII 'The Process of Creative Destruction',  (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1950), pp. 81-86.  
67 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 44; and Marcuse, op.cit. (1967a), p. 62.
68 For 'deep green' and 'anarcho-primitivist' critiques which hold civilisation per se rather than technics or economics 
to be the major cause of environmental upheaval, see for example, D. Jensen, Endgame v1: The Problem of  
Civilization, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006). It should be acknowledged that Jensen disapproves of this 
term. See also J. Zerzan, Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization, (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 
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I hope that when I speak of doing away with the horrors of capitalist industrialization it is 
clear I am not advocating a romantic regression behind technology. On the contrary, I believe 
that the potential liberating blessings of technology and industrialization will not even begin 
to be real and visible until capitalist industrialization and capitalist technology have been done 
away with.69 
Accepting his distinction between technology and technics, the actual prospects of the sort of 
reforms Marcuse was calling for can now begin to be drawn into an ecological context. Indeed, 
Marcuse was adamant that any attempt to understand the modern technological phenomenon – let 
alone to consider ways in which it might be reformed or directed toward environmental causes – 
must take into consideration the influence of the prevailing mode of production and the incentives it 
intersperses through all levels of society. In this context, the oxymoronic “greening” of the means of 
production appears inadequate to address the problem of the direction of modern technological 
development; what is instead required is a radical reorientation of its chief incentives, and, ipso 
facto, its apprehension and appropriation of the natural environment. Hence, if it is the case that the 
fusion of capitalism and technics amounts to a “technological” mode of production, and that this 
mode of production encourages a manner of dealing with both human and first nature which is 
predatory, competitive and exploitative, the growth or success of the mode of production itself 
arguably begins to illuminate its potential limitations. However, it is precisely these limitations 
which neither the capitalist, nor the technological mode of production appears willing to 
countenance. Indeed, as it will be argued in the next chapter, growth for the sake of growth – that 
which the current arrangement makes its chief imperative – appears particularly antithetical to 
environmental limitations of any sort until it reaches them. Therefore, in Marcuse's view, the 
changes that appear to be required in terms of our social conduct as well as our treatment of the 
natural environment appear unlikely to emerge through reform to technics alone, but through what 
he referred to as qualitative change; “change, not only in the basic institutions and relationships of 
an established society, but also in individual consciousness in such a society”.70 Although this may 
appear a utopian option, arguably even Marcuse did not – and perhaps could not – have adequately 
envisioned the extent to which profit motives would come to dominate the direction of social and 
technological development after his death, and, more pressingly, the extent to which this directive 
2002); and his edited volume, Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections, (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 
2005). 
69 Marcuse, op.cit. (1967a), p. 68.
70 See Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society', Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 3:3, (1979), p. 30.
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impetus would lead to a potential practical risk to the continuation of civilisation as a whole.71 Yet, 
these same profit motives appear to be the major motivation of the effort that has, thus far criticised, 
countered and thwarted any substantial, concerted efforts to rectify the situation. 
To summarise, Marcuse's separation of technics and technology is founded in the original Marxian 
divisions of mode, means, and relations of production. The technological society is one in which the 
powers of technics and the incentives of wealth-generation form a mutually reciprocal union, 
spanning, stimulating, and interpenetrating each division of productive activity as well as playing a 
major influential role in the relations of production by suppressing or redirecting criticism, protest 
and alternatives to the status quo. It is therefore necessary to explain the role of technological 
rationality in more detail, specifically its influence in shaping the relations of production. 
Technological Rationality and the End of Technology
Modern man, committed to the ideology of the machine, has succeeded in creating a lopsided 
world which favors certain aspects of the personality that were long suppressed, but which 
equally suppresses whatever does not fit into its predominantly mechanical mold.72 
This section of the discussion aims to describe Marcuse's concepts of “technological rationality” 
and what he viewed as its “end”; an arrangement in which technoscientific capacities would be 
liberated from the incentives which play the major role in fostering their current, “dominating” 
instantiation.73 It will be the aim to show here that each of these concepts arise from the extent to 
which the technical has become a model for various forms of public and political communication, 
behaviour and imagination, and to trace its starkly different implications to our mediation of the 
natural environment. 
71 Marcuse's most coherent statements on environmentalism are arguably found in Counterrevolution and Revolt  
(Chapter 2), as well as Marcuse, ibid. (1979). See also D. Kellner, 'Marcuse, Liberation, and Radical Ecology' in 
Illuminations, (1982); and the essays on the environment in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by A. 
Abromeit and W.M. Cobb, (New York: Routledge, 2004). See also S. Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature 
in Critical Theory, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), and also 'The Question Concerning Nature', 
in Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), pp. 115-134
72 L. Mumford, The Conduct of Life, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1952), p. 180. 
73 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 5.
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As has been described so far, Marcuse's critical-social theory and philosophy of technology are 
highly bifurcated; on the one hand he was acutely pessimistic about the direction of modern 
technology in the advanced industrial societies of his age and believed it had taken on a controlling, 
oppressive aspect.74 On the other: the requisite technoscientific powers of the one-dimensional 
society themselves stood as sufficient evidence for Marcuse that the capabilities already existed 
which could allow for the emergence of “new sensibility” and even a “new science”, which he 
believed would be in accord with the “end” of a liberated technology.75 Yet, in Marcuse's estimation, 
a betrayal of this potential had occurred to the extent that the apparatus had defeated its own 
purpose “...if its purpose is to create a humane existence on the basis of a humanized nature”.76 It 
was not simply the case that the roles traditionally ascribed as holding between technology and 
humanity – “man the tool-maker”, Homo fabiens, etc., – had been reversed, but that the orientation 
and direction of modern technological rationality had shifted; instead of serving as the chief means 
by which human potential may be enriched, he believed it had now tended to sacrifice this most 
appropriate of ends on the altar of capitalist profit-making. 
Although Marcuse only mentioned the term a small number of times in his later works, the concept 
of the end of technological rationality remains of significant import in understanding his critique of 
one-dimensional society and his view of technology. Compared with much of Marcuse's other 
thought, the concept is markedly simple: as technics consisted in “the translation of potential into 
the actual”,77 the end of technological rationality is to improve human life, extend instrumental 
capacities, and thereby work toward the authentic satisfaction of genuine needs. The manipulation 
of nature is a necessary part of this, but this process may take on disparate forms, some relatively 
benign, some utterly malignant – just as technics “may increase the weakness as well as the power 
of man”, it may also be deployed on the environment in a sensitive or an exploitative fashion.78 
Despite undoubted improvements to standards of living in the advanced industrial nations since the 
onset of the industrial revolution, Marcuse contended that certain crucially important opportunities 
afforded by advanced technology seemed to recede, whilst others continued to grow well beyond 
sensible or equitable proportions. Amongst many examples, great discrepancies continued to exist 
in wealth distribution and today appear to be at least as wide or wider still.79 In advanced industrial 
74 Marcuse's contentions on this score are summarised in the opening chapter of One-Dimensional Man; 'The New 
Forms of Control'.
75 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a). See also S. Vogel, 'Marcuse and the "New Science"', in Abromheit and Cobb, op.cit.  
(2005), pp. 240-245. 
76 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 149.
77 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 79.
78 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 240.
79 For example, in the United States, easily the wealthiest nation in the world (defining "wealth" as "the value of 
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nations, increases in free time proportional to increases in technological automation had rarely 
eventuated, yet innovations in automation which are economically expedient routinely result in job 
losses. Commodities which inundate the affluent nations which may be produced by cheap, “off-
shore” labour often result in surpluses whilst the sections of the populations of the producing 
countries may not even have access to basic sanitation. As Marcuse argued, were this artificial 
suspension of technoscientific development to be lifted, the way could be clear for a materialisation 
of values and needs which would allow the “free play of thought and imagination” to assume “a 
rational and directing function in the realization of a pacified existence of man and nature”, opening 
up “a universe of qualitatively different relations between man and man, and man and nature”.80 In 
other words, the end of technological rationality was available but stymied; its potentials for 
creating a vision of the liberated society were instead directed toward the perpetuation and 
stabilisation (i.e.: growth) of consumer-capitalist society.
Advanced industrial society is approaching the stage where continued progress would demand 
the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. This stage 
would be reached when material production (including the necessary services) becomes 
automated to the extent that all vital needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is 
reduced to marginal time. From this point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of 
necessity, where it served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby 
limited its rationality; technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the 
struggle for the pacification of nature and society.81
Even before the evolution of Homo sapiens, technics served as a means of “transcending the realm 
of necessity”.82 Anything from building nests and digging burrows to erecting siege-towers required 
the manipulation of the environment to some end, whether this end happened to be formed in the 
mind of the constructor previously or not.83 Again, in the modern period, Marcuse contended that 
everything a person or family owns, minus any debts") 1 percent of the population own 42 percent of the nation's 
overall wealth. Extending further, the top 10 percent of the population are said to own 93 percent of the nation's 
overall wealth. See E.N. Wolff, 'Recent trends in household wealth in the United States: Rising debt and the middle 
class squeeze – an update', Working Paper No. 589. (Annandale-on-Hudson, New York: The Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College, 2010). See also G.W. Domhoff, The Power Elite and the State: How Policy Is Made in  
America, (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990).  
80 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 239.
81 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 18.
82 For a recent discussion of this contention in a palaeoanthropological context, see T. Taylor, The Artificial Ape: How 
Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010). For an 'existential' 
anthropological discussion, see J. Ortega y Gasset, (1939), 'Thoughts on Technology' in Mitcham and Mackey, 
op.cit. (1983), pp. 290-313. 
83 It should be noted that the implication here – that 'technics' is not merely human activity – is not explicitly made by 
Marcuse, but accepted in this thesis. 
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technical capacities had developed to a point at which this ultimate end had become practically 
realisable. As technoscientific capacities developed and proliferated around the Earth, “the 
reduction of the required physical energy and its replacement by mental energy” opened up the 
possibility for the 
...dematerialization of labor. At the same time, an increasingly automated machine system, no 
longer used as the system of exploitation, would allow that “distantiation” of the laborer from 
the instruments of production which Marx foresaw at the end of capitalism: the workers 
would cease to be the “principal agents” of material production, and become its “supervisors 
and regulators” - the emergence of a free subject within the realm of necessity.84
Instead of being directed toward the “pacification of nature and society”, Marcuse contended that 
the dominant rationality of advanced industrial societies had become “technological”, and served as 
a means of legitimation and control over human and non-human nature. 
Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology but as 
technology, and the latter provides the great legitimation of the expanding political power, 
which absorbs all spheres of culture (…) In this universe, technology also provides the great 
rationalization of the unfreedom of man and demonstrates the “technical” impossibility of 
being autonomous, of determining one's own life. For this unfreedom appears neither as 
irrational nor as political, but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which enlarges 
the comforts of life and increases the productivity of labor. Technological rationality thus 
protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon of 
reason open on a rationally totalitarian society.85  
Once again, far from offering a dystopian or determinist position on technology, Marcuse's use of 
the term “submission” shows the extent to which he believed that the mass of individual labourers 
themselves had been seduced and placated by the “false needs” generated by the overall apparatus. 
As such, his concept of the end of technological rationality showed his respect and admiration for 
the potential of science and technics as historically generic capacities in virtue of the prospects they 
held if allowed free expression. However, and arguably most importantly: along with this was the 
requirement of widespread and fundamental attitudinal change, or the emergence of a “new 
84 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 49. 
85 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 162. (Emphasis added).
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sensibility”: 
...a different sensitivity as well as consciousness: men who would speak a different language, 
have different gestures, follow different impulses; who have developed an instinctual barrier 
against cruelty, brutality, ugliness.86 
As he optimistically thought, such change would engender a public mind “physically and mentally 
incapable of creating another Auschwitz.”87 Hence, Marcuse fell short of placing uncritical faith in 
technoscientific powers alone. Indeed, he noted is resistance to “all technological fetishism” and 
“ideas of the future omnipotence of technological man, of a “technological Eros”.88 This caveat 
appears as a cautionary note to those commentators (amongst which Marcuse includes various 
“Marxist critics of contemporary industrial society”),89 who would appear to conflate a pacified 
existence with an increase in the power of technoscience isolated from a new consciousness or 
sensibility.90 Just as technology may be reformed under new incentives, Marcuse believed such a 
new sensibility would lead to a very different approach to the natural environment. As it will be 
shown in more detail later, unlike a significant proportion of modern environmental theorists, 
Marcuse did not have a problem with the idea of human “mastery” over nature, but with the 
technological domination of nature in which it is reduced to mere inert matter and resources. 
Although, as it will be seen, Marcuse's concept of nature was not without its problems, he reminded 
that there are two forms of mastery: “a repressive and a liberating one.”91 In his view therefore, such 
concepts as mastery or management do not necessitate or imply domination or voracious, rapine 
inclinations, but are subject to the particular social mode of production under sway. 
Once again, Marcuse's discussion of the technological is highly reminiscent of the ontological work 
on the subject carried out by Heidegger some ten years prior to the publication of One-Dimensional  
Man.92 Indeed, as Feenberg sees it, the most 
...important vestige of Heidegger's influence is Marcuse's theory of the two dimensions of 
86 Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p. 21.
87 Marcuse, op.cit. (1979), p. 38.
88 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 239.
89 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 239.
90 As it will be argued in detail later, this criticism extends to various technological determinists as well as more recent 
advocates of the so-called "technological singularity". See chapter seven of this thesis.  
91 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 240.
92 See Heidegger, (1954), 'The Question Concerning Technology' in Basic Writings, edited by D.F. Krell, (New York: 
Harper & Rowe, 1977),  pp. 287-317
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society. Although his presentation of this theory in One-Dimensional Man does not reference 
Heidegger, on examination it reveals a remarkable resemblance to the argument of 'The 
Question Concerning Technology.' In fact Marcuse sketches a sort of 'history of being' that 
parallels Heidegger's account in his famous essay.93 
Marcuse's concept of technological rationality also bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Heidegger's concept of the “essence” of technology, which the latter names gestell, (usually 
translated as 'framework' or 'enframing'), an all-consuming ordering in which human agents and the 
natural environment are swept up into the “standing reserve”, where they are conceived and treated 
as resources.94 As other commentators have taken up these comparisons in detail, they will not be 
attended to at any length here, suffice to say Feenberg's comment that “Marcuse intended his own 
'history of being' as a politically charged alternative to Heidegger's” will be accepted over what 
follows.95 Contrary to Heidegger however, Marcuse's critique of the 'relation' of human to technics 
is arguably far clearer than his former teacher and colleague. For Heidegger, technology appears as 
a monolithic, apparently autonomous force; as “no mere human doing.”96 For Marcuse, 
technological rationality describes the growing tendency to construe and intentionally produce 
social relations, (i.e., relations between individuals, political arrangements, legal and social services, 
education, and economics) in terms of priorities and values normally ascribed to technical artifacts, 
hence efficiency, operationalism, and instrumentality, the theoretical background of the physical 
sciences, and the discourses associated with management and production come to be widely 
imposed on the lifeworld.97 As Marcuse wrote, “...when technics becomes the universal form of 
material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality – a 'world'”.98 
Through tracing the history of technological rationality to the twentieth century, grounded in his 
already rigorous critique of consumer capitalism, this concept arguably brings the incentives 
guiding modern production back into sharp focus by emphasising the extent to which the "new 
forms of control" were put to work to engender both a one-dimensional individual and society. 
Marcuse shows that the concept of rationalization confounds the control of labor by 
management with control of nature by technology. The search for control in nature is generic, 
but management arises only against a specific social background, the capitalist wage system. 
93 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 86.
94 See J. Malpas, Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World, (Boston, MASS: The MIT Press, 2006), p. 209. 
95 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 86.
96 Heidegger, op.cit. (1954), p. 300.
97 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), chapter seven.
98 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 158.
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Workers have no immediate interest in the output of this system, unlike earlier forms of farm 
and craft labor, since their wage is not essentially linked to the income of the firm. Control of 
human beings becomes all important in this context.99
Thought broadly, technological rationality consists “in a core set of characteristics that runs through 
a variety of types of action.”100 For Marcuse, it represents the inherently instrumental values and 
operating principles which are normally deemed appropriate in the design and function of artifacts, 
values such as efficiency, order, predictability, reliability, etc. This provides for a generally 
functionalist or instrumental appraisal of artifacts, the designs of which are ideally aligned to the 
tasks said artifact was produced to perform: the hammer to hammer, the container to contain, the 
refrigerator to refrigerate, etc. This does not mention the various ways in which technical artifacts 
may be turned to alternative uses, perhaps unintended (although perhaps also hoped for, but not 
envisioned) by the original designers.101 However, as Marcuse, and other members of the Frankfurt 
School had critically noted, technological rationality had widened and extended to the social realm, 
permitting the extension of its characteristic values to the social domains of ideology, culture, the 
family, etc., amounting to a means of ordering and standardising social relationships and individual 
behaviours. Hence, the 'second dimension' of rational-critical debate which Marcuse believed 
formerly served as a means of questioning the given was increasingly obscured. As Marcuse writes, 
“the decisive point” is that technological rationality
...dissolves all actions into a sequence of semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed mechanical 
norms—is not only perfectly rational but also perfectly reasonable. All protest is senseless, 
and the individual who would insist on his freedom of action would become a crank. There is 
no personal escape from the apparatus which has mechanized and standardized the world. It is 
a rational apparatus, combining utmost expediency with utmost convenience, saving time and 
energy, removing waste, adapting all means to the end, anticipating consequences, sustaining 
calculability and security.102
This situation was, Marcuse believed, historically specific as – in reference to his tracing of its 
99 Feenberg, 'Subversive Rationalisation', in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge, edited by A. Feenberg and A. 
Hannay, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 11.
100 L.C. Simpson, 'Technological Rationality', in Olsen et al, op.cit. (2009), p. 189. 
101 In various "open source" projects, from "homebrew" software programs to mods and other sorts of adaptations, the 
original design of certain technical artifacts invites users to modify the original design and turn it to other 
constructive uses. Again, in Marcusean terms, such examples appears to show how the 'technical' both precedes – 
and may exceed – the 'technological'. 
102 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 46.
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emergence prior to and after the industrial revolution into the twentieth century – technology 
decreasingly served democratic or liberating roles in society, but had taken on a controlling, 
regimenting aspect. More precisely today, it is a force directed under the auspices of profit, rather 
than satisfying immediate and pressing instrumental needs. Thus, for Marcuse, “technology and 
technological systems are embedded in a variety of social, political and economic contexts – 
contexts that ultimately shape the concrete form that material technologies and technological 
processes will assume.”103 One need not go far to note the extent of technological language in 
managerial discourse, corporate jargon, and government press releases. For a society supposedly 
overtly resistant to the objectification or reduction of persons to numbers or statistics, the way 
workers are stimulated into compliance with pregiven “performance targets”, “benchmarks” all 
aimed at generating “positive outcomes”, and the tendency for such “weasel words” to infest 
everyday speech has never been more prevalent. As Heidegger noted critically, the “...talk of human 
resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic” is now so ubiquitous and widely accepted as to 
be barely noticeable.104 Friends and acquaintances are referred to as “support networks” or 
“contacts”; hospital deaths become “negative patient outcomes”, and obstacles, difficulties, or 
barriers are reduced to mere “challenges” to which “solutions” must be attained. Hence, this 
operationalistic tendency appears as a strong indication of the technologically-rational content of 
language and speech.105 Merely anecdotal evidence is sufficient to argue that engaging in such 
banter is not merely accepted but encouraged as a means of personal and professional legitimation 
under the current ordering of advanced industrial society. Thus, it can be seen that technological 
rationality describes a mechanical tendency which serves to administer and order human subjects, 
bringing their performances, ideas and opinions into productive conformity. Subsequently, many of 
those aspects of the life-world that are not necessarily amenable to such means of evaluation and 
quantification – or, those which may be highly resistant to them – came to engender a pervasive 
value-neutrality, resulting in what Marcuse referred to as “a pattern of mind and behavior which 
justified and absolved even the most destructive and oppressive features of the enterprise.”106 In the 
public sphere, this pervasive pretense to impartiality regarding normative claims has arguably had 
the effect of devaluing and effectively sequestering many forms of discourse and critique that can 
be routinely countered as merely subjective, relative, 'ideological' or reflective of only personal 
tastes or preferences. Informed or educated judgment, if not consigned to the ever more exclusive 
103 Simpson, op.cit.  (2009), p. 189
104 Heidegger, op.cit. (1954), p. 299. (Emphasis added).
105 For a large collection of such terms, see the works or D. Watson, specifically, Watson's Dictionary of Weasel  
Words: Contemporary Clichés, Cant and Management Jargon, (Sydney: Knopf, 2004), and Bendable Learnings: 
The Wisdom of Modern Management, (Sydney: Knopf, 2009). 
106 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 149.
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and narrow domains of 'experts' and 'specialists', comes to be treated as examples of supposedly 
fossilized and outmoded 'grand-narrative' approaches to philosophical, historical and other topics, a 
pervasive attitude that, although welcomed in many academic domains, has had its most powerful 
pronouncements trickle down into the public sphere as if they were (paradoxically of course) gospel 
truth. In other words, critique of the current arrangement appears to be reduced a priori to the 
slippery slopes of value preference and personal subjectivity.107 
Marcuse contended that the predominance of technological rationality arises out of the success of 
the modern sciences, the quantification and prediction of nature, not through a “specific societal 
application of the sciences”, but from values “inherent in pure science even when no practical 
purposes were intended: 
The quantification of nature, which led to its explication in terms of mathematical structures, 
separated reality from all inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the good, 
science from ethics (…) The precarious link between Logos and Eros is broken, and scientific 
rationality emerges as essentially neutral.108
Yet, if technological rationality – in its practical application – aims toward quantifiability, exactness, 
accuracy and realism, how is it that its social / ideological manifestation appears to represent the 
very opposite? Put simply, as it carries out its functional role in ordering and engendering human 
performances, speech and behaviours, other important concerns (ethical, existential, ontological) 
appear to be conveniently passed over. “Conveniently”, because it is most opportune that the sort of 
deeper questions Marcuse was asking are given license to be left in abeyance. In other words, 
Marcuse was not simply complaining about the spread of 'scientism' into the life-world or claiming 
“...that the philosophy of contemporary physics denies or even questions the reality of the external 
world”, instead he is emphasising that “in one way or another, (science) suspends judgment on what 
reality itself may be, or considers the very question meaningless and unanswerable.”109 This 
supposed 'impartiality' (which, again, is quite appropriate in “strategic-instrumental” domains), now 
appears to apply to an increasing list of vital human concerns.110 Under technological rationality; 
107 Arguably, this tendency is most prevalent in the so-called 'postmodern' movement, typified by the ongoing debate 
between Júrgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. For an overview, see The Derrida-Habermas Reader, edited by L. 
Thomassen, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). For a formidable critique of postmodernism from a 
Marxian perspective, see A. Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).  
108 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 150.
109 See Marcuse, ibid. (1964), pp. 154-155.
110 The term 'strategic-instrumental action / rationality' is owed to J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action,  
vol.1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984). 
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positivism came to be practically construed as the domain of objective fact,111 whereas other ideas – 
values, spirituality, notions of 'the Good'; the concept of substance; etc. were “de-realised”;112 not so 
much 'disproven' as excised from discussion and hence rendered “ideal”. As a result, it is 
unsurprising that they were effectively impotent in their power to critically challenge the socio-
political or economic status quo. As Marcuse surmised: 
If the Good and the Beautiful, Peace and Justice cannot be derived either from ontological or 
scientific-rational conditions, they cannot logically claim universal validity and realization. In 
terms of scientific reason, they remain matters of preference, and no resuscitation of some 
kind of Aristotelian or Thomistic philosophy can save the situation, for it is a priori refuted by 
scientific reason. The unscientific character of these ideas fatally weakens the opposition to 
the established reality; the ideas become mere ideals, and their concrete, critical content 
evaporates into the ethical or metaphysical atmosphere.113   
It is hardly surprising then, under the current arrangement the idea of an alternative society – one 
which, (say) was no longer so completely ordered under the auspices of economic growth alone – 
can seem utopian not merely to the majority of the public, but to the majority of "experts". 
Questioning the mode of production is therefore easily dismissed; consigned to the same 
predicament as the 'Good', the 'Beautiful', or the status of a universalisable basis of moral conduct. 
The most immediate, basic questions confronted by such prospects are stalled by such elementary 
'critique' as "who's definition of a better society?", "by what or who's standard is it better?", etc., 
etc., ad infinitum. This is arguably not merely mistaking a lack of answers in practise for a lack of 
answers in principle, but serves to sideline genuine rational-critical debate of the status quo as a 
whole. To be sure, the appearance, if not the end of rational-critical debate are tolerated within the 
one-dimensional society in a manner sufficiently evident on the surface to give the appearance of 
being highly democratic, but on ethical and even certain practical subjects, many important debates 
seldom reach solutions. For a prominent example of this tendency, consider mass-media's treatment 
of the 'debate' concerning the theory of anthropogenic climate-change. Whilst the media strive to 
appear to carry out their function in providing an avenue of debate and information, in reality they 
commonly fall victim to the balance fallacy (otherwise known as the fallacy of false balance), 
which ensures that – despite the large-majority of the weight of scientific evidence being on one 
111 Marcuse cites Herbert Dingler, who wrote that physics “does not measure the objective qualities of the external and 
material world – these are only the results obtained by the accomplishment of such operations.” See Marcuse, op.cit.  
(1964), p. 152.
112 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 151.
113 Marcuse, ibid. (1964).
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side of the theory – the detractors, (incorrectly labelled "sceptics"), enjoy equal airtime to promote 
their views. However, as an indication of the false balance on this topic, a survey of the abstracts of 
928 peer-reviewed articles on 'global climate change' published between 1993 and 2003 in 
respected scientific journals found that exactly none disagreed with the contention that human 
activities are the primary causes of global warming.114 In another more recent survey of the opinions 
of geophysicists and meteorologists, 97 percent agreed that "global average temperatures have 
increased", with 84 percent saying they believe that human activities are the cause, 65 percent 
agreeing that television news was "not very" or "not at all" reliable as a source of information on 
global climate change, and similar figures were reported in regard to its coverage by local 
newspapers.115 It seems therefore, that there is significant evidence that the politically-correct 
imperative to present both sides of the story does not always improve the public's grasp of such 
important problems, but allows them the false assurance that the decision is, ultimately up to them. 
However, science is not a democracy. In the particular context of anthropogenic climate change, 
ignorance is potentially perilous, but appears to be a boon for the continuation of 'business as usual'. 
Another possible example of this tendency to resist criticism involves the growing discrepancies 
between income in the affluent nations (let alone when the average earnings of affluent individuals 
are compared to 'underdeveloped' nations). Consider the salaries of various CEOs compared with 
their colleagues.116 Even despite the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, any hope of reforming 
such drastic discrepancies seems consigned to theory, one again lubricated by a normative sense of 
impartiality that rules against one's earnings being open to criticism and scrutiny.117 Rights tend to 
exceed and displace responsibilities and obligations; as the super-affluent few defend their 
"freedom" to continue to improve their credit ratings, those who have no hope of perhaps ever even 
gaining one languish in powerlessness and obscurity. For Marcuse, this stultification of critique was 
therefore not merely regrettable, but tragic, as outside the means of verifiability employed by the 
empirical sciences is an entire world, a world 
...of values, and values separated out from the objective reality become subjective. The only 
114 See N. Oreskes, 'Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change', in Science, vol. 306: 5702 
(December, 2004), p. 1686. For an overview of global climate change science and politics, see A.E. Dessler and 
E.A. Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) and J. Houghton, Global Warming: The Complete Briefing, 4th ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
115 See the summary by S.R. Lichter, 'Climate Scientists Agree on Warming, Disagree on Dangers, and Don't Trust the 
Media's Coverage of Climate Change', STATS Survey, (George Mason University, 2008). 
116 See Wolff, op.cit. (2010), and Domhoff, op.cit. (1990).
117 Ironically, the wages of politicians are not afforded the same level of impartiality.
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way to rescue some abstract and harmless validity for them seems to be a metaphysical 
sanction (divine and natural law). (…) No matter how much they may be recognized, 
respected, and sanctified, in their own right, they suffer from being non-objective. But 
precisely their lack of objectivity makes them into factors of social cohesion. Humanitarian, 
religious, and moral ideas are only “ideal”; they don't disturb unduly the established way of 
life, and are not invalidated by the fact that they are contradicted by a behavior dictated by the 
daily necessities of business and politics.118 
As such, the critique of modernity mirrors the critique of the modern socio-economic, technological 
status quo; in effectively disregarding direct answers, encouragement of open-ended toleration and 
an almost paranoid resistance to notions of absolute truth permeates not only everyday political and 
social discussion, but also elements of academic, socio-political, philosophical critique. All the 
while, technological rationality operates and expands happily. As has been argued here, Marcuse 
shows that this arrangement serves a specific (yet not necessarily conscious) function: as a means of 
redirecting rational-critical debate away from the many concrete issues of practical and ethical 
exigency which are unwelcome to those who benefit from the reproduction of the capitalist status 
quo. Politically, technological rationality is therefore at home in both the traditional political right 
and left which continue to maintain a charade of fundamental disagreement on certain social issues. 
It can be described as a “charade” for the reason that neither faction, whether Tory or Labor in the 
United Kingdom, Republican or Democrat in the United States, or Liberal or Labor in Australia, 
appear willing to disturb the imperative of perpetual economic growth, but keep it operating in an 
optimal fashion. This serves as an effective filter to those who may hold such questions to be of the 
utmost import. In accord with the cosmeticist faith – all problems or contradictions are cast as as 
merely challenges to be solved by increases in efficiency or funding.119 Indeed, potential 
interference in this almost religious techno-economic faith may not only count as risks to growth 
but risk to votes, hence it could only be rational to place one's political reliance in an ethos that 
could not only offer quantification, calculation, prediction and measurement on the one hand; the 
victory of Logos over Eros and Mythos, but had also proven itself in bringing about vast increases 
in levels of affluence visible in the advanced industrial nations of the present day. Here was a 
system that – quite simply, visibly, worked; hence, any questioning of its tendencies that do gain 
118 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 151.
119 For alternative approaches which lead to very similar conclusions as Marcuse, see N. Postman, Technopoly: The  
Surrender of Culture to Technology, (New York: Vintage, 1993); see L. Winner, 'Techné and Politeia: The Technical 
Constitution of Society', in Controlling Technology: Contemporary Issues, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), 
pp. 291-303. The term 'cosmeticism' is owed to W.R. Catton Jr., Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary  
Change, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1982).
78
any prominence are easily dismissed as criticisms of “progress”. Given this situation, the reasons as 
to why Marcuse's critique quickly diminished in popularity soon after his death are arguably 
implicit in his own work: under the current condition of technological rationality, the object of the 
second dimension of critical reason is suspended and “made into a methodological principle” that 
guards against such 'utopian' critiques as Marcuse's own. He expands on the implications as 
follows:  
...this suspension has a twofold consequence: (a) it strengthens the shift of theoretical 
emphasis from the metaphysical “what is …?” to the functional “How...?”, and (b) it 
establishes a practical (though by no means absolute) certainty which, in its operations with 
matter, is with good conscience free from commitment to any substance outside the 
operational context (…) To the degree to which this conception becomes applicable and 
effective in reality, the latter is approached as a (hypothetical) system of instrumentalities; the 
metaphysical “being-as-such” gives way to “being-instrument.” Moreover, proved in its 
effectiveness, this conception works as an a priori – it determines experience, it projects the 
direction of the transformation of nature, it organizes the whole.120  
For philosophers of technology still debating whether technology can be understood as applied 
science, Marcuse arguably shows that science and technics are increasingly oriented toward 
exchange value rather than use value.121  Science and technology come to increasingly rely on each 
other, but the horizon of neutrality in the scientific domain has now extended into the “essential 
neutrality of technics.”122 What is deemed reasonable, valuable, interesting or otherwise worthwhile 
to pursue scientifically comes to be ever-more determined by what can be derived from it which 
may lead to sources of profit. Even experimental research is ultimately contingent on economic 
rationality; whether it can “deliver the goods” or at least stand a good chance of accidentally 
revealing some discovery that may.123 Once cast as an independent search for knowledge which was 
considered valuable in itself, technological rationality and economic expediency have integrated 
120 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 155.
121 The view of technology as applied science was noted early by Francis Bacon, who argued that the purpose of the 
human sciences is to reveal “Knowledge of Causes, and Secrett Motions of Things; and the Englarging of the 
bounds of Humane Empire, to the Effecting of all Things possible”. The purpose of knowledge was that it formed 
the means to which this end could be sought, and was to be embodied in technics. See F. Bacon, (1627), 'On the 
Idols and on the Scientific Study of Nature', excerpt from his New Atlantis: Or, Voyage to the Land of the  
Rosicrucians, in Scharff and Dusek, (eds.), op.cit. (2005), p. 31. For a more recent discussion of technology as 
applied science, see M. Bunge, 'The Philosophical Richness of Technology', in PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial  
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2 (1976), pp. 153-172. On the topic in general, see R.C. Scharff, 
'Technology as Applied Science' in Olsen, et al, (eds.), op.cit. (2009), pp. 160-164.
122 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 158.
123 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 46,
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much scientific work into the technological mode of production, and consigned many of the hours 
once spent in the field to filling out grant applications. As Marcuse explained, without reducing the 
scientific enterprise entirely to the status of a tool of profit-making, he emphasised the extent to 
which an “instrumentalist horizon” in the sense of an “a priori 'intuition' or apprehension” had 
come to preface and pre-define much of the work it carries out.124 Although science has been 
focused on here, arguably similar critiques may be leveled in regard to technological rationality's 
colonisation of education, medicine, social work, the arts and entertainment industries, and even 
“free time”, which becomes “directed leisure”.125 Once again, just as the nature of capitalism is to 
absorb and sell anything deemed potentially profitable, the nature of technological rationality is to 
make use of whatever it touches; its essence: “...to compel the qualitative to become the 
quantitative."126 Under the guiding direction of the former, the latter comes to be propelled by a 
singular incentive, amounting to a highly efficient, yet also often highly risky or even destructive 
pairing of mutual benefit.127 Even previously non-technological, or even anti-technological domains 
come to be defined and evaluated primarily on the basis of their instrumental / economic potential, 
and thus function to sell or reaffirm the status quo. For this to be possible, traditional production 
must be accompanied by an 'ideological' extra productive aspect: in short, the values driving 
traditional production must be extended from their technical instantiations to the social domain. 
With the success of capitalism, the global increase of trade, commerce and communication, 
Marcuse contended that technological rationality had increasingly replaced the role previously held 
by agents of authority, but instead of being turned to alleviating the “struggle for existence”,128 
humanity's augmentative powers were now used to bolster and rigidify the age-old struggle of 
competition and commerce; 
In the social reality, despite all change, the domination of man by man is still the historical 
continuum that links pre-technological and technological Reason. However, the society which 
projects and undertakes the technological transformation of nature alters the base of 
domination by gradually replacing personal dependence (of the slave on the master, the serf 
124 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 160.
125 Marcuse, op.cit. (1979), p. 35. Despite increases in affluence, rates of work and overtime in many affluent nations 
continues to grow. See for example, C. Hamilton & R. Denniss, Affluenza: When too Much is Never Enough,  
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2005), p. 5.
126 See J. Wilkinson, 'Translator's Preface' to Ellul, op.cit. (1964), p.xvi.
127 On the potential existential risks posed by modern technoscience, see N. Bostrom, 'Existential Risks: Analysing 
Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards', in The Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol.9, no.1, (2002); 
Global Catastrophic Risks, edited by N. Bostrom and M.M. Ćirković, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); M. 
Rees, Our Final Century? (London: Vintage, 2004); J. Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of  
Human Extinction, (London: Routledge, 1996) and R. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
128 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 148.
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on the lord of the manor, the lord on the donor of the fief, etc.) with dependence on an 
“objective order of things” (on economic laws, the market, etc.).129 
Under the “matter-of-factness” conferred by technological rationality,130 the values of individual 
reason that had formed the second, critical dimension of society therefore came to be suppressed 
and redirected toward profitable production, uniformity of interest, and “rationalisation”.131 Those 
actions, behaviours, attitudes or technological artifacts that are obviously not counter-productive to 
the prevailing incentives are obviously endorsed and often drawn into it for productive purposes; 
but often so are those that may appear to be resistant, or even antithetical to the status quo. If not, 
they arguably tend to be ignored, undermined, rendered obsolete, dismissed as 'utopian', counter-
productive or merely preferential. In short, technological rationality productively appropriates 
whatever can be deemed of use to its somewhat limited scope of evaluation, liquidating 
...all reference to essence and potentiality. It aims at classification, quantification, and control. 
It admits no tension between true and false being and makes no distinction between 
preferences and potentialities. The empirically observed thing is the only reality and truth and 
falsehood apply only to propositions about it. (…) Modern reason flattens out the difference 
between the essential potentialities of things and merely subjective desires. It declares its 
“neutrality” over against the essences which govern the earlier technai. Arbitrarily chosen 
values are placed on the same plane as essences and no ontological or normative privilege 
attaches to the latter. It is this abstention from essentializing that gives modern reason its 
peculiar positivist self-understanding as purified of social influences.132 
As economic growth informs and motivates technical advance and proliferation, the latter tends to 
unfurl in a manner largely unfettered by social or philosophical critique, and as was noted 
previously, mainstream politics appears to be of little help due to its own overtly declared adherence 
to the growth imperative. The final alternative for Marcuse was therefore to appeal to people's 
attitudes and sensibilities. If change could be affected in this domain, the potential could be opened 
up for a new kind of society coupled with a new approach to the natural environment. If liberated 
from its current direction: 
129 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 147.
130 The phrase “matter-of-factness” is once again owed to Lewis Mumford. See his 1934 book, Technics and 
Civilization, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963).
131 For his opinions on Weberian social theory and the concept of rationalisation, see Marcuse, op.cit. (1969a).
132 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 87.
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...technical experimentation, science and technology would and could become a play with the 
hitherto hidden – methodically hidden and blocked – potentialities of men and things, society 
and nature (…) This means one of the oldest dreams of all radical theory and practice. It 
means that the creative imagination, and not only the rationality of the performance principle, 
would become a productive force applied to the transformation of the social and natural 
universe. It would mean the emergence of a form of reality which is the work and the medium 
of developing sensibility and sensitivity of man.133
To summarise what has been said thus far, it may be helpful to point out what Marcuse was not 
saying. Firstly, although his critical-social theory was radical by today's standards, labelling him a 
utopian thinker is arguably an exaggeration. As Andrew Feenberg explains, the radical nature of 
Marcuse's philosophical approach should not be surprising given he was imagining how modern 
society may “appear to a backward glance rooted in the wider context of values evolved over past 
centuries and destined to achieve realisation in future ones.”134 In other words, if a time-traveller 
from a century ago were to travel to the affluent societies of the early twenty-first century, she 
would likely be impressed by the average living conditions she witnessed, the diversity of 
foodstuffs and gadgets, the innovative medical techniques, and so on. By analogy, Marcuse was 
hoping the same could be said of civilisation a century from today. Of course, much would have to 
changed: the forces arrayed against qualitative change were and are considerable, the means and 
relations of production appear as “one-dimensional” as they were when Marcuse was attending to 
them, and the now almost singular emphasis on perpetual economic growth on the part of 
governments, corporations, as well as the wider public is arguably stronger than ever.135 Under the 
current arrangement, technical and scientific potential is turned toward the incentives of power, 
control and the profit of these “vested interests”, (as Marcuse defined them: “hierarchical private 
bureaucracies that enforce division”), and away from the democratisation of functions that 
technological rationality – taken to its logical end – appears to affirm.136 However, this arrangement 
is now no longer stultifying for the project of social / individual liberation, rather, the perpetual 
reproduction of the capitalist status quo now arguably threatens the environmental basis which 
forms the precondition of social flourishing per se. Secondly, Marcuse was neither calling for 
reductions in material affluence or “work”, on the contrary, he was tracing the possibilities for 
creative work, beyond the “realm of necessity” which advancing techniques such as automation also 
133 Marcuse, op.cit. (1967b), p. 83.
134 See Feenberg's comment in Marcuse, op.cit. (1979), p. 40.
135 See the subsequent chapter. 
136 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1941a), p. 152. 
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appear to affirm: 
...to make the work is necessary, and will remain necessary, but it will be a very different kind 
of work. What is no longer necessary is that the human organism as a whole is mainly an 
instrument of toil (I don't say work). The technical term is alienated work. Pleasure is 
relegated to marginal hours of the day, or of the night. This in my view is a perversion of the 
human being itself. Nothing in the human being says that it has to be this way. And to the 
degree to which society succeeds in abolishing scarcity – to the degree to which society 
actually succeeds in utilizing and distributing the available resources according to the needs of 
all citizens – that is to say, primarily the abolition of misery, poverty, oppression, whatever it 
is, to that degree this perversion in human existence can be remedied.137 
Marcuse's approach hence also rules out simplistic reductions that would pit the individual against 
'the system', or free agents against an oppressive, deterministic technological edifice. Rather, 
Marcuse argued that technics and humanity both come to be subject to a deeper set of incentives 
that increasing numbers – despite having little choice but to participate within them – also feel quite 
free and happy to take on for understandable reasons. As a result, for most individuals the grounds 
of revolutionary class-consciousness are hardly ruled out on the basis of an iron fist, but are 
ameliorated and pacified, rendered largely irrelevant, and to varying extents, the entire mass of 
society finds itself labouring to reproduce the necessary conditions of the renewal of capitalism. 
The individual is not simply placated, numbed "brainwashed" by a cold, calculating system that lies 
in opposition to her wants and interests – on the contrary – it is the predominant source of her wants 
and interests. The one-dimensional individual is not merely distracted or somnambulated by her 
increased capacity to purchase surplus commodities, even though she may be dazzled by the 
prospect. Rather, the "one-dimensional existence" is one that is manufactured, as well as agreed and 
consented to – even viscerally defended – by the society at large who tend to view it as the only 
option.138 Such a situation requires technological rationality to become operative at the level of the 
actual goals, attitudes and aspirations of individuals themselves, rather than serving as merely the 
physical means by which regimentation is enacted. In other words, technological rationality and the 
technological mode of production denote the production of both artifacts and social attitudes, hence, 
in any epoch, let alone the modern one, the philosophy of technology must not be isolated to the 
discussion of technical artifacts alone. One cannot ignore the incentives guiding production without 
137 Marcuse, op.cit. (1979), p. 30.
138 See Ocay, op.cit. (2010), p. 61.
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acknowledging both the base-level human interests that guide it, and specifically, the distinctly 
human monetary incentives which play such formative roles both in their social relations and 
productive performances. Marcuse's social critique is therefore offering a significantly more diverse 
basis upon which the role of modern technology in the advanced industrial society can be criticised 
than many other thinkers who place the source of social problems in such domains as the 
diminution of the influence of religion, the 'breakdown' of the family, the advent of 'mass-society', 
urbanisation, the rising influence of the media, or the growth of corporatism. To the extent that these 
factors exist and are in play, they do not get to the root of the problem. As Marcuse wrote: 
...an entire dimension of human reality finds itself suppressed: the dimension which permits 
individuals and classes to develop a theory and a practice of transcendence (dépassement) and 
to envisage the 'determinate negation' of their society. Radical critique and effective 
opposition (intellectual as well as political) finds itself from now on integrated into the status 
quo; human existence becomes 'one-dimensional'. Such an integration cannot be explained 
solely by the emergence of mass culture, the organization man, or the Hidden Persuaders,  
etc.; these notions belong to a purely ideological interpretation which neglects the analysis of 
fundamental processes: processes which undermine the base upon which the radical 
opposition could develop.139
If Marcuse's critique is sound, under technological rationality, the one-dimensional society 
represents the success of an effort to impose the methods of production on the society itself; 
individuals literally become objects of a colossal “engineering project”. The individual is 
sufficiently shaped and molded so as to emerge as a receptive and amenable operant / participant in 
the technical system as a whole where she takes on her role as a consumer / producer. To reiterate: 
this is not always against her will, but is conducted in such a manner as to cultivate her willingness 
to exchange her labour for material rewards gained from productive activity and to make her 
sufficiently gratified by the yearns and desires collective labour itself contrives to generate. Such a 
one-dimensional existence, a rationality that appears thoroughly focused on the hedonic treadmill of 
self-gratification, instrumental reason, ethical relativism and hyper materialism, and whose hopes 
for the future include merely elevated levels of the same, appears to represent a significant obstacle 
for a turn toward Marcusean qualitative change, let alone the necessary goal of living in accord with 
the carrying capacity of the Earth. 
139 Marcuse, 'De l'ontologie à la technologie: les tendences de la société industrielle' Arguments, 4, no. 18 (1960), cited 
in Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 239.
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In accord with the aforementioned bipolarity or multidimensional nature of his critical-social 
theory, the veracity of Marcuse's criticism of technological rationality can be seen as inversely 
proportional to the extent to which it cancelled out the very hopes of the latent prospects it itself 
projects for the human future. The promise of technology is therefore betrayed and undermined by 
the domination of economic incentives which are one step removed from praxis. Rather than being 
turned toward the goals of a “free human realisation” in which humanity could transcend the “hard 
struggle for life, business and power”,140 releasing “individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of 
freedom beyond necessity”, the promise and potential offered by the end of technological rationality 
is closed off, with technics being turned to ever more efficient exploitation of the natural 
environment, and in the social realm, becoming a system of mass psycho-social control. Were the 
overall direction of production to alter, to be allowed "free expression", the individual
…would be liberated from the work world's imposing upon him alien needs and alien 
possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would be his 
own. If the productive apparatus could be organized and directed toward the satisfaction of 
vital needs, its control might well be centralized; such control would not prevent individual 
autonomy, but render it possible in actual fact, however, the contrary trend operates: instead 
of fulfilling the individual's natural requirements for autonomy, the individual is drafted into 
the service of the system as a constituent.141
Whether more individual autonomy rather than less will provide an answer to many of the 
environmental questions humanity now faces in regard to its technological 'experiment' appears to 
be an open question, but today, it is one that demands concrete, concerted action before the luxury 
of the possibility of voluntary action dwindles further. In this context, it is arguably on this point 
that Marcuse's contentions are at their darkest, as the one-dimensional individual has become so 
accommodated into believing that capitalism is not just superior to alternative configurations of 
society, so 'natural' as to be 'second-nature', but that it is the sole contender. Alternatives are greeted 
not just with ambivalence or disinterest as such, rather, one-dimensional society is scarcely capable 
of envisioning the need for them. As Marcuse noted, "today, the prevailing type of individual is no 
longer capable of seizing the fateful moment which constitutes his freedom. He has changed his 
function; from a unit of resistance and autonomy, he has passed to one of ductility and 
140 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 160.
141 Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 5.
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adjustment".142 Hence, if Marcuse's impressions of the one-dimensional society are at all accurate, it 
appears that the likelihood of qualitative change is inversely proportional to efforts placed upon 
containing just this possibility, and as we have seen, the efforts are considerable; spanning almost 
all sectors of individual social and work life as well government and the wider community. The 
uncritical matter of factness afforded to the status quo, (continual growth in population, affluence 
and consumption), appear firmly set in, but they are occurring at the precise moment at which the 
exploitative power of the means of production are at their apex, a "tipping point" at which the 
finitude of the planetary "resource base" has never been clearer, and from which much of the low-
hanging fruit has already been located and plucked.143  Unless the contingency the technological 
mode of production places on the notion of perpetual growth is earnestly reassessed, sooner or later, 
a very different sort of socialism than that advocated by Marcuse looms as a potential future for 
global civilisation. Hence, voluntary adaptive and mitigative action – no matter how difficult – 
appears far preferable to a world in which first-nature once again assumes the commanding status it 
had for the vast majority of H. sapiens' evolutionary development. 
142 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 152.
143 See for example, R. Heinberg, The End of Growth: Adapting to our New Economic Reality, (Gabriola Island: New 
Society Publishers, 2011). On the oil crisis, see M. Yeomans, Oil, (New York: The Free Press, 2005); R. Heinberg, 
The Party's Over: Oil, War, and the Fate  of Industrial Society, 2nd ed., (Forest Row: Claireview Books, 2005); and 
P. Tertzakian, A Thousand Barrels a Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy  




Marcuse on the Contradictions of Perpetual Growth
For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, 
whether he have sufficient to finish it?1
This chapter will suggest that Marcuse's philosophy of technology can be applied to  modern 
environmental and politico-economic concerns. Rather than dismissing his call for qualitative social 
change as utopian or continuing to emphasise his critique of capitalism, it will be argued that 
environmental problems emerging from the current direction of technological development under 
an imperative of perpetual growth instead lends some support for his call for significant "qualitative 
change".   
Marcuse's critique of the current politico-economic status quo was conducted from the vantage 
point of a hypothetical liberated future society in which technology had been directed to its 
appropriate ends. These 'ends' consisted in directing technological powers to the construction of an 
individual liberated from what Marcuse considered were the stultifying effects of the affluent 
society. As Marcuse contended, the question for social theory asks "how can (these) resources be 
used for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs and faculties with a minimum 
amount of toil or misery?"2 Although there is little doubt that he was staunchly critical of capitalism 
in almost all respects, his critique was not based in a specifically economic context. As a 
philosopher of concrete praxis, he was concerned with broader meta-economic contradictions he 
believed had arisen in affluent, consumer capitalist nation states as a result of a collective 
misdirection of technological development. In making his case, Marcuse outlined what he took to 
be a number of contradictions which had arisen not through an excess of materialism, nor through 
1 St. Luke, chapter 14, v.28.
2 Marcuse, (1964), 'The Paralysis of Criticism: Society Without Opposition', Introduction to the first edition of One-
Dimensional Man, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. xli. 
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the auspices of a seemingly autonomous Orwellian technological order, but from the 'artificial' 
suspension and misdirection of technical capacities away from extending and augmenting human 
powers to a system of regulation and conformity which hindered their expression. Marcuse outlined 
some of these contradictions as follows:  
The union of growing productivity and growing destruction; the brinkmanship of annihilation; 
the surrender of thought, hope, and fear to the decisions of the powers that be; the 
preservation of misery in the face of unprecedented wealth constitute the most impartial 
indictment – even if they are not the raison d'être of this society but only its by product: its 
sweeping rationality, which propels efficiency and growth, is itself irrational.3 
For Marcuse, technology had become a means of mass social organisation and control; instead of 
using the saved labour time made possible through advances in automation with more 'free' time, 
increasing levels of productivity and efficiency were channelled into the production of surplus 
products which – for Marcuse – represented "false needs"; false in that they were deceptively 
marketed, sold, and taken on as necessities. The implications of Marcuse's indictment are 
considerable: if it is the case that “...the continued acceptance of domination no longer prevailed, 
that scarcity and the need for toil were only 'artificially' perpetuated – in the interests of preserving 
the system of domination”,4 the benefits of technical and scientific progress were at best hindered, 
or at worst canceled. As he wrote: “It has frequently been stressed that scientific discoveries and 
inventions are shelved as soon as they seem to interfere with the requirements of profitable 
marketing. The necessity which is the mother of inventions is to a great extent the necessity of 
maintaining and expanding the apparatus."5 Marcuse then echoes Thorstein Veblen's claim that in 
such a monopolistic system, driven by the competitive urge to keep up with innovation or perish, 
"invention is the mother of necessity."6 This contention can be strengthened when one considers the 
establishment's attitude toward recent innovations such as the internet. For example, the greatly 
increased possibility of sharing and acquiring information have – to say the least – hardly been 
greeted with enthusiasm by defenders of copyright laws, intellectual property, or traditional 
exchange relations. Indeed, from the perspective of mainstream legal, political and economic 
discourse, these new capacities are commonly denounced as thievery, or more specifically "piracy". 
This is not to argue of course that all technical innovations should automatically be made available 
3 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), pp. xliii-xliv. 
4 Marcuse, 'Political Preface' to Eros and Civilization, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 11.
5 Marcuse, (1941), 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in D. Kellner (ed.), Technology, War and 
Fascism: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, (New York: Routledge, 1998). p. 46. 
6 Marcuse, ibid. (1941).
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to the public; however, it arguably bears out Marcuse's contention. Yet despite its radical nature, 
Marcuse based it chiefly on a relatively conservative understanding of the appropriate role of 
technology, one that most would likely accept. 
For Marcuse, however it may come to be defined, technics is an augmentative phenomenon. 
Conventional and 'common sense' understanding views technical artifacts as opening up the 
potential of new capacities or to make other tasks easier, more accurate, manageable, productive, 
etc. They provide extensions or prostheses to human (and indeed, to non-human) sensory and 
physiological capacities and their advance and innovation adds to this process, accelerating levels of 
efficiency in pre-existing tasks and revealing further avenues of instrumental potential. In short, the 
question of human progress in terms of our moral conduct may at least be debateable, however – for 
better or worse – there can be little doubting the rate of technical and scientific progress in the 
modern period. As efficiency levels rise and capacities increase related potentials emerge: one the 
one hand, such advances imply that the requirement of labour under necessity may diminish, freeing 
up time for workers to be spent pursuing their own interests aside from the differed incentive of 
earning a wage. Commenting on some passages from Lionel Stoleru, André Gorz wrote: 
Stoleru, by contrast with the majority of political leaders and apologists for the employers, 
admits that the current technical changes save on working hours across the whole of society  
and not just on the scale of particular enterprises: they allow more and better production using 
fewer working hours and less capital; they allow not only wage costs to be reduced but also 
costs in capital per unit produced. Computerization and robotization have, then, an economic 
rationality, which is characterized precisely by the desire to economize, that is, to use the 
factors of production as efficiently as possible (...) From the point of view of economic 
rationality, the working time saved across the whole of society, thanks to the increasing 
efficiency of the means used, constitutes working time made available for the production of 
additional wealth.7 
The stakes have risen considerably since Marcuse's time, and it is now no longer only the 'artificial' 
plight of the worker under the technologically rational, one-dimensional ordering of the politico-
economic status quo that is in question, but the entropy defying nature of the global productive 
system as a whole which looms as a threat. In short, a mode of production that resists 
acknowledging limitations and seeks only growth – if left unfettered – will eventually reach the 
7 A. Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, 2nd ed., (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 2-3. 
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limits of its resource base. This entails that the question concerning technology is now existential  
rather than only political, economic, or philosophical. In short, the conditions for liberation from 
necessary labour consist in the extent to which technological innovation and the social ordering had 
rendered the need for it obsolete, and as was noted previously, Marcuse believed sufficient levels of 
innovation for such changes had been reached by the mid-twentieth century.8 In this manner, 
Marcuse and Gorz were repeating the calls of earlier libertarian socialists such as William Morris 
who distinguished “useful work” from “useless toil”.9 Bertrand Russell summarised the position in 
1935: 
Modern methods of production have given us the possibility of ease and security for all; we 
have chosen, instead, to have overwork for some and starvation for the others. Hitherto we 
have continued to be as energetic as we were before there were machines; in this we have 
been foolish, but there is no reason to go on being foolish for ever.10
Arguably by most indications, the path that Russell described as “foolish” continues to be enacted 
and pursued in earnest today. Yet further compounding the situation is a certain externality that 
neither Russell nor Marcuse could likely have predicted would appear on the horizon so soon: 
ecological overshoot. Today, problems such as anthropogenic climate change, decreasing supplies 
of easily accessible fresh water, as well as a number of less well-known 'exotic' threats emerging 
from technology itself have – for certain thinkers – rationalised placing it in the category of 
prominent existential risks.11 Hence, rather than a set of tools utilised to further human flourishing 
and security, there appear to be mounting reasons to conclude the overall direction of modern 
technology and production could pose a significant threat to these very prospects. At the very least, 
this echoes Marcuse's contention that modern technology – at least in terms of its environmental 
implications – is a historically unprecedented event. It is also arguably this particular situation 
which most strongly shows the folly of investigating technics 'in itself', as if it could be detached 
from the various interests which animate and direct it and the implications – both intended and 
8 "Man's liberation from domination and exploitation (...) has failed to materialized although the historical conditions 
for its realization have been attained". See Marcuse, 'Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the Totalitarian 
Era', in Kellner, op.cit. (1998), p. 201. 
9 See W. Morris, (1884), Useful Work versus Useless Toil, (London: Penguin, 2009). 
10 B. Russell, (1935), In Praise of Idleness, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 15.
11 Although academic discussion of existential risks remains somewhat isolated, it is generally concluded by various 
experts in the field that anthropogenic (i.e. technological) risks are at least equal to – or outweigh – known 'natural' 
threats. Once again, see N. Bostrom, 'Existential Risks: Analysing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related 
Hazards', in The Journal of Evolution and Technology, vol. 9, no.1, (2002); M. Rees, Our Final Century? (London: 
Vintage, 2004); R. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and volume 
edited by Bostrom and M.M. Ćirković, Global Catastrophic Risks, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). See 
also J. Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction, (London: Routledge, 1996).  
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unintended – of its subsequent proliferation. 
Even if technical solutions are available which could allow certain persistent problems to be 
overcome, other factors can hinder or stall action. To take a well-known example often mentioned 
by Marcuse, if various experts are to be believed, solving the problem of world hunger is 
technically feasible but has not yet eventuated due to a diverse variety of other factors; political, 
social, economic, etc.12 Likewise, even if the effects of climate change appear to be locked in, a 
great deal of work could be done – far more than is being conducted at present – to either adapt, 
prepare or work to minimise its potential effects. Again, neither technical capacities, nor a lack of 
information is the problem in this context, but a diverse array of competing and often oppositional 
interests, many of which it must be said are driven by pecuniary interests. For this reason, and 
despite the enormity of the task, Marcuse resisted the tendency to abstract technology from its 
complex and diverse interconnections; for him, the question concerning technology cannot be 
confined to technics itself, for this would require isolating it from both the incentives and 
implications which are always already active in the artifacts themselves as well as their performance 
and function.
Although necessarily technically embodied, arguably, the chief incentive of modern technological 
advance and development is not technical, but economic. Can it be doubted that few technical 
projects – either large or small-scale – escape the mediation of money and are created for purely 
technical reasons, which is to say, in and of themselves? Although the majority of Marcuse's work 
was spent broadly criticising the influence of capitalism on the individual and nation state and only 
dealt with economic growth in passing, his views of technology remain especially relevant in the 
current environmental context, where apparently decreasingly few critics and philosophers of 
technology address the role of profit making in technological mediation. Hence, assessing the 
primary interests and incentives fuelling and guiding technology in the advanced industrial nations 
(as well as developing nations) becomes crucial to the philosophy of technology, and it is the central 
claim of this thesis that Marcuse's work can be read not merely as a critique of capitalism or 
technology, but of its combination driven by an imperative of perpetual growth. Two related 
contentions which emerge from this conjecture will be dealt with here: 
12 Jon Foley, head of the University of Minnesota's Institute on the Environment claims that solving world hunger is 
technically feasible, "but not with business as usual." See B. Walsh, 'Feeding the Planet Without Destroying It', 
Time, May 22, 2012. One official from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) went further, 
saying that it is "easily possible", but falls into the trap of contending it will result from technological 'silver bullet 
solutions' in order to do so. See the editorial in Nature, vol. 466, issue 7306, (July, 2010), pp. 531-532.   
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1. The environmental implications of technology driven by the growth imperative;
2. The philosophical / existential implications of the prioritisation of exchange value at the 
expense of use-value.
The allocation of profit-making as the central engine guiding and motivating technical mediation 
ought be regarded with a considerable degree of scepticism borne out of caution in regard to its 
current and potential environmental implications. As the evidence of the side-effects of industrial 
pollution, global climate change, ocean acidification, species extinction, etc. become more evident 
by the day, affording a proportionate level of caution in regard to technological development would 
appear to be sound, yet the prioritisation of economic growth (coupled with technological 
expansion) remains firmly fixed in the minds and words of dominant political and economic 
interests. Indeed, faith in the ideology and practise of perpetual economic growth (henceforth: 'the 
growth imperative') is evident not only in the realm of trade, business and government, but at the 
level of individuals and family groups for whom the Good Life remains contingent on increases in 
discretionary income. Despite the seemingly obvious entropic contradiction evident in the 
arrangement of a bottomless convention applied to technical mediation in a finite resource 
environment, "growth has become the recognised political responsibility of governments throughout 
the capitalist world".13 
Marcuse's approach echoes Marx's distinction between use value and exchange value, and from this 
perspective, it can be seen that technics decreasingly proliferate out of the need to satisfy the former 
rather than the latter. As was noted above, its is naive to consider that technical production is no 
longer carried out as it long was: by contriving a technical solution to a given problem. Rather, the 
solution must also be affordable and profitable which transforms the technical artifact into a 
commodity. Indeed, the converse also often occurs; that is, a certain innovations or products will 
emerge which may have a profitable function assuming a technical problem can be invented which 
it can address. To be sure, Marcuse was not directly criticising the practise of money-making, 
however, the his critical-social theory contains an implicit critique of the narrowness of economic 
13 R. Heilbroner, (1953), The Worldly Philosophers, New Ed, (London: Penguin, 1980). It should be noted that the 
growth imperative is not necessarily restricted to capitalism. The Australian economist, Clive Hamilton, summarises 
the modern role of growth in modern politico-economic circles: Nothing more preoccupies the modern political 
process than economic growth. As never before, it is the touchstone of policy success. Countries rate their progress 
against others by their income per person, which can rise only through faster growth. High growth is a cause of 
national pride; low growth attracts accusations of incompetience in the case of rich countries and pity in the case of 
poor countries. A country that experiences a period of low growth rates goes through an agony of national soul-
searching, in which pundits of the left and right expostulate about 'where we went wrong' and whether there is some 
fault in the national character. See Hamilton, Growth Fetish, (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2003), p. 1.
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reason and profit making when viewed in an environmental context. Whilst a summary history of 
philosophical, religious and other critiques of money-making are beyond the scope of this thesis, a 
couple of brief points bear mentioning. 
It barely need be stated that technology and economics depend entirely on the environmental base 
from which they are ultimately derived and in which they are put to work, yet in one of the more 
salient examples of "irrational rationality", this contingency relation appears to have been reversed 
in practice and smoothed over with ambiguous terms and catchphrases designed to offer 'solutions' 
(i.e., compromises) between economic and environmental interests.14 For example, the term 
'development' is now usually prefaced by the term 'sustainable', although whether this refers to 
economic or environmental sustainability seems an open question. Secondly, and this is once again 
a conservative point that will be returned to below, technological deployment,  production and 
economic growth are inextricably interrelated. Hence, if it is the case that the limitless status of 
money and profit making form the primary incentives of technical mediation then this arrangement 
becomes questionable on the basis that – sooner or later, (and arguably already) – many such limits 
are beginning to be reached.15 Despite this knowledge being all the more evident today, defenders of 
perpetual growth cite the human capacity for invention and innovation which, on the surface is an 
appealing formula easily lent to a feeling of optimism on the part of its adherents. However, given 
the majority of the population of the planet understandably aspire to even a fraction of the 
continually escalating 'standards' set by the affluent nations, the level of  innovation required to 
cater to such a population (whose appetites, if the affluent West is any indication would hardly be 
static) would appear to require little short of a second agricultural revolution. This also sets up a 
seemingly paradoxical contention which claims that the problems caused by the 'inappropriate use' 
of technology can be simply rectified by using it 'appropriately'... 
In the absence of an ethical imperative, environmentalism has been reduced to a technological 
fix, and as with all technological fixes, solutions are seen to lie once more in the hands of 
manager technocrats. Economic growth, propelled by intensive technology and fuelled by an 
14 As the naturalist, John Livingston wrote: The words may change, but the message is constant. 'Resource 
management,' of course, is now a centenarian; of more recent arrival was 'resource development.' This soon mutated 
into the lunatic term 'ecodevelopment', (...) at roughly the same time we had 'appropriate technology,' which was 
perilously close to being internally contradictory. At the present moment we have 'sustainable development,' a full-
blown oxymoron. What these slogans seem to say is 'How to plunder nature and get away with it.' See J. Livingston, 
Rogue Primate, (Ontario: Key Porter Books, 1994), p. 60.
15 Of course, whilst off-planet based resources cannot be entirely ruled out, given the money required to bring (say) 
Space-Based Solar Power or expeditions to nearby asteroids and planetary bodies online, it should be said placing 
hopes that such prospects could significantly offset current energy requirements appears radically incautious. 
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excessive exploitation of nature, was once viewed as a major factor in environmental 
degradation; it has suddenly been given the central role in solving the environmental crisis.16 
As with technological innovation, economic growth is also regularly cited as a cure all:  
The answer to almost every problem is 'more economic growth'. Unemployment is rife: only 
growth can create jobs. Schools and hospitals are underfunded: growth will improve the 
budget. Protection of the environment is unaffordable: the solution is growth. Poverty is 
entrenched: growth will rescue the poor. Income distribution is unequal: growth will make 
everyone better off.17  
Unlike various other philosophers who have dealt with technology, Marcuse always acknowledged 
its intertwinement with economics. Efficiency could not merely be understood as technical 
efficiency, but economic efficiency; technological rationality was also economic rationality: 
"expediency in terms of technological reason is, at the same time, expediency in terms of profitable 
efficiency, and rationalisation is, at the same time, monopolistic standardization and 
concentration."18 As he noted in a discussion of the analysis of Max Weber, the rationality of 
capitalism can be defined in terms of two historical facts: 
1. the provision of human needs and calculable efficiency takes place within the private 
enterprise system and is geared toward the profit of the individual entrepreneur or 
enterprise;
2. the means of production are private property, and the labourers must sell their wage labour 
to the owner of the means of production to provide for their own needs.19
Since the “capitalist system is directed by the 'focal reality' of a market-exchange system and 
private property geared toward maximum profit, the 'calculable efficiency' of capitalist rationality is 
directed towards the maximization of profit.”20 Furthermore, continual rises in affluence has fostered 
the expectation amongst consumers in the affluent nations for ever more commodities and products 
16 R. Kothari, 'Environment, Technology, and Ethics', Technology and Values: Essential Readings, edited by C. Hanks, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), p. 431. 
17 Hamilton, op.cit. (2003), p. 2. 
18 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 46. 
19 Marcuse, (1965c), 'The Containment of Change in Industrial Society', in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: The  
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 206.
20 D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 266. 
(Emphasis added).
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to the point where the promises of the advertisements have reached “transcendent” degrees that 
were not satisfiable. In short, Marcuse contended that the growing wealth of the capitalist system 
could not
...satisfy the needs which it creates. The rising standard of living itself expresses this dynamic: 
it enforced the constant creation of needs that could be satisfied on the market; it is now 
fostering transcending needs which cannot be satisfied without abolishing the capitalist mode 
of production.21
The legitimacy of ever-increasing levels of individual consumption appears irrational on the 
surface; having engendered an individual not merely accustomed to the expectation of little else but 
more of the same and expecting it as a natural right, even in Marcuse's time of writing this process 
appeared to be offering temptations it could not hope to provide for. In an economic network made 
more brittle by its increasing complexity, events as seemingly disparate as oil “shocks” (i.e. price 
spikes); revolutionary activities in far off nations, over-speculation, the bursting of real estate or 
other “bubbles”, not to mention outright fraud and criminality in the financial industries and 
property markets, stabilisation remains the prime directive of the reproduction of the status quo, and 
even if this does not necessarily require perpetual economic growth, at the least it continues to be 
accompanied by it. Politically, there seems to be broad agreement by most parties – whether social-
democratic, conservative, and even green – that this must continue.22 Although loudly touted, 
traditional political divides between left and right, conservative and liberal, Labor and Tory, 
Republican and Democrat, appear as one in their shared faith concerning the growth imperative and 
appear widely favourable to the continuation of what Marcuse considered to be the “mutilated” and 
“abbreviated” existence offered by consumerism.23 Political and other sources of change appear at 
best beneficial in piecemeal terms, or at worst, impotent in carrying out the changes required or 
completely counter-productive. Instead, all energies are devoted to the task of ensuring growth 
21 Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972a), p. 16. As a caveat: it has been suggested by 
a number of environmental thinkers that it is large scale industry and the military who remain the largest polluters, 
and that motivating consumers to 'do their bit' can serve as a convenient strategy to deflect responsibility to change. 
For numerous examples of this strategy in Australian politics, see C. Hamilton, Scorcher: The Dirty Politics of  
Climate Change, (Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2007). For a more general discussion of the anti-environmentalist 
movement, see S. Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, revised ed., (Melbourne: Scribe 
Publications, 2006). 
22 On fraud in the finance industries, see S. Das, Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk, (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2011). 
23 Consumerism, Jeremy Seabrook claims, involves the individual being "...denuded of everything but appetites, 
desires and tastes, wrenched from any context of human obligation or commitment. It is a process of mutilation; and 
once this has been achieved, we are offered the consolation of reconstructing the abbreviated humanity out of the 
things and goods around us, and the fantasies and vapours which they emit." Quoted in T. Homer-Dixon, The 
Upside of Down, (Melbourne, Text, 2006), reference 74, p. 371.
96
continues unfettered and insignificant political change – if emerging at all – is reduced to glacial 
adjustments: 
The democratic process organized by this structure is discredited to such an extent that no part 
of it can be extracted which is not contaminated. Moreover, using this process would divert 
energy to snail-paced movements. For example, electioneering with the aim of significantly 
changing the composition of the U.S. Congress might take a hundred years, judging by the 
present rate of progress, and assuming that the effort of political radicalization continues 
unchecked (…) under these circumstances, to work for the improvement of the existing 
democracy easily appears as indefinitely delaying attainment of the goal of creating a free 
society.24
At this point the substantial differences between Marcuse and Marx become increasingly evident. 
Marcuse was extremely skeptical about the possibility of change emerging from the working class 
and was just as skeptical of its emergence from modern political sources. Secondly, whereas Marx 
envisaged a shift from capitalism to socialism, Marcuse emphasised the extent to which capitalism 
had thwarted such a historical 'necessity' through the inauguration of a counterrevolution.25 The 
failure of the working class to emerge as an effective revolutionary class was made even more 
certain, as the workplace itself became a locus of the technological and economically rational 
values of "efficiency, productivity, performance".26 Langdon Winner goes further: 
...the rational arrangement of sociotechnical systems has tended to produce its own distinctive 
forms of hierarchical authority. Legitimized by the felt need to do things in what seems 
to be the most efficient, productive way, human roles and relationships are structured in rule-
guided patterns that involve taking orders and giving orders along an elaborate chain of 
command. Thus far from being a place of democratic freedom, the workplace tends to be 
undisguisedly authoritarian. At higher levels in the hierarchy, of course, professionals claim 
their special authority and relative freedom by virtue of their command of scientific and 
technical expertise. At the point in history in which forms of hierarchy based on religion and 
tradition had begun to crumble, the need to build and maintain technical systems offered a 
way to restore pyramidal social relations. It was a godsend for inequality.27
24 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 63.
25 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a). 
26 A. Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, (London: Verso, 1989), p. 5.
27 See L. Winner, 'Techné and Politeia: The Technical Constitution of Society', in The Whale and the Reactor: A 
Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 48.
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Marcuse's point was that instead of being turned toward liberating alternatives from artificially 
sustained wage labour and increasing free time, increased efficiency and productive power were 
directed to increasing (economic) outputs, with efficiency being turned to minimise expenditure in 
inputs (i.e. replacement of obsolete machinery and labour, 'outsourcing', etc.). The problem of the 
diminished need for labour could be subverted by channelling it into the production of "surplus" 
products which could then not only be conspicuously consumed, but cast as genuine needs. 
Marcuse's  concern with the chief  incentives  which propel  and guide technological  proliferation 
show that he resisted the more broad critiques of modern technology offered by a number of his  
contemporaries such as Jacques  Ellul.28 This  arguably allowed his  philosophy of technology to 
retain significant explanatory value in the critique of the shared grounds of technology and the 
environment. Marcuse's views should not be dismissed as utopian, as they are not necessarily any 
more  so  than  the  assumption  that  growth  can  continue  unabated  forever.  Marcuse  makes  the 
philosophy of technology practically useful by not isolating it from the dominant collective interests 
which drive and guide its development. Although certain elements of his critique of capitalism are 
outdated (specifically those reliant on his revisionary Freudianism),  his discussions of the false 
gratifications of consumerism, his wariness of economism, and his regular denunciations of the one-
dimensional pursuit of growth for growth's sake remain pertinent. 




The New Technology? 
"According to nature" you want to live? O you noble Stoics, what deceptive words these are! 
Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without 
purposes and consideration, without any mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain 
at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power – how could you live according to this 
indifference!1
As the philosophy of technology standardly involves an account of nature, this chapter will begin 
by critically addressing Marcuse's view of the topic and the role he thought it could take in the 
creation of a society liberated by a "new science" and a "new technology". As it will be argued, 
despite several problems existing in Marcuse's view of nature, it will be defended from criticisms 
levelled by Jürgen Habermas, Andrew Feenberg, and Steven Vogel. 
New Science, New Technology
As Jürgen Habermas observed, “Long before the Club of Rome, Marcuse fought against 'the 
hideous concept of progressive productivity according to which nature is there gratis in order to be 
exploited'”.2 However, although prescient in various ways, Marcuse's views on this topic were also 
problematic, and have subsequently faced considerable criticisms from Habermas and others. 
Habermas' critique consists in a two-pronged attack, one aimed at Marcuse's concepts of a new 
science and technology, the other directed toward his view of nature. Over what follows, the former 
Marcusean concepts will be defended from the first part of Habermas' critique, with the remainder 
1 F. Nietzsche, (1886), Beyond Good and Evil, 9, (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 15.  
2 J. Habermas, 'Afterword: The Different Rhythms of Philosophy and Politics For Herbert Marcuse on his 100th 
Birthday', in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.2, edited by D. 
Kellner, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 236. 
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of the discussion directed toward Marcuse's vision of the inherent, semi-teleological potential of 
nature. Whilst Marcuse's connection between a philosophy of technology and a philosophy of 
nature was important and is still generally lacking in much modern philosophical work purportedly 
concerned with technology, it cannot be ignored that his reasoning in this context remains confusing 
and abruptly alters course away from his early concern with “concrete philosophy” and praxis. 
Hence, his earlier, but brief acknowledgment of the preconditional status of the natural environment 
will be emphasised as opposed to his teleological and subjective approaches to nature. 
Habermas provided reasons to doubt the coherency of the concept of a new science or new 
instrumentality, and criticised what he took as Marcuse's championing of the "secret hope"3 of a 
"fraternal relation to nature."4 As the outline of this debate has been attended to in sufficient detail 
elsewhere, and also given the idiosyncratic nature of Marcuse's theory of nature, a brief indication 
of what he did not appear to be arguing will be necessary. 
Firstly, by "nature" Marcuse was not always referring to the environment, biosphere, or 'wild-
nature' specifically, but usually uses it as a collective term which includes his Marxian view of 
human nature chiefly derived from the 1844 Manuscripts, as well as his more specific discussion of 
“feminine nature” in Counterrevolution and Revolt.5 Although he tended to generally distinguish 
"human" from "external" nature, he often took the concepts together, which can only be expected 
given the scope of his critique.6 Secondly, Marcuse was not calling for a return to simpler times or 
championing a worldwide retreat to medieval agrarianism. Rather, he saw nature as a 
...part of history, an object of history; therefore 'liberation of nature' cannot mean returning to 
a pretechnological stage, but advancing to the use of the achievements of technological 
civilization for freeing it from the destructive abuse of science and technology in the service 
of exploitation.7 
3 J. Habermas, 'Technology and Science as "Ideology"', in Toward a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 
p. 86
4 Feenberg leaves this quotation unreferenced in his Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999), p.156. 
However, it appears arguable that Habermas's use of the concept of a "fraternal" relation to nature is invoked in 
order to illustrate a potential implication of the way nature may be treated in the advent of a 'new technology', not as 
a way of characterising Marcuse's view as a whole. See Habermas, ibid. (1970), p.88. However, Habermas does use 
this phrase in 'A Reply to My Critics' – see J. Thompson and D. Held, Habermas: Critical Debates, (London: 
Macmillan, 1982), p.241. See also S. Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory, (Albany, 
State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 153.
5 See Marcuse, 'Nature and Revolution' in Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press 1972a), pp. 59-78.
6 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 59.
7 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 60.
101
As should be evident in this passage, Marcuse was not asking what the Luddites referred to as "the 
machinery question",8 and he was hardly against the idea of civilisation or technoscience per se, but 
what he took to be a historically specific mode of production directed primarily by the bottomless 
incentive of the profit-motive in which technoscientific powers had come to take on irrational and 
self-defeating forms.9 “I suggest”, Marcuse wrote in a 1968 speech, “that the desublimation which 
is demanded today is not an undoing of civilization but an undoing only of the archaic exploitative 
aspects of civilization. Far from undoing and regressing it is rather the reintegration into civilization 
of human faculties, needs and satisfactions which have been reduced, mutilated and distorted in the 
tradition of exploitative civilization.”10 However, it is less clear that Marcuse was not – at least 
implicitly – recommending a shift in emphasis to the technical as he defined it earlier in his career 
and as it is defined in this thesis.11 He was advocating that a mature society and a mature technology 
would be conducted on the basis of its ultimate contingency upon nature, but that the horizon of this 
noble and necessary end had been obscured, visible only in abstraction from the currently dominant 
direction of development.  
This brings the discussion to the first prong of Habermas's critique; the argument that modern 
technology represents a historically specific condition of civilisation. This was a major aspect of 
Marcuse's thought, one which some philosophers of technology find to be in accord with more 
recent sociological analyses of technics.12 Without following this particular path further here 
however, Marcuse's position is that technics (and more importantly, the technological mode of 
production) are ultimately shaped by the societies and cultures in which they emerge.13 Once again, 
8 The "Machinery Question" was developed by David Ricardo in the chapter 'On Machinery' added to the third edition 
of his 1817 work, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (London: Barnes and Noble, 2005). See also K. 
Sale, 'The Achievements of "General Ludd', in The Ecologist, v.29, no 5, (August / September 1999), pp. 69-78.
9 The reduction of all environmental problems to “civilisation” appears to be the thesis of D. Jensen's Endgame V1: 
The Problem of Civilization, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2006), as well as featuring prominently in the work of 
J. Zerzan. See for example his Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization, (Port Townsend, WA: Feral 
House, 2002), and the edited collection, Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections, (Port Townsend, WA: Feral 
House, 2005). 
10 Marcuse, (1968), 'Beyond One-Dimensional Man', in Towards a Critical Theory of Society: The Collected Papers of  
Herbert Marcuse, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 115.
11 See Marcuse, (1941), 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in Technology, War, and Fascism: The 
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.1, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 41-65. 
Feenberg also appears to allude to something very close to this approach in his effort to reform Marcuse's theory 
through an invocation of techné. See for example A. Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and 
Redemption of History, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 112. 
12 See for example, Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), pp.10-12. 
13 The position Feenberg offers in Questioning Technology was subjected to critical discussion in a Symposia by I. 
Thomson, 'From the Question to Technology to the Quest for a Democratic Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, 
Feenberg' and D.J. Stump, 'Socially Constructed Technology: Comments on Andrew Feenberg's Questioning 
Technology', as well as Feenberg's replies which are reproduced in Inquiry, (Summer, 2000), pp. 225-238. The 
second session included T. Veak 'Whose Technology? Whose Modernity?: Questioning Feenberg's Questioning 
Technology', and Feenberg's reply, 'Do We Need a Critical Theory of Technology?' in Science, Technology and 
Human Values, (Spring 2000), pp. 238-242.
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he was speaking of concrete socio-political reality as he saw it; not merely offering a novel 
approach from which to continually reiterate the thesis that the design of technical artifacts have 
diverse socio-cultural origins.14 For Marcuse, from the abstract stance of the purely ideal, technical 
artifacts appear as merely the materialisation of instrumentality and as such, they can be easily 
understood as ethically neutral. As the well-known saying goes: “guns don't kill people; people kill 
people.” But such a view is arguably too quick and not only ignores the context of praxis as well as 
the individual's concrete lived experience of modern technical mediation, it fails to acknowledge the 
historical (and evolutionary) novelty of the means of production as directed by the infinite 
convention of the profit motive on a global scale. As such, it is only in the "abstract" context 
afforded by separating technics from concrete human intentions and interests that motivate and 
direct their development, that such a view can seem sensible.15 
What Marcuse thought was historically "new" about technology and the sciences in the modern 
epoch was that both had taken on controlling rather than liberating manifestations due to the nature 
and influence of the extant mode of production which provides the framework and rationalisation of 
their development. Borrowing a term from the existentialists, Marcuse contended that societies are 
always "...a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend 
to do with men and things."16  
(Marcuse) concedes that technical principles can be formulated in abstraction from any 
content, that is to say, in abstraction from any interest or ideology. However, as such, they are 
merely abstractions. As soon as they enter reality, they take on a socially specific content 
relative to the "historical subject" that applies them.17
The idea that technics are neutral is then, as Andrew Feenberg continues, “a special kind of 
ideological illusion.” The “illusion” consists in treating technics and technology as if they were 
unshaped or removed from their underlying foundations in social causes and dominant interests, 
and that they form a singular, separate and generic historical process, largely discernible from 
merely a technical perspective. This not only appears to be Habermas's position,18 but also tends to 
14 This arguably summarises the approach of social constructivists of technology. This criticism will be expanded on in 
the final chapters of this thesis. 
15  Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 157-158. (Emphasis added).
16 Marcuse, (1968a), 'Industrialization and Capitalism in Max Weber', in Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, edited 
by J.J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 224. 
17 Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 160.
18 To be sure, Habermas is critical of the technical (i.e. as a form of instrumental conduct) intruding into the social-
communicative sphere. However, (to drastically simplify), this does not appear to be a sufficiently pluralistic basis 
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concur with theories of technology from sources as diverse as Marshall McLuhan to Wired. 
However, arguably, Feenberg does not adequately follow this contention where it appears to lead. 
Like most other philosophers who concern themselves with technology, its chief guiding and 
motivational incentives seem to be largely passed over in favour of different explanations, arguably 
more attuned to what Feenberg refers to elsewhere as the “temper of the times”.19 This not only 
tends to divert a critical theory of technology away from its chiefly economic guiding incentives, 
but also obscures the fact that economic rationality has concrete, explicit implications for individual 
political participation – short of outright revolt – the only means by which social changes may be 
inaugurated. For example, as Elaine Bernard argues: 
At least in a democracy each person is formally equal. The humblest citizen, the most 
prestigious citizen still has only one vote. But when we move that power over to the 
marketplace, the humblest and the wealthiest are totally asymmetrical. One has such immense 
power that they can literally crush the other completely and utterly and fully.20 
As such, if Feenberg's statement that “the fundamental problem of democracy today is quite simply 
the survival of agency in this increasingly technocratic universe”, the responsibility to address the 
fundamental connection between modern production and the implications of constant growth for the 
environment must surely be brought to prominence.21 Passing over them does not merely imply 
sidelining the chief incentives Marcuse always took as peculiar to the technological mode of 
production, but also appears to separate the last two centuries of well-explored trends in the history 
of technical mediation from the tremendous rupture that occurred when the incentives which came 
to drive it shifted from the technical, to the deferred conventions of technological and economic 
rationality. The views of Marcuse's friend André Gorz are of specific relevance in this context, and 
deserve to be quoted at length:
Economic rationality has never (…) in essence, been in the service of a determinate goal. Its 
object is the maximization of the type of efficiency that it knows how to measure 
arithmetically. The main indicator of this efficiency is the rate of profit. And the rate of profit 
from which to arrive at an environmental, or animal ethics. This contention will be further delineated below. For 
more on the topic, see Vogel, op.cit. (1996).   
19 Feenberg, 'A Fresh Look at Lukács: On Steven Vogel's Against Nature', in Rethinking Marxism, (Winter, 1999b), p. 
85.
20 Elaine Bernard, quoted in J. Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, (London: 
Constable and Robinson LTD, 2004), p. 146.
21 Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 101. 
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depends, in the last analysis, on the productivity of labour. The pursuit of an unlimited 
maximum of efficiency and profit would therefore demand the greatest possible growth of the 
productivity of labour and, as a result, of production.22 (…) The economic rationalization of 
labour did not, therefore, consist merely in making pre-existent productive capacities more 
methodical and better adapted to their object. It was a revolution, a subversion of the way of 
life, the values, the social relations and relation to Nature, the invention in the full sense of the 
word of something which had never existed before. Productive activity was cut off from its 
meaning, its motivations and its object and became simply a means of earning a wage. It 
ceased to be a part of life and became the means of 'earning a living' (…) the satisfaction of 
'producing works' together and the pleasure derived from 'doing' were abolished in favour of 
only those satisfactions that money could buy. In other words, concrete labour could only be 
transformed into what Marx called 'abstract labour' by turning the worker / producer into a 
worker / consumer: that is, the social individual who produces nothing she or he consumes 
and consumes nothing he or she produces; for whom the essential objective of work is to earn 
enough to buy commodities produced and defined by the social machine as a whole.23 
As previously noted, rather than address the major incentive which shapes technological design, 
production and deployment as a whole – the economically rational growth imperative – Feenberg 
appears more interested in pursuing a social-constructivist approach which incorporates other 
agential interests which play more or less informative and / or influential roles in the design and 
production of technical artifacts. Generally, Marcuse's thought appears to be compatible with such a 
view, but his critique cuts deeper than the acknowledgment that agents or interests are somehow 
working or contributing to technical designs in various ways, providing the motive and direction of 
their instantiation, etc. In other words, to borrow a well-known term from Langdon Winner, 
Marcuse would have agreed that "artifacts have politics", but with the caveat that these are 
ultimately shaped not only to some extent by the actions of individual agents, but more 
fundamentally by the social mode of production in play.24  
In the historical context traced by Marx, Marcuse and Gorz, it should not be surprising that 
Marcuse's call for change was explicitly world-historical in scope; a “total transformation of the 
entire traditional culture”.25 This follows from his understanding of the content and influence of 
22 A. Gorz, Critique of Economic Reason, (London: Verso, 1989), p. 114. 
23 Gorz, ibid. (1989), pp. 21-22. 
24 See Winner, 'Do Artifacts have Politics?', in The Whale and The Reactor, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1986a), pp. 19-39.
25 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 79.
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technology as manifest in both ideological and social contexts, (technological) as well as the 
instrumental (technical) realm. As he contended, what was crucially unprecedented about modern 
technics was that it no longer served as an extension of human capacities as such, but as a means of 
legitimating and reproducing the capitalist status quo through the exercise of "new forms of 
control".26 In short, technological rationality was now applied to the management, organisation and 
adjustment of individuals themselves, prescribing their interests and behaviours rather than strictly 
binding individuals to them, drawing them into productive, "compliant efficiency".27 But this 
affected production as well; no longer was it geared toward purely instrumental or 'internal' 
concerns, i.e.: no longer was technical project x produced in order to address or engage with 
problem y; rather, the incentives of production were radically narrowed to the goal of creating 
profits. This paralleled the rationality of the technical appropriation and evaluation of nature; as 
Marcuse frames the situation, the natural environment and the organisms, minerals, materials and 
energies within it are located, quantified, harvested, processed and distributed in a manner once 
again very similar to Heidegger's description of both human and non-human nature being 
"challenged" to "offer itself up" as a well of resources which are then practically expedited as 
"standing stock".28 The problem with Heidegger's critique then, as Marcuse later came to suspect, 
was that despite its purported concern with the concrete, it had neglected to countenance socio-
economic reality. Marcuse was more concerned to reveal a more everyday, but pressing reality: no 
longer could technics and the sciences be defined simply along instrumentalist lines as 
augmentations, prostheses, instruments, 'tools' produced and used to increase human capacities and 
remaining firmly under their control, but as a means of administration, productive uniformity and 
regimentation of the labouring classes toward securing the end of perpetual growth. Habermas 
summarises Marcuse's position:
At the stage of their scientific-technical development, then, the forces of production appear to 
enter a new constellation with the relations of production. Now they no longer function as the 
basis of a critique of prevailing legitimations in the interest of political enlightenment, but 
become instead the basis of legitimation. This is what Marcuse conceives as world-historically 
new.29 
26 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), chapter one.
27 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 49.
28 See Heidegger, op.cit. (1954), pp. 296-301.
29 Habermas, op.cit. (1970), p. 84. Max Weber notes that the rupture within of the relations of production was not 
merely technical, but economic. As he mentioned, one of the most evident signs of the irrationality of capitalism was 
that the individual now existed "...for the sake of his business, instead of the reverse." See Weber, (1905), The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (London: Routledge Classics, 2004), p. 32. 
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In a manner not far removed from Habermas's own "colonisation thesis", Marcuse thought that 
technological rationality had become formatively implicated within a tremendous dispersion of life-
world domains which were previously technologically unmediated. To be sure however, he was not 
merely expressing his distaste in regard to this tendency, but sought to emphasise the novelty and 
difference of the mechanism of legitimation which fostered and rationalised such forms of technical 
colonisation. Whilst valuing that which can be quantified (i.e. subject to measurement in money, 
distance, energy, time, etc.), and rendering the supposedly unquantifiable up to subjectivity and 
often relativism, any number of social domains – even and especially verbal communication itself – 
became subject to the operationalistic principles of technological rationality, a contention which 
Habermas appears to agree with if only in broad terms. Thus – to reiterate – Marcuse was not 
merely engaging in a critique at the level of technics or design, but arguing for the complete reform 
and renewal of basic individual attitudes spanning the institutional-bureaucratic, governmental, 
public and technical domains through to individual psychological renewal, a goal which he believed 
could only be achieved with an end to the capitalist status quo.30 
If the phenomenon on which Marcuse bases his social analysis, i.e. the peculiar fusion of  
technology and domination, rationality and oppression, could not be interpreted otherwise 
than as a world "project," as Marcuse says in the language of Sartre's phenomenology, 
contained in the material a priori of the logic of science and technology and determined by 
class interest and historical situation, then social emancipation could not be conceived without 
a complementary revolutionary transformation of science and technology themselves.31 
As Samir Gandesha has observed, Marcuse's use of the Sartrean term 'project' in this context is 
important, as it denoted a "specific way of experiencing, interpreting, organizing and changing the 
world, a specific historical project among other possible ones, not the only necessary one."32 For 
Marcuse, alternative forms of technological rationality were available, even those that may lead to a 
restoration of its essential “end”. Therefore, qualitatively different societies were available, just 
because of the riches and advancements so lauded by the defenders of capitalism. As a result, 
Marcuse contended Ananke or the "reality principle" had been invalidated, yet, Ananke remained, 
this time mediated by the "performance principle", which "manipulates instinctual desires through 
30 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), pp. 44-45.
31 Habermas, op.cit. (1970), p. 85.
32 Marcuse, (1965a), 'On Science and Phenomenology,' in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, edited by A. Arato 
and E. Gebhardt, (New York: Urizen, 1978), p. 469. See also S. Gandesha, 'Marcuse, Habermas, and the Critique of 
Technology', in Abromeit and Cobb, op.cit.(2004), pp. 188-208.
107
the creation of false needs as soon as the old ones are satisfied, thus making individuals in the 
capitalist society to work more and perform well".33 
Despite this artificial suspension of the powers of technology in the service of the renewal of the 
status quo, Marcuse's optimism regarding the prospects of a new science and new technology in 
turn implies that there are alternative ways in which the natural environment may be approached, 
treated, or used, and that these were ideally means which treated it in accordance with what he 
considered were its own inherent potentials. As it will be discussed below, this is arguably where 
Marcuse's approach runs into some significant barriers, however, at this point it is sufficient to note 
his belief that the given was always a state of affairs which could be subjected to change: 
Marcuse envisages not only different modes of theory formation but a different scientific 
methodology in general. The transcendental framework within which nature would be made 
the object of a new experience would then no longer be the functional system of instrumental 
action.34
Once again, although he was critical of the “colonization of life world by system” and the 
“technization of the life-world”35 and shares with Marcuse a general suspicion regarding the modern 
spread of instrumental rationality into the realm of symbolic / communicative discourse, Habermas 
pays little attention to technics in his later works, and it does not feature as a category in his media 
theory at all.36 Aside from this, Habermas nonetheless appears to be in broad agreement with 
Marcuse's concern that the governing principles of "purposive-rational action" (i.e. those governing 
technics) are inappropriate if applied in the social realm, however he does not agree that they are 
inappropriate if applied to nature.37 As a form of purposive-rational action, there can only be one 
technological rationality in Habermas's thinking, so invoking a 'new' technology, science or 
instrumentality are not simply suspect on the basis of their inherent romanticism, but because of 
their philosophical incoherency; in short, Marcuse was simply making a category error, or 
"boundary violation".38 As Steven Vogel summarises Habermas's position: “...there is no such thing 
as a new science, there is no alternative to the science and technology we have, because these are 
33 J.V. Ocay, 'Technology, Technological Domination, and the Great Refusal: Marcuse's Critique of the Advanced 
Industrial Society', in Kritike, vol.4, no.1, (June 2010), p. 68.
34 Habermas, op.cit. (1970), p. 86.
35 See Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 167.
36 A lacuna Feenberg attempts to remedy in his revised version of the media theory and his concept of "technical 
codes". See Feenberg, ibid. (1999), pp. 87-89.
37 Feenberg, ibid. (1999), p. 167.
38 Vogel, op.cit. (1996), p. 111.
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associated with a fundamental project of the human species, and not one that is socially variable."39 
In Habermas as in Weber, scientific-technical rationality is nonsocial, neutral, and formal. By 
definition it excludes the social (...) it is neutral because it represents a species-wide interest, a 
cognitive-instrumental interest which overrides all group-specific values. And it is formal as a 
result of the process of differentiation by which it abstracts from itself from the various 
contents it mediates. In sum, science and technology are essentially indifferent to interests and 
ideology and represent the objective world in terms of the possibilities of understanding and 
control.40 
Once again taking up the argument from the basis of Marcuse's criticism of Weber, Feenberg 
questions Habermas's apparently blanket contention with reference to the concept of efficiency. If 
merely seen in abstract terms as "the ratio of inputs to outputs", Feenberg contends such a concept 
"would apply in a communist or capitalist society, or even in an Amazonian tribe"; the point is that 
efficiency comes to be embodied in different manners in different societies and cultures... 
Concretely, when one actually gets down to applying the notion of efficiency, one must decide 
what kinds of things can serve as inputs and outputs, who can offer and acquire them and on 
what terms, what counts as discommodities, waste, and hazard, and so on. These are all 
socially specific, and so, therefore, is the concept of efficiency in any actual application.41
It is not difficult to find many other examples which further endorse Feenberg's point, as any 
number of cultural forces can shape productive forays in varying ways. Ritual, spirituality, and 
culturally varying standards of conduct and decency can come to play both instructional roles in the 
production and use of technical artifacts, as well as providing the incentives for their production in 
the first place. The principles of “scientific management” or Fordism may be more efficient per se  
in a society of mass-production, but this sort of efficiency is not necessarily the same as (say) the 
routines and rituals which informed traditional Japanese sword craft. Hence, Feenberg believes this 
aspect of Marcuse's thought attests to its continual relevance in the modern period. What Feenberg 
refers to as the "neue Sachlichkeit, or "new sobriety" is therefore brought into question if 
environmental concerns are added to the already extensive list of Marcuse's criticisms of capitalism. 
39 Vogel, 'Marcuse and the New Science', in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by R. Abromeit and W.R. 
Cobb, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 242. 
40 Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), pp. 159-160.
41 Feenberg, ibid. (1999), p. 160.
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As Feenberg mentions, whereas Habermas's brief sojourn into the philosophy of technology was 
suited to "a time when we tamed our aspirations", despite its optimism, Marcuse's account of 
technology appears to have stood the test of time better than his colleague.42 For Feenberg, this 
seems at least partly due to its similarity with more recent work in sociological and philosophical 
approaches to technical development, such as that of social constructivism, (a field that certain other 
prominent philosophers of technology have not been so favourable towards),43 but for the current 
purposes, it also provides grounds for optimism, as the potential to exercise a renewed sense of 
responsibility over the power and damage technics have wrought remains open in the Marcusean 
view, but appears less clear from Habermas' perspective. 
However, Marcuse's “subjectivisation” of nature cannot be defended as easily, and is beset with a 
number of significant problems. His thoughts on this score will now be described and subjected to 
various criticisms which can be summarised as follows: 
1.  that Marcuse appears to have an overly optimistic regard for human nature and contends 
     that first nature contains inherently "liberating", positive qualities;
2. that Habermas was generally correct to consider Marcuse's endorsement of nature as a 
    'subject' a category error; and
3. by placing hope in revolutionary social change and replacing the current technologically 
    rational incentives of production with those belonging to the aesthetic dimension sidelines 
    the now practical necessity to confront the ecological crisis with an instrumental response 
    – in short, a basis by which the incentive of the growth imperative can be replaced by an 
    ecological imperative is arguably of foremost importance. 
Firstly, Feenberg notes his agreement with "most commentators that there are insuperable problems 
in the dizzying multiplication of categories in which Marcuse attempted to cloth his position after 
One-Dimensional Man".44 Indeed – rather than clarifying his position – Marcuse's conceptual 
apparatus arguably increases the gulf between theory and practise. As mentioned, his final major 
works, specifically Counterrevolution and Revolt and The Aesthetic Dimension, substantially differ 
from earlier writings in terms of their renewed optimism, but also in their almost playfully ironic 
42 Feenberg, ibid. (1999), p. 157.
43 For a critique of the social constructivist approach to technics, see L. Winner, (1993), 'Social Constructivism: 
Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty' in Dusek & Scharff, op.cit.(2007), pp. 233-242. For a rejoinder to 
Winner's critique and his counter-response, see M. Elam, 'Anti Anticonstructivism or Laying the Fears of a Langdon 
Winner to Rest', in Dusek and Scharff, ibid. (2005), pp. 612-616.
44 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 83. 
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tone and their bewildering categorial complexity. Within them Marcuse places a renewed emphasis 
on nature (both human and non-human variants) and looks to the domain of art and aesthetics as a 
basis upon which to construct a renewed harmony between agents and things.45 For example, he 
referred to the "rediscovery of nature as an ally in the struggle against the exploitative societies in 
which the violation of nature aggravates the violation of man", and described nature's potential role 
"as a vehicle in the liberation of man".46 He also deliberately calls for its treatment as a "subject",47 
and, citing Theodor Adorno, that he wanted to help it "open its eyes".48 As will hopefully become 
clearer below, this implies more than merely allowing for the potentials of nature to be permitted 
release by humans in a more careful, less exploitative instrumental fashion, but in conformance with 
what Marcuse took to be its intrinsic, life-enhancing aspects. 
As previously noted, Marcuse's philosophy of nature owes much to the philosophical-anthropology 
outlined in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, in which humanity's supposedly "essential" capacities; its 
"musical ear," and its "eye for the beauty of form"49 can be released in accordance with the currently 
contained aesthetic qualities of nature:  
The emancipated senses, in conjunction with a natural science proceeding on their basis, 
would guide the "human appropriation" of nature. Then, nature would have "lost its mere 
utility," it would appear not merely as stuff – organic and inorganic matter – but as life force 
in its own right, as subject-object; the striving for life is the substance common to man and 
nature. Man would then form a living object.50
Although Marcuse aimed to re-establish the common ground between the "life affirming" aspects of 
human and non-human nature, he qualified that his view is not teleological and does not require a 
plan to be ascribed to nature, but a "postulate" of its objective status:51 "the idea of the liberation of 
nature stipulates no (...) plan or intention in the universe; liberation is the possible plan and 
intention of human beings, brought to bear upon nature."52 However, Marcuse's view does appear to 
assume the "potentialities" of nature are fundamentally positive.53 For example, he described nature 
45 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 59.
46 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p.59. (Emphasis added).
47 For example, see Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 60.
48 Pointed out by Vogel, in his 'Marcuse and the New Science', in Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited by J. 
Abromeit and W.M. Cobb, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 244.
49 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 64.
50 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 65.
51 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a).
52 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 66.
53 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), pp. 60-61.
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as "receptive", and "opposed, not to productive activity, but to destructive productivity", and, 
playfully tempting criticisms from an anthropomorphic context, that "nature, too, awaits the 
revolution!"54 He ascribes "gratifying forces and qualities" which can potentially be "uncovered and 
released", and that nature contains "life enhancing, sensuous, aesthetic qualities."55 As he himself 
himself admitted, his approach is "outrageously unscientific",56 but nevertheless, despite it being 
existential (in a socio-political, rather than ontological sense),57 these remain broad, sweeping 
claims which apprehend biological and 'wild' nature as inherently positive or life affirming and 
would therefore appear to be open to various criticisms. Further, given the highfalutin feature of his 
ideas in this context, it is hard to see how it would be convincing in practice, rather than of merely 
philosophical interest. 
Many of the problems Marcuse's philosophy of nature faces derive from Marx's view of the topic 
put forward in the 1844 Manuscripts which the former largely uncritically inherits. From this 
source, Marcuse reads a means by which humanity might "understand nature as a universe which 
becomes the congenial medium for human gratification to the degree to which nature's own 
gratifying forces and qualities are recovered and released."58 As Feenberg notes, "Marcuse never 
distinguished his idea of nature from Marx's. Instead, he tried out a whole series of unsatisfactory 
explanations for the concept of nature he derived from Marx."59 It must be mentioned that, amongst 
these "unsatisfactory explanations", Marcuse's attenuation of the Marxian view of nature with 
recourse to Freudian depth psychology is merely the most obvious,60 however, this avenue of 
criticism will be passed over here in order to make a case for a more plainly philosophical criticism 
of inconsistency. 
Simply put: Marcuse's view of nature appears beset with confusing antinomies. As noted previously, 
on one hand he advocated a view of nature as an "external" realm upon which human survival 
crucially depends on.61 Yet he also offered a view roughly in accord with the thesis that nature must 
be understood as a historical category or "social construction".62 As such, this appears to be in direct 
54 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 74.
55 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 67.
56 Marcuse, ibid. (1972a), p. 65.
57 See Marcuse, 'Existentialism: Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Être et le Néant,' in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol.3, no.3, (March, 1948), pp. 309-336.  
58 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 67.
59 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 126.
60 However, it should be known that Marcuse was not uncritical of Freudianism. See for example his (1970c) 'The 
Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man', in Shapiro, (ed., 1970), pp. 45-61. 
61 See for example, Marcuse, (1972b) 'Ecology and Revolution', in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers  
of Herbert Marcuse, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 175.
62 György Lukács appears to be the first Marxist thinker to explicitly describe nature as a social construct in his 
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conflict with Marcuse's other contention that nature contains inherently liberating, and hence 
positive properties. However, it also raises tensions between Marcuse's almost Heideggerian-
sounding recommendations to let nature be and to allow it to flourish "as a life force in its own 
right."63  
Marcuse says that "nature is a historical entity" and eloquently insists that the role of a new 
science and a new technology is to rebuild the world; but on the other hand he constantly 
writes as though the model for this rebuilt world is to be found somehow in a noumenal 
nature's 'own' 'objective' or 'inherent' qualities.64 
Furthermore, Vogel adds that the influence of the views of the early Marx on Marcuse's theory of 
nature compound the problem, that "it is not the active character of knowledge that the new science 
is supposed to emphasize but rather (and quite inconsistently) its receptive character".65 Vogel's 
proposed solution will be discussed below, however, these are not the only difficulties which arise 
due to Marcuse's reliance on Marx's philosophical-anthropological view of human nature in which 
nature's inherent properties become objectified through the transformative power of labour and 
technics. In Marcuse's early "phenomenological" reading of the 1844 Manuscripts, the senses (by 
which Marcuse means not merely sensory organs but the body in its entirety),66 also come to play a 
defining role as "theoreticians in practice."67 However, this seems to be of little help either; as 
Feenberg summarises Marcuse's position: "...in a free society labor both humanises nature and 
liberates it to the free development of its own potentialities."68 But this still appears to demand an 
explanation as to how the prospect of a "human appropriation" of nature can be liberated (by 
humans) and at the same time pursue its own ends. If "ends" or "functions" can be ascribed to nature 
in toto at all, they are either in the service of the methodological procedures of the sciences, or – in 
the case of natural selection – simply to reproduce, pursue opportunity, and avoid the threat of pain 
History and Class Consciousness, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), p. 234. See also N. Smith, Uneven 
Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 64-65. See also Vogel, 
op.cit. (1996). For a critique of postmodern views of nature as a social construct, see G. Sessions, 'Reinventing 
Nature, ...?' A Response to Cronon's Uncommon Ground', in The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy, vol.13, no.1, 
(1996), pp. 33-38. 
63 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 65.
64 Vogel, op.cit. (1996), p. 136.
65 Vogel, ibid. (1996).
66 See Ocay, op.cit. (2010), pp. 68-69.
67 See for example, K. Marx, (1932), 'First Manuscript' in E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York: Contiuum, 
2004), pp.84-85. See also Marcuse, 'New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism', in Heideggerian 
Marxism, edited by M. Abromeit and R. Wolin, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p.102. The 
"phenomenological" aspects of Marcuse's discussion of the 1844 Manuscripts is noted by Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), 
pp. 122-126. 
68 Feenberg, ibid. (2005), p. 124.
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or death. The earlier Marxian response proffered by Marcuse, that "man is not in nature; nature is 
not the external world into which he first has to come out of his own inwardness. Man is nature"69 
appears to deviate from his later comments that the end of capitalism was not just a matter of 
political or psychological renewal, but of survival.70 Furthermore, in Capital, Marx is not 
necessarily so attentive to the inherent value of the environment in any case: "(Man) ... develops the 
potentialities slumbering in nature, and subjects the play of its forces to his own sovereign power."71 
Once again, in advocating the liberation of the supposedly suppressed potentials of nature, Marcuse 
clearly stated he was not arguing civilisation should be abandoned to the weeds, but in advocating 
letting nature be what it might like to be a significant antinomy arises. Marcuse's calls for a new 
sensibility which could allow for the "emancipation of the senses";72 a profound, global raising of 
consciousness which in his words would have the effect of making individuals "physically and 
mentally incapable of creating another Auschwitz", though inspiring, lacks practical efficacy.73 Such 
a prospect may at least be philosophically conceivable, but is extremely difficult to envision in the 
context of the daily business of the consumer society, staunchly defended as it is by deeply-
entrenched politico-economic practises which tend to be uncritically aligned with economic and 
technological rationality, which arguably undercuts their frequent references to objective / 
normative ideals such as justice or morality. As Feenberg notes, modern (mainstream) politics 
appears to consist in little more than a technocratic lubrication for deciding "who gets what and how 
they get it."74 
Aside from these practical political concerns, Habermas's criticism of Marcuse's philosophy of 
nature are rather more straightforward. In a related manner to his criticism of the coherence of a 
new science and technology, Marcuse's invocation of a subjective approach to nature flows from 
this original category error. Habermas' position differs from Marcuse's insofar as the latter retains a 
basically monological outlook in regard to the anthropological centrality of labour – a position 
Marx made clear in the 1844 Manuscripts. Yet Habermas famously splits action, initially into the 
separate contexts of "work" and "interaction", and later into "communicative" and "instrumental" 
69 Marcuse, op.cit. (1932), p. 97.
70 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972b), p. 174.
71 Marx, (1867) Capital, volume 1, part 3, chapter 7, (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), p. 283. (Emphasis added). In 
the Grundrisse, Marx goes further: “for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a 
matter of utility; ceases to be recognized as a power in itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws 
appears merely as a ruse so as to subjugate it under human need.” Cited in Hay, op.cit. (2005), p. 294. For an 
extensive discussion of Marx's theory of nature, see Alfred Schmidt's The Concept of Nature in Marx, (London: 
Verso, 1973).
72  Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), pp. 64-65.
73  Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society', in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol.3, no.3, (1979), p. 38.
74  Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 87.
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domains.75 Vogel summarises the Habermasian position as follows:  
Whereas scientism on the one hand takes categories appropriate to nature and misapplies them 
to the social realm, what happens in Marcuse is that categories appropriate to the social realm 
get misapplied to the natural one. Thus it is simply a category mistake, Habermas argues, to 
talk about "dominating" nature or "liberating" nature. Domination and liberation are ethical 
categories that have to do with relations between people, and nature is not a person.76 
In defence of Marcuse, it should be emphasised that although he called for the treatment of nature 
as a subject, he was not arguing that it ought be treated as one would a person or a moral agent as 
such.77 Yet Vogel persists with this characterisation. For him, Marcuse's view of nature and the new 
science is a "romantic dream" which posits a "nature with whom we could speak, a nature that is 
itself a moral agent and with whom a reciprocal moral relation is a possibility".78 However, despite 
his use of subjective terminology in describing the close correspondences between the treatment of 
human and non-human nature under the technological mode of production, Marcuse often appears 
to speaking metaphorically. For example, he wrote that "the pollution of air and water, the noise, the 
encroachment of industry and commerce on open natural space have the physical weight of 
enslavement, imprisonment."79 Marcuse was not arguing here that nature is literally imprisoned, 
implying an entrapped subject with the desire for release, but speaking figuratively by drawing a 
comparison between the reduction of human and non-human nature into the status of mere 
resources in a manner reminiscent of Heidegger.80 For Marcuse, there was nothing inevitable about 
this situation; control, production or management per se were not inherently aggressive or 
exploitative, rather, these repressive elements were the result of a particular socio-historical 
condition or mode of production, one which Marcuse held could be subjected to widespread 
changes. The emergence of a new sensibility could allow the threateningly materialistic animating 
incentives of modern technology to be replaced by alternatives – specifically those of imagination 
and creativity found within certain great works of art.81 Despite phrases such as "mastery of nature" 
no doubt connoting domination, perhaps even aggression and exploitation, as ever for Marcuse, 
there were other dimensions in which such terms could be understood; there can be dominating, 
75  See Vogel, op.cit. (1996).
76  Vogel, op.cit. (2004), p. 243.
77  Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 156. 
78  Vogel, op.cit. (1996), p. 111.
79  Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 61. (Emphasis added).
80  See Heidegger, op.cit. (1954). 
81  See Marcuse, op.cit. (1978). 
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exploitative forms of mastery, or there can be liberating ones.82 As he pointed out, these apply to 
control and management in a number of contexts: 
If it were demonstrable that the abolition of domination is biologically impossible, then I 
would say, the idea of abolishing domination is a utopia. I do not believe that anyone has yet 
demonstrated this. What is probably biologically impossible is to get away without any 
repression whatsoever. It may be self-imposed, it may be imposed by others. But that is not 
identical with domination. In Marxian theory and long before it a distinction was made 
between rational authority and domination. The authority of an airplane pilot, for example, is 
rational authority. It is impossible to imagine a condition in which the passengers would tell 
the pilot what to do. The traffic policeman is another typical example of rational authority. 
These things are probably biological necessities, but political domination, domination based 
on exploitation, oppression, is not.83
Hence, Marcuse's view, although confusing at times, makes more sense once it is realised that he 
was not collapsing technics and science in their entirety into 'domination', but criticising their 
prevailing directive impetus under the current mode of production. Of course, technical 
development itself can only but be directed toward a mastery of various elements of nature; those 
that are mastered in the production of the artifact itself, and those ends that the artifact was intended 
to perform.84 Indeed, to save nature (and potentially ourselves) from the continuing history of 
human plunder, certain levels of mastery over it (for example, scientific knowledge of its workings) 
obviously remains necessary. To note a trivial example: the very process of understanding which 
leads to a knowledge of the properties of plants leads on to the knowledge that we require them for 
our own well-being quite literally.85 Hence, as Marcuse continually emphasises, the advance of 
technoscience as a means of uncovering nature's secrets remains amongst the most important of 
human activities. Marcuse was thus not calling for merely technical reform or advance, but 
something far more fundamental. It is not sufficient that technics should merely be remodelled with 
nature in mind or made 'sustainable', but informed by very different social incentives and attitudes 
than those currently prevailing. For him, the reduction of 'wild nature' and human nature were 
82 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 240.
83 Marcuse, op.cit. (1967), pp. 80-81.
84 Of course, artifacts can also be used to carry out functions that may be unintended by designers. This topic will be 
addressed in detail in the subsequent chapter. 
85 Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the abuse of individual sentient creatures for "false" reasons (for 
example, to test a 'new' cosmetic product which is nothing more than the most recent in a line of functionally 
identical, "rebranded products") is ethically abhorent. 
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parallel; the former viewed as a collection of resources to be plundered for profit, the latter 
narrowly defined as a self-interested and largely amoral agent, consumed by the conflation of 
material acquisition and happiness. 
As mentioned, as well as a move to socialism, Marcuse placed his hopes in the liberating potentials 
of art and aesthetics to provide a framework from which nature could be viewed and engaged with 
on a new footing. Instead of being segmented and removed from everyday experience and 
distantiated to the elite realms of the "higher culture", he advocated that the arts should be given a 
new prominence and made into a "productive force in material as well as cultural transformation".86 
Instead of being mediated by commercial or market interests, Marcuse turned his focus back not 
just to his 1932 article on the 1844 Manuscripts, but his earlier concern with the aesthetic 
dimension. This approach called for a  unification of the arts, nature and the productive forces, with 
art's "political function and potential" as a model for revolutionary social change granted specific 
import.87 With this late turn to the arts (particularly the literary arts), Marcuse was returning to a 
subject he had been intimately acquainted with from the beginning of his philosophical career 
where he argued in his doctoral thesis that in premodernity, the union of artist and society was far 
closer than in modern times.88 Today, the imagination, interests and expression of the artist tend 
either to be co-opted into industrialised, commercial forms, sequestered away as special interests, or 
confronted with opposition by certain sectors of society. From this vantage point, he argued that 
"great art indicts and protests against the existing society and its ideology, values and reality 
principle" and therefore contained liberatory potential:
Authentic art, for Marcuse, contains a vision of liberation that preserves images of freedom 
and happiness denied in the everyday world. Furthermore, in a world in which language, 
philosophy and the sciences are incorporated into an apparatus of domination, in which one-
dimensional thought prevails, art remains a refuge of critical truths. That is, by its very nature, 
art pertains to another world and can thus speak truths other than the conventional wisdom.89
According to Feenberg, the reasons why Marcuse selected art for such a formative role were 
86 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 32.
87 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1978), p. ix.
88 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 93. Marcuse's doctoral dissertation concerned Der deutsche Künstlerroman, (the German 
artist novel') and was intended as a "social critique of bourgeois society". See Marcuse (1922), 'The German Artist 
Novel: Introduction', translated by C. Reitz, in Art and Liberation: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.4, 
edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 71-80. See also Kellner, op.cit. (1984), pp. 347-357.
89 See Kellner, ibid. (1984), p. 348.
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twofold: 
In the first place, with speculative metaphysics discredited, he needs an experiential basis for 
identifying potentialities transcending the given. Second, he needs a more concrete and 
imaginatively rich value criterion than morality by which to measure the social world. Even if 
the advanced industrial society criticised in One-Dimensional Man could meet basic moral 
standards, it would still constitute a social universe hostile to human being and nature. This is 
related to problems in its technical structure that must be met with aesthetically informed 
solutions.90
Marcuse's view of the role of the arts also has strong analogies with his view of nature; both are 
alternative worlds to the given reality; both offer an experience starkly different to that of 'work', 
whether from the perspective of the assembly line or the office cubicle; and both offer the prospect 
of escape from the fumes and noise of the traffic, urban sprawl, and ungratifying, often wasteful 
consumption. As mentioned above, Marcuse's invocation of the redemptive features of art are 
arguably grounded once again in his belief that nature itself contained inherent aesthetic, life-
affirming and positive properties which, like those aspects of human nature he contended were 
repressed under capitalism, lay inert or exploited due to the narrowed evaluations permitted under 
the sway of technological and capitalist-economic rationality. From this point, on the surface at 
least, it seems to follow logically from Marcuse's premise that the arts could provide a model of 
liberatory potential. Yet although it has not been argued here that such ideas are untenable per se, as 
practical means toward qualitative change, it may be asserted that Marcuse could have set his sights 
on somewhat more realistic strategies. For example, in a purely practical context, it is difficult 
enough today even to save certain natural enclaves or species from the onslaught of commercial 
'development', let alone nature as a whole. Nevertheless, rather than just calling for the 
"decommercialisation" or "deindustrialisation" of parts or aspects of art or nature, Marcuse was 
placing his hopes in far more radical goals, and it is in his final works that this vision reaches its 
most optimistic proportions. 
In one sense, this is confusing as Marcuse was a philosopher who had long stressed his concern for 
philosophy to have practical as well as theoretical worth; to address and critique the concrete, lived 
experience of modern life in the advanced industrial nations.91 Of course, he could not necessarily 
90 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), pp. 94-95.
91 For an early example of this intention, see Marcuse, 'On Concrete Philosophy', in Abromeit and Wolin, (eds), op.cit.  
(2005), pp. 34-52.
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have envisioned how soon concerns such as resource depletion, mass extinction, pollution and 
environmental degradation in general would come to pose dangers to civilisation on a global scale 
despite him earlier mentioning that qualitative change was now a matter of "survival",92 but as such 
concerns are now in the background of an increasing number of discourses, it seems likely that were 
he alive today, they would play a more significant role in his philosophy. Indeed, given the urgency 
of questioning technology in an environmental context, calling for production to be driven by 
values other than the acquisition of money, power, and the consequential exploitation of nature are 
of the utmost importance, however, again, it seems vanishingly likely that such motivations could 
be replaced by those within the aesthetic realm any time soon. Despite the forces of production 
remaining directed toward the plunder and desolation of nature, the time for experimenting with 
aesthetics rather than considering concrete praxis appears to be dwindling. 
Perhaps, as Gandesha points out, the "ambiguity" regarding Marcuse's understanding of nature can 
be clarified when it is recalled that the two major sources informing his critique are historical 
materialism and phenomenology.93 For Gandesha, this amounted to "an ambivalent juxtaposition of 
technology as neutral instrumentality, fettered only by society's production relations, on the one 
hand, and technology as a world-disclosing project on the other."94 Of course, as he continues, 
Marcuse's ambivalence in regard to technology is further diminished by the distinction he placed 
between technics (ethically neutral artifacts if viewed in abstraction from the mode of production) 
and technology (a value-laden "social process"), in which the rationality of the latter serves as an a 
priori which forms both the precondition and horizon guiding the development of the means and 
relations of production.95 In this move, a comparison with Heidegger's thesis in 'The Question 
Concerning Technology' is again obvious; in the final analysis, both thinkers appear to be in 
agreement that any philosophy of technology (that is to say, one which addresses technology as a 
whole rather than individual technical artifacts) is insufficient if it is limited to the latter, as this 
would be to exclude that which Heidegger characterised as a "mode of revealing" and "nothing 
technological, nothing on the order of a machine", and that Marcuse refers to as a social process and 
mode of production.96 Both thinkers contrast the technical practices of the past which they claim 
were driven by "the realization of essential potentialities" with those of the present, which now tend 
92 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1972b), p. 174.
93 See Gandesha, op.cit. (2004), p. 195.
94 Gandesha, ibid. (2004), p. 196.
95 See Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 105; and Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 157.
96 Heidegger, op.cit. (1954), p. 305.
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to be relativised and treated as the "democratic" satisfaction of personal preference, administered by 
a technical edifice "which 'enframes' nature and society in a rationality of calculation and control."97 
Finally, both look for alternatives in art. However, instead of addressing technical mediation in 
ontological terms and recommending a patient acquiscence in regard to its apparently semi-
autonomous revelations as per Heidegger, Marcuse's Marxian approach led him to address its 
concrete socio-political manifestations, ideology and impacts, as well the interests and incentives of 
the human agents behind its workings. 
However, even with this influence taken into consideration, the ambivalence of Marcuse's 
somewhat romantic view of nature is not rectified quite so easily as his understanding of technics 
and technology. As will now be argued, it is the optimistic nature of Marcuse's broader claims 
concerning human nature and first nature that both secures the continual relevance of his 
philosophy, but is not without its problems. 
Misapprehending Nature
In agreement with Vogel, the major problem facing Marcuse's view of nature is not that he was 
arguing domination or exploitation are inherent features of production, but that nature embodies 
inherently positive features that tend to be contained and concealed by the peculiarly singular 
rationality of the technological mode of production.98 Yet whilst a "human appropriation" of nature 
which would aim to restore and emphasise its "life-enhancing" and "aesthetic qualities"99 is a noble 
vision, it seems excessively optimistic on the basis of Marcuse's own critique of the 'one-
dimensional' society, and insufficiently cautious in the context of the role of capitalism in providing 
further stimulation to the predicament. Furthermore, Vogel's solution to this problem – that 'nature' 
is a social construction – is arguably of little help also. What follows will therefore firstly provide a 
concrete example as to how Marcuse's optimism may actually diminish the potential for change, 
before briefly taking a critical look at the treatment of Marcuse's view from Vogel. 
Firstly, any number of examples that attest to the many ways in which nature per se is nurturing, 
97 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 88. For an argument to this effect in relation to the media specifically, see R. Hoggart, 
Mass Media in in a Mass Society: Myth and Reality, (London: Continuum, 2004). 
98 Vogel, op.cit. (2004), p. 244.
99 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 67.
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life-enhancing or positive can be contrasted with just as many examples which illustrate its 
harshness, violence, and starkly inhuman aspects. This counts not just for 'first nature', but for 
human nature – as Dostoevski noted; it is only humans that are "artistic" and "picturesque" in the 
context of their violence; only (some) humans seem capable of authentically evincing the concept of 
gratuitous cruelty, so it can be admitted that this appears to be a social construction.100 Indeed, 
unless we are to consider the tendency of the domestic feline to toy with its prey as a form of 'sport' 
or even 'psychopathy', considering nature as a whole as either essentially good or evil would appear 
to ignore its supreme indifference to such distinctly human conceptions, as well as the extent to 
which just this indifference was in fact a motivation for human technical capacities in the first 
place.101 Despite the positive potential of natural selection, it consists in a process which is – by 
supposed 'human standards' – grisly; a brutal competition delimited by opportunity on the one hand 
and the avoidance of death on the other, in which the vast majority of mutations are 
disadvantageous. Furthermore, human nature may well be able to be countenanced in terms of 
subjective and intersubjective status, as may – albeit in varying degrees – a great many species of 
non-human animals, yet the same cannot be said for nature as a whole. Conceived either in 
biological / evolutionary, chemical or physical forms, once again, nature per se is oblivious to 
suffering, notions of ethical conduct, aesthetic sensibilities and beauty, despite all these things 
ultimately originating from it. 
It is important to recall that Marcuse was not entirely against approaching nature in an instrumental 
fashion which separates his thought from various schools of environmental ethics which are critical 
of the instrumentalisation of nature on the basis of its inherently masculine, reductionistic, or 
anthropocentric features.102 On the contrary, Marcuse expressed his hope that nature could serve as a 
100 F. Dostoevsky, (1880), The Brothers Karamazov, book V, chapter four, (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 311. See also 
Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 133. 
101 A feature of early philosophy of technology, now, unfortunately usually relegated to the more radical branches of 
philosophical-anthropology was the theory of "organic substitution", owed to Ernst Kapp's work, Grundlinien einer  
philosophie der technik: Zur entstehungsgeschichte der cultur aus neuen gesichtspunkten, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Library, 1877). Other examples of this theory can be found in A. Gehlen, (1965), 'A Philosophical-
Anthropological Perspective on Technology', in Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, edited by 
R.C. Sharff and V. Dusek, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 213-220; Der Mensch. Seine Natur Und Seine Stellung in  
Der Welt, (Düsseldorf: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1974). See also J. Ortega y Gasset, (1939), 
'Thoughts on Technology' in Philosophy and Technology, edited by C. Mitcham and R. Mackey, (Cambridge MASS: 
The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 290-313. For a recent palaeoanthropological approach with strong similarities to the 
theory of organic substitution, see T. Taylor, The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human 
Evolution, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010).
102 For a brief introduction to the ecofeminist critique which establishes parallels between the domination of women 
and the domination of nature, see K. Warren, 'The Power and Promise of Ecofeminism', in Ethics: The Big 
Questions, edited by J. P. Sterba, (Malden, MASS: Blackwell, 1998), p. 414. The deep ecology movement is also 
broadly critical of the instrumentalisation of nature. See for example the collected volume Deep Ecology for the 21st 
Century, edited by G. Sessions, (London: Shambhala, 1995). 
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"gauge" that could promote a very different attitude or sensibility which would inform both the 
relations and means of production and replace their current repressive instantiations.103 Again, 
following Marx – he contended that such treatment may not only be informed by incentives of 
plunder and exploitation, but in "conformance with the laws of beauty".104 In the new society, nature 
would take on the status of "subject-object"; "as a cosmos with its own potentialities, necessities, 
and chances."105 Taken on face value, such comments once again appear perfectly laudable; as 
Feenberg summarises the point in reference to a comment in Counterrevolution and Revolt : "the 
point is not to avoid disturbing nature but to avoid 'violating' it."106 But again: the "laws of beauty" 
are human laws; unless one is to accept (say) Vogel's contentions that nature is a social construct, 
they occur only accidentally in the context of nature per se.107 Just as problems emerge in 
conceiving of nature in terms of the language of rights emanating from the liberal, social contract 
tradition, speaking of the 'violation' of nature appears to imply a subject capable of consent at one 
end of the scale, or at the other, at least an inherent telos, a 'principle of order' which is being 
forcibly overridden by an agent somehow removed from the natural scheme of things.108 This is to 
return to the second prong of Habermas's criticism, but aside from this, Marcuse's move arguably 
verges on both inductive generalisation and anthropomorphisation.109 Whilst it can be agreed that 
industrial practises such as coal-mining have a destructive effect upon the surrounding environment 
and atmosphere, to refer to them as a form of 'violation', despite its poetic or emotional appeal, 
appears procedurally inappropriate. Although doubtless the vast swathes of animals subjected to the 
grisly prospects of human consumption and experimentation may be said to be violated in 
individual manners, this is precisely because they are sentient beings, capable not just of suffering 
and pain, but having an interest in resisting or avoiding them.110  As Epicurus famously thought, the 
avoidance of pain and suffering and the pursuit of pleasure were not merely the basis of human 
moral conduct, but common to all beings / subjects capable of experiencing them.111 Yet once again, 
103 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1969b), p.27; (1972a), pp. 79-128; and (1978). 
104 K. Marx, 'First Manuscript: Alienated Labor', XXIV, in Fromm, op.cit. (1961), p.84. See also Marcuse, ibid.
(1969b), p. 27.
105 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 69.
106 Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), p. 107.
107 To clarify further: it is not being argued here that certain individual creatures or species are not capable of carrying 
out ethical conduct or capable of enjoying pleasure – on the contrary – anyone who has stroked a dog's belly knows 
this position is false. Secondly, it also goes against the weight of the findings of modern ethological research which 
indicates exactly the opposite in a large variety of species. See for example J. Balcombe, Pleasurable Kingdom: 
Animals and the Nature of Feeling Good, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) and C.D.L. Wynne,  Animal 
Cognition: The Mental Lives of Animals, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
108 For a critique of the language of rights applied to nature, see M. Midgley, 'Duties Concerning Islands' in 
Environmental Ethics, edited by R. Elliot, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 247-261.
109 Although the sentiment can be agreed upon, John Gray arguably commits this error by referring to the human 
species as "Homo rapiens" in his Straw Dogs, (London: Granta, 2003), p. 7, 184.
110 See P. Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd ed., (London: Pimlico, 1995), pp. 9-16.
111 See N.W. DeWitt, (1954), Epicurus and his Philosophy, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), p. 220
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nature as a whole cannot be apprehended as such a "subject" as it neither experiences nor is 
motivated by either "static" or "kinetic pleasure", despite many of its denizens arguably being 
capable of such states. Nor does nature as a whole have anything that could be described as 
"interests"; these instead derive from beings with the cognitive capacity to accommodate some sort 
of internal will or instinct, some will to pursue or resist, something which plankton or slime-moulds 
may only possess to limited degrees, but orang-utans and ferrets in a far greater sense. The point is, 
nature as a whole does not possess these things, and it has little more than methodological 
instrumental value for theory to presume that it does.112 Evidently, Marcuse was aware of such 
problems,113 however, his response is arguably far from satisfactory and further propels his late 
social-critical theory further away from concrete practicality.  
Marcuse's problem arguably emanates from his "monistic" approach to nature which entails "that a 
single moral philosophy of ethical theory is required to generate our correct duties and obligations 
toward the environment". As Andrew Light continues, this can be contrasted with that of the 
"pluralist" approach which contends that "the sources of value in nature are too heterogeneous in 
kind, and because the multitude of contexts in which we find ourselves in different kinds of ethical 
relationships demand a diverse set of methods for fulfilling our moral obligations."114 This arguably 
has the effect of vitiating Marcuse's view, which tends to subsume various aspects of nature ('first 
nature' itself, feminine nature, non-human animal natures, etc.), into a unified whole. Furthermore, 
placing the majority of emphasis on the prospect of human liberation may have the effect of 
stultifying or discouraging various other practical ecological or liberatory strategies which are not 
only achievable now, but in contrast with Marcuse's far more lofty aspirations, less difficult, risky 
and radical. Take diet as an example: the practical project of diminishing the pollution, 
environmental degradation, waste and suffering that are the obvious and necessary results of the 
modern intensive or "factory farm" style system of animal production is possible and quite feasible 
in the affluent nations. Yet reducing the tendency toward such 'farming' operations may be 
discouraged for the reason that Marcuse believed such projects must come second to the liberation 
of humanity as a whole: 
Can the human appropriation of nature ever achieve the elimination of violence, cruelty and 
brutality in the daily sacrifice of animal life for the physical reproduction of the human race? 
112 See T. Lewens, Organisms and Artifacts: Design in Nature and Elsewhere, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 
2005).
113 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 65.
114 A. Light, 'Are All Anthropocentrists Against Nature?' in Rethinking Marxism, 11:4, (1999), p. 97.
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To treat nature "for its own sake" sounds good, but it is certainly not for the sake of the animal 
to be eaten, nor probably for the sake of the plant. The end of this war, the perfect peace in the 
animal world – this idea belongs to the Orphic myth, not to any conceivable historical reality. 
In the face of the suffering inflicted by man upon man, it seems terribly "premature" to 
campaign for universal vegetarianism or synthetic foodstuffs; as the world is, priority must be 
on human solidarity among human beings. And yet, no free society is imaginable which does 
not, under its "regulative idea of reason," make the concerted effort to reduce consistently the 
suffering which man imposes on the animal world.115 
This passage is both provocative and telling, and is arguably an aspect of Marcuse's theory that 
invites strong criticisms, not least his dubious alignment of the sentience of the Hibiscus to that of 
the Chimpanzee. Initially, it may be asked to what extent the goal of "perfect peace" in the human 
world is a utopian aspiration, but even if it is, surely Marcuse would have contended that this ought 
not undermine the chances for incremental improvements. Although he did not go so far as to 
fallaciously assume that the prospect of (say) the diminution of animal suffering excludes 
improvements to the human lot, his comment that such actions appear "premature" is certainly 
questionable, as the goal of the former is hardly isolated from that of the latter. Aside from 
questions as to how animals ought to be treated in an ethical context, there are many practical 
environmental reasons to contend that the relatively minor choice to adopt a vegetarian or vegan 
diet, or at least significantly reduce one's consumption of meat products is – if not exactly 
environmentally beneficial – far less detrimental than a carnivorous diet, and also potentially 
healthier.116 Secondly, as Peter Singer has repeatedly argued, adequately feeding the entire 
population of the Earth is obviously contingent on the amount of food available, and with the global 
population expected to rise and then plateau between roughly 9 and a half to 10 billion individuals 
by the 2050s through to the 2070s, feeding the human population is actually hampered by the 
increasing technologically, economically rational tendency to treat farms as "corporate agribusiness 
entities", or as simply means of profit rather than genuine forms of practical technical advance: 
Some people think that factory farming is necessary to feed the growing population of our 
planet. The truth, however, is the reverse. No matter how efficient intensive pork, beef, 
chicken, egg and milk production become, in the narrow sense of producing more meat, eggs 
115 Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 68.
116 On the health benefits of a vegetarian diet, see for example A. Pan et al, 'Red Meat Consumption and Mortality', 
Archives of Internal Medicine, American Medical Association, (March, 2012), pp. 555-563. See also R. Stanton, 'A 
Plant-Based Diet – Good for Us and Good for the Planet', in The Medical Journal of Australia Open, 1, Supplement 
2, (04.06.2012).
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or milk for each pound of grain we feed the animals, raising animals on grain remains 
wasteful. Far from increasing the total amount of food available for human consumption, it 
reduces it.117 
Obviously, it is not being argued here that Marcuse would have explicitly excused – let alone 
endorsed – the morally vacant, economically-rationalised modern technoscientific processes of 
intensive farming, live exports and so on, but that he does not connect them to the irrational 
rationality he himself was so attentive to in his social critique. To be sure however, it may well be in 
the domain of our conduct toward animals that this irrational rationality is most starkly evident. In 
distancing what can easily be accomplished in practice – especially in the affluent societies that 
certainly do not lack for protein or fats – the potential for change seems to be passed over by 
Marcuse due its apparently piecemeal efficacy. In lieu of the goal of "world-historical change" this 
approach easily leads to the dismissal of not only ethical / environmental vegetarianism / veganism, 
but those who refuse other environmentally destructive advantages afforded by the advanced 
industrial nations. If such efforts can be so quickly dismissed as premature, Marcuse appears to 
have missed a crucial and potentially formative opportunity for some change at the expense of 
awaiting the perhaps overly-optimistic goal of "qualitative change". Such views – even amongst 
contemporary environmental thinkers – are not unusual. For example, as James Lovelock claims:
In theory, we could eat less and save energy, but in practice we never will, unless made to do 
so (...) If our leaders were all great and powerful they could ban the keeping of pets and 
livestock, make a vegetarian diet compulsory, and fund a huge programme of food synthesis 
by the chemical and biochemical industries: doing this might limit the loss of life to pets and 
livestock only (...) almost certainly, it will never happen this way.118
Affluent individuals – if they so choose – could easily halve, or even halt their consumption of 
factory farmed products tomorrow and hence send a considerable message that even the market 
would acknowledge, for there is nothing determining them to not do so. Some statistics arguably 
bear out these contentions. For example: surely it is irrational to drain aquifers in order to irrigate 
grain crops that could be fed directly to the hungry rather than to beef cattle which are then 
consumed by individuals affluent enough to meet their nutritional requirements without it. As a 
recent report by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation noted, it is only 
117 P. Singer and M. Mason, The Ethics of What we Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter, (London: Text, 2006), p. 210.
118 J. Lovelock, The Vanishing Face of Gaia, (London: Allen-Lane, 2009), p. 49.
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economically rational to permit modern 'farming' practices of raising, feeding, transporting and 
producing livestock which cause ecologically destructive effects on a “massive scale”.119 To expand 
on this contention, current rates of livestock production allegedly contribute around “14 to 22 
percent of the of the 36 billion tons of 'CO2 equivalent' greenhouse gases the world produces every 
year”,120 and beef is the least efficient animal-production form of all, requiring “an energy input to 
protein output ratio of fifty four to one”, closely followed by sheep at fifty to one,121 and 
contributing fifty seven times the amount of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere than growing 
potatoes.122 In terms of protein inputs and outputs, around “41 million tons of plant protein is fed to 
US livestock to produce an estimated 7 million tons of animal protein for human consumption.”123 
In simple terms, this represents a figure of approximately 6 kgs of plant-based protein input to 
produce 1kg of beef, and in other countries the input required is significantly higher. To be sure 
however, despite improvements in efficiency, what is not often taken into account in such figures is 
“the fact that only about half the weight of a steer is boneless beef. 13 pounds (5.89 kgs) of grain 
are required to produce that single pound (.45 kgs) of beef.”124 On a global scale, irrigating this 
grain-based protein for stock is said to utilise “70 percent or more of all water used”, and once 
again: despite the estimates of the amount of water required to produce a steer varying significantly 
from country to country, and also on the method of calculation used,125 a kilogram of grain-fed beef 
requires “at least 15 cubic metres (15,000 litres or 15 tonnes) of fresh water.”126 Worse still, these 
forms of aggressive, mechanised production are also aspired to by the populations of developing 
nations as they pursue economic growth, and if the trends continue, the more affluent a country 
becomes, the more meat their populations are likely to consume.127 To put this into context, a study 
by Vaclav Smil cited by Singer and Mason calculated that if everyone in the world was to consume 
the equivalent amount of meat devoured by the affluent nations at 2000 levels, “in the absence of 
some unforeseen advances in bioengineering, (this would) require 67 percent more agricultural land 
than the world possesses.”128 Furthermore, the methane emissions from the livestock themselves 
contribute to global warming, making pastures requires land-clearing and deforestation, and the 
119 H. Steinfeld, P. Gerber, T. Wassenaar, V. Castel, M. Rosales, and C. De Haan, 'Livestock's Long Shadow: 
Environmental Issues and Options', a report for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 
(Rome, 2006), p. xx.
120 Steinfeld et al, ibid. (2006), chapter three.
121 D. Pimantel, 'Livestock Production: Energy Inputs and the Environment', American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 
vol.78, no.3, (September, 2003), pp. 660-663. 
122 N. Fiala, 'How Meat Contributes to Global Warming', Scientific American, (February 4, 2009).
123 A. Berntell, executive director of the Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI), quoted in A. Kirby, 'Hungry 
World “Must Eat Less Meat”', BBC News, (August 16, 2004).
124 Singer and Mason, op.cit. (2006), p. 212.
125 See Singer and Mason, ibid. (2006), pp. 212-215.
126 Berntell, op.cit. (2004). 
127 See Steinfeld, et al, op.cit. (2006).
128 Singer and Mason, op.cit. (2006), p. 211. 
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livestock industry's dependence on government subsidies and petrochemicals in order to produce 
pesticides, fertilisers, and to fuel machinery need only be cited.129 Yet compounding the irrationality 
even further, influential apologists and lobbyists for the livestock industries and their governmental 
“regulators” appear utterly impotent even to put effective regulatory guidelines into place that 
would ensure the slaughter of the unfortunate stock is carried out with minimal suffering. Despite 
the horror stories regularly featuring on news and current affairs programs featuring torture, 
dismemberment, terror, and other forms of barbaric abuse to non-human animals sufficient even to 
ignite the meat-eating public's outrage,130 in their defense, the regulators continue to emphasise the 
money generated by the industry, the jobs and livelihoods of the families involved, all the while 
invoking oxymoronic public relations phrases such as “sustainable development” and “ethical 
slaughter”. Even advocates of meat-consumption such as Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall and Michael 
Pollan have strongly criticised intensive farming operations.131 For example, the former writes: 
The vast majority of our food animals are now raised under methods that are systematically 
abusive. For them, discomfort is the norm, pain is routine, growth is abnormal, and diet is 
unnatural. Disease is widespread and stress is almost constant.132 
Roger Scruton – an unrepentant carnivore (and defender of fox hunting) – has written that "a true 
morality of animal welfare ought to begin from the premise that this way of treating animals is 
wrong".133 Hence, in summary, not only are there obvious reasons for intensive farming to be 
rejected on ethical grounds, there are equally solid reasons to reject it on environmental and even 
health grounds.134 Yet it is not rejected. Why not? Unfortunately for the philosophers, the answer 
seems to be quite simple: the example set by the affluent nations – which continue to eat more meat 
than ever before at a point when they could most afford not to do so – reveals a paradigm of 
irrational rationality, a paradigm that will likely not be overcome with more information, more 
knowledge, or more elegant philosophical arguments, but only through widespread attitudinal 
129 This theme can be explored further in works such as Food, Inc., edited by K. Weber, (New York: Public Affairs 
Press, 2009); and P. Singer and J. Mason, Animal Factories: What Corporate Agribusiness is Doing to the Family  
Farm, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1990).
130 It must be emphasised that – due to the necessary subterfuge required on behalf of the livestock industry to divert 
the public's attention, such footage overwhelmingly comes from groups courageous enough to violate the law by 
trespassing on private or corporate owned operations. 
131 See M. Pollan, 'An Animal's Place', The New York Times Sunday Magazine, (November 10, 2002). See also Pollan, 
The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals, (New York: Penguin, 2006).
132 H. Fearnley-Whittingstall, quoted in Singer and Mason, op.cit. (2006), p. 218.
133 R. Scruton, quoted in Singer and Mason, ibid. (2006), p.219. See also Scruton's Animal Rights and Wrongs, (New 
York: Continuum, 2006).
134 See for example, R. Stanton, 'A Plant-Based Diet – Good For Us and For the Planet', in Medical Journal of  
Australia Open, (2010), 1, suppl. 2: 5-6. 
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change; the sort of “new sensibility” Marcuse continually emphasised. To the extent that the goal of 
human liberation requires a truly sustainable source of adequate nourishment, ignoring or sidelining 
animal-rights issues and the impact of modern agriculture on the environment is – on the contrary – 
arguably deleterious to such a prospect. Despite the utopian context of "perfect peace in the animal 
world" obviously being close to impossible, at least a rudimentary attempt at restoring some sanity 
and morality ought not be left to await the answer to the question as to whether the prospect is 
equally utopian in the human world. Other than their taste for meat-products, there are no 
substantial reasons – let alone technologically deterministic forces – to stop affluent individual 
consumers from opting out of contributing to the unnecessary suffering of sentient beings and 
adopting a more conservative version of "the Great Refusal" in response to the waste and excess 
that is the necessary result of intensive farming. 
It has been the aim thus far to argue that Marcuse's optimism concerning the scope of the prospects 
of qualitative change may leave certain vital ethical and practical concerns in abeyance.135 As such, 
his conviction that little short of a world-historical revolution is required to bring about change 
could be seen as playing a stultifying rather than liberating role. To be sure, at least Marcuse did not 
share Habermas's initially somewhat flippant disregard of these particular concerns, a position the 
latter made abundantly clear in his association of vegetarianism with "taboo", "mystically inspired 
philosophies of nature", and the "anthropomorphising treatment of house pets."136 As Vogel 
understandably retorts: 
The supercilious tone – not to speak of the glaring petitio principii involved in relegating 
vegetarianism without argument to the status of an irrational taboo, or in trivializing concerns 
for animals into sentimentality about pets – doubtless sets one's teeth on edge; Habermas 
seems blind to the serious kinds of concerns expressed by proponents of an ecological 
ethics.137     
 
The topic of human conduct toward its sentient non-human cousins has been raised for the reason 
that it arguably represents a superior "gauge" than nature in general by which one can at least 
135 For a critique of Marcuse's view of human nature from a 'biological' perspective, see J. Noonan, 'Marcuse, Human 
Nature, and the Foundations of Ethical Norms', in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 34, no. 3, (March, 2008), 
pp. 267-286. See also Mason, op.cit. (1982). 
136 Quoted in Vogel, op.cit. (1996), p. 153.
137 Vogel, ibid. (1996), p. 153. Vogel does note however that Habermas later softened this position considerably. See 
Habermas, 'A Reply to My Critics', in Habermas: Critical Debates, edited by J. Thompson and D. Held, (London: 
Macmillan), p. 245.
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anecdotally measure the willingness of individuals – especially those in the affluent societies who 
do not necessarily have to consume meat in order to receive sufficient nourishment or nutrition – to 
reduce their strain on the Earth as well as markedly reduce the quotient of non-human suffering.138 
Suffice to say, currently the gauge appears to be registering a low probability of change. 
Unfortunately however, at worst, Marcuse's views could be seen to play into the hands of the more 
visceral detractors of animal ethics who commonly award precedence to human interests, 
enthymematically assuming that doing one precludes doing the other. As there remain human 
beings who continue to suffer, the ethical vegetarian or vegan is therefore easily painted in the 
public mind as at best, a pretentious quirk of affluent, middle-class society, naive and insensitive to 
the more significant problems affecting humans worldwide; or at worst, dangerous radicals, 
"extremists", and even "terrorists". However, as has been argued, this is far from the case, and 
carries the tacit presumption that human and non-human problems are isolated from each other. 
Worse, such dismissals arguably also provide an excuse for a lack of practical action on the part of 
the affluent public who are culturally conditioned to defend their meat consumption with all the 
tenacity one would usually afford a natural right. 
Nature as Social Construction
Other philosophers who have dealt extensively with Marcuse's theory of nature have been led to 
similar difficulties. For example, although not attempting to retrieve Marcuse's late concepts of a 
new technology and a subjectivisation of nature from obscurity, Feenberg tries to make sense of 
them by placing them into a variety of other philosophical frameworks, specifically 
phenomenology, which appears to be the only context in which Marcuse's views may be rendered 
coherent.139 Although Feenberg offers many constructive suggestions, the major problem facing 
Marcuse's theory was the attempt to reconcile his reliance on the philosophical-anthropological 
views of the early Marx, and – as has already been briefly noted – Marx's views do not square 
easily with Marcuse's account of nature which attempts to understand it in terms of its own 
potentials. Although Feenberg notes that "what is truly innovative in Marcuse's position is the 
hypothesis that once increasing wealth releases society from the struggle for existence, perception 
can transcend the given toward unrealized potentialities foreshadowed in art",140 Marcuse's 
138 See Stanton, op.cit. (2010). 
139 See Feenberg, op.cit. (2005), chapter six.  
140 Feenberg, ibid. (2005), p. 128. 
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approach appears to once again fall into a number of considerable problems. 
Another prominent critique which has already been touched on above is that of Steven Vogel, who 
is justifiably critical of how nature was conceived not just by Marcuse, but in the Western Marxist 
tradition as a whole.141 As this latter element is the target of his focus, what follows will be limited 
to Vogel's treatment of Marcuse as well as critically attending to Vogel's proposed solution: that 
nature is a "social construct".   
Vogel finds those aspects of Marcuse's view where he sounds like a proto-social constructivist 
appealing, however, as it has already been noted, Marcuse also argued that nature was an external 
domain; that it was literally 'out there', independent of and external to human minds.142 Despite this 
leading Marcuse's approach into ambiguous territory, this very ambiguity seems sensible in the 
sense that, on the one side, it can be understood that our concepts of nature, the environment, etc. 
are, as Marcuse claims, "historical" – which is to say socially constructed – which is hardly a 
controversial idea. Equally uncontroversial is that nature also exists independently of human 
experience, yet Vogel's main contention is that philosophical consistency requires adopting one 
option at the exclusion of the other, but as will become clear below, he went significantly further 
than arguing our 'concept' of nature was a social construction. 
As discussed in the first part of this thesis, Marcuse's view of nature was highly indebted to Marx 
who – in some moods – also sounds mildly like a proto-social constructivist. As Marcuse noted, the 
instrumental evaluation of first nature emerges as a necessary side effect of humanity's self-
creation; “...not only man but also nature 'comes to be' in history, insofar as it is not something 
external to and separated from the human essence but belongs to the transcended and appropriated 
objectivity: “world history” is “the transformation of nature for man.”143 Although Vogel's position 
has considerable philosophical relevance in regard to the somewhat rarefied vantage point of the 
treatment of nature by the critical theorists, the thesis that nature is a social construction arguably 
leads to various other problematic implications, especially in terms of our practical dealings with 
the environmental crisis. As Vogel's work encompasses a number of the major figures of the 
141 See Vogel, op.cit. (1996). 
142 In one of his final speeches, Marcuse repeatedly noted nature's "external" status, speaking of the "pacification of 
external nature". See Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society' in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 3:3., 
(Copyright © 1992 by Peter Marcuse), p.36. See also Marcuse, op.cit. (1972a), p. 59.
143 Marcuse, (1932), 'New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism' in Marcuse: A Critical Reader, edited 
by J. Abromeit and W.M. Cobb, (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.102. Compare the comment in Marcuse, op.cit.  
(1972a), p. 2. 
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Western Marxist tradition (Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas), a sustained 
critique of his entire thesis will not be possible here, instead, some criticisms will be offered in 
regard to his major conclusion. 
The thesis that nature – or indeed, reality itself – is a social construction remains common, although 
perhaps not so common as it was in the late 1980s through to the mid 1990s.144 Perhaps the most 
famous version of the view to appear in recent times was made by Bill McKibben, who since the 
release of his 1989 bestseller, The End of Nature, has continued to argue that the biosphere, the 
oceans, the weather – even the planet itself – are no longer external to humanity, but are shot 
through at virtually every level with the signs of material human presence.145 
The storm that might have snapped the hot spell may never form, or may veer off in some 
other direction, not by the laws of nature, but the laws of nature as they have been rewritten, 
blindly, crudely, but effectively, by man. (...) A child born now will never know a natural 
summer, a natural autumn, winter, or spring. Summer is becoming extinct, replaced by 
something else which will be called 'summer'.146
Although Vogel's point is less starkly conveyed than McKibben's and is explicitly epistemological 
and ontological, following his argument where it leads ends up at the similar conclusion that nature 
is not merely isolated; "Other", or in Adorno's words, "the nonidentical";147 it is, and always was an 
artifact, and that the concept of nature itself is too problematic and ambiguous to be of any 
assistance to environmental ethics. To be sure – both  McKibben and Vogel's illustration of this 
thesis are believable to certain extents; the former is obviously correct in claiming that the weather 
(for example) is no longer entirely 'natural' in the same sense as it was prior to the growth of human 
industry. Yet even McKibben agrees that there is – or was – something out there, so to speak; 
something that has been changed, tampered with, tainted, is worthwhile attempting to recover, and 
that its essence is not exhausted by the signifiers attached to it. However, Vogel's thesis explicitly 
144 See for example V. Burr, An Introduction to Social Constructionism, (London: Routledge, 1995); W. Chaloupka and 
R. McGreggor Cawley, 'The Great Wild Hope: Nature, Environmentalism, and the Open Secret', in In the Nature of  
Things: Language, Politics, and the Environment, edited by J. Bennett and W. Chaloupka, (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 3-23, and E.A.R. Bird, 'The Social Construction of Nature: Theoretical Approaches 
to the History of Environmental Problems', in Environmental Review, 11, (1987), pp. 255-64.
145 See B. McKibben, The End of Nature, (London: Penguin-Viking, 1989), and Eaarth: Making Life on a Tough New 
Planet, (Melbourne: Black Inc, 2010). Vogel discusses McKibben's thesis in 'Environmental Philosophy after the 
End of Nature', in Environmental Ethics, vol.24, issue 1, (Spring, 2000), pp. 23-39. 
146 McKibben, ibid. (1989), p. 54.
147 See T. Adorno, (1966), Negative Dialectics, (London: Routledge, 2006). 
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denotes that nature has only ever been a social construct is therefore arguably far more radical. 
Once again, if limited to an epistemological claim, i.e., if Vogel's concern was restricted to how 
nature comes to be conceived, understood, apprehended, etc. then it is hardly radical that whatever 
understanding of it is given will be socially constructed. This also entails such 'understandings' are 
culturally variable: the culture of Hesiod had a different account of the dynamics of the movement 
of the sun to the cultures from which the Inca or Einstein emerged. Yet Vogel's claim goes quite a 
deal further than this, opting for a "strong" version of the constructivist approach, in which nature is 
just an artifact or sub-set of the social; hence, it can be viewed as something we construct. Unlike 
various other theorists to have adopted the social constructivist stance in regard to nature, Vogel's 
argument does not equivocate or vacillate between the separate contentions that nature is a social 
construct and that our concept of nature is socially constructed.148 After offering criticisms of 
Habermas' views, he describes his position as follows: 
Nature cannot both be constituted by us and independent of us, not produced by interests and 
the origin of these interests; one or the other claim has to be given up. I have already indicated 
that I think it ought to be the latter; this seems to me to be the lesson to be learned from the 
trajectory of Western Marxist thought on nature as a whole from Lukács to Habermas. There 
is no "nature in itself," or at least none we can say anything about or that it does the slightest 
good for our epistemology to assume.149
As Vogel makes clear at the onset of his discussion, the "specific form in which the thesis that 
'nature is a social construct'" will appear in his book consists in a "quasi-Hegelian" approach which 
emphasises "the way in which the environment that surrounds us and that we take for granted as 
'natural' turns out on investigation to be the product of human labor and hence literally socially 
constructed."150 Human labour is of course, intellectual, physical, instrumental action, and so nature 
in toto is conceived as "umwelt"; a mind-dependent entity that is always already human. There are 
seemingly obvious problems immediately emerging from this view, but this is not to say that they 
should be ignored. For example, as David Kidner notes: 
...most of us would accept that the way we see an animal will be affected by the type of 
binoculars we use. However, we might be more reluctant to accept that the animal is 
148 D.W. Kidner notes this tendency in various sources in his 'Fabricating Nature: A Critique of the Social Construction 
of Nature', in Environmental Ethics, v.22, (Winter, 2000), p. 343.
149 Vogel, op.cit. (1996), p. 123. 
150 Vogel, ibid. (1996), pp. 6-7.
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constructed by the act of looking through the binoculars, or that it has no independent 
existence aside from this act.151
Nevertheless, the final sentence is exactly what Vogel is arguing. As he writes: "we do not think the 
world, or imagine it, but rather build and rebuild it through concrete action that is difficult and 
sometimes fails."152 As a consequence, it appears that any evaluation of nature based on (say) its 
rarity, its 'untouched' or 'pristine' condition must be abandoned; old growth forests and monocultural 
plantations, genetically engineered species of wheat and the progenitor species it was derived from 
are ontologically one and the same. 
The chief incentives motivating Vogel's argument are apparently philosophical consistency and a 
keenness to avoid the naturalistic fallacy which plagues various schools of environmental ethics – 
especially Deep Ecology – in their haste to construct non-anthropocentric and non-instrumental 
approaches to the moral worth of the natural environment. As Andrew Light notes in his discussion 
of Vogel's thesis, "the overwhelming majority of environmental ethicists are, at best, hostile to 
anthropocentrism and indifferent to questions of built space and, at worst, see anthropocentric views 
and questions of built space as a priori excludable from the terrain that we can properly call 
environmental ethics."153 Nevertheless, Light cautiously notes that it is not clear how Vogel's 
contention can carry much normative weight: 
As with any constructivist view, a fair question is how we are to determine the right way of coming 
up with norms about nature. But how do we know and on what grounds can we tell if we have 
failed to build the world correctly? One answer would be to make a purely procedural claim that we 
can fail to build the world correctly when we do so in a manner that violates the proper function of a 
communicative ethics. But beyond this recommendation, I find it hard to discern other ways to 
differentiate good decisions from bad ones, or rather the creation of better or worse structures in the 
world.154 
Perhaps the dichotomy Vogel draws on between the view that nature is either independent of us or 
constructed by us is too sharp; the question may after all come down to degree rather than type. For 
example, just because one human sets foot in a pristine environment, (or contemplates the 
151 Kidner, op.cit. (2000), p. 343.
152 Vogel, ibid. (1996), p. 139.
153 Light, op.cit. (1999), p. 94.
154 Light, ibid. (1999), p. 99.
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atmosphere of Venus), this hardly makes either of these entities an "extra-social" artifact. As Peter 
Hay comments on this contention in relation to McKibben's view, "Whilst the time may come when 
nature is reduced to a sub-set of culture, we have not reached that time yet...
Why should it be assumed that the smallest incursion of culture into nature constitutes the end 
of nature? It is just as logical to argue the opposite – that, because trees grow in London's 
parks, and geraniums in its window boxes, London has ceased to become part of the realm of 
culture, and has become nature.155
Vogel's argument therefore seems to be the exact inversion of what Hay refers to as the "clever-dick 
riposte" which entails that, because humans are natural, then so is everything they do. "So human-
induced species extinction is 'natural', and so are chemical weapons, and so was Chernobyl, and so 
was Bhopal..." etc.156 If this seems vacuous, then what of the very opposite view which holds that 
Olympus Mons, isopods, ferret-fur and phenotypes are socially constructed? Either view is arguably 
descriptively lacking, yet if the 'natural' solely consists in human labour, their own status as natural 
organisms appears to come into question. For example, if nature is a social construct, this appears to 
imply that as soon as Homo sapiens sapiens emerged (from...something), this something 
disappeared, never to be evinced again. This appears to leave humans in a peculiar predicament; 
Vogel hardly appears to be denying that humans originally emerged from a domain which long 
predates them, but if immediately subsequent to the event of a comparatively odd species of primate 
beginning to use language, symbolic thought, etc. 'nature' disappeared, then it seems to follow that 
humanity itself is not natural. Whilst it can be agreed that rigid 'folk' dichotomies between such 
broad concepts as 'natural', 'unnatural', and 'artificial' lead to various epistemological problems and 
may not be sufficiently epistemologically acute to articulate the evolutionary novelty of human 
nature, this does not appear to be sufficient reason to discard such terms entirely.157 In any case, as 
theorists from a diverse array of backgrounds have argued, our comparatively peculiar physical / 
cognitive evolution seems to be strongly contingent on our technical capabilities. As a number of 
philosophers and anthropologists such as Arnold Gehlen and more recently, Timothy Taylor have 
posited, compared to their closest primate cousins, humans are peculiarly deficient beings if viewed 
in isolation from their extra-genetic heritage.158 Indeed, the theory of "organic projection" was an 
early feature of the work of the early philosopher of technology (and apparently the first to name 
155 P. Hay, Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), p. 21.
156 Hay, ibid. (2005), p. 23.
157 For more on the development and interplay of these terms, see B. Bensaude-Vincent and W.R. Newman, (eds.), The 
Artificial and the Natural: An Evolving Polarity, (Boston MASS: The MIT Press, 2007).
158 Gehlen himself traced it back to the work of Johann Gottfried von Herder. See Gehlen, op.cit. (1974). 
134
the discipline as such), Ernst Kapp, who in his 1877 work, Philosophie der Technik situated 
technical capacities specifically in the context of "the connection between man's organic 
shortcomings and his inventive intelligence."159 This view implies that humans were not only 
always already technical, but that they were always already cast against nature, manipulating it in 
order to secure ourselves from its external dictates. Unfortunately, such a philosophical-
anthropological approach to the technological phenomenon is now rather rare, but arguably 
philosophers of technology would benefit from revisiting it in their work.160         
To reiterate, although Vogel's thesis provides an interesting contrast to the concepts of nature owed 
to the critical theorists, it remains difficult to see how his approach can carry much practical 
efficacy in facing up to exigent environmental threats. As Holmes Rolston III concisely put it: "All 
those persons who did not think that 'lion' refers to a real predator lurking in the grass are extinct".161 
Consider also the theory and reality of anthropogenic climate change. As Kidner notes, "If the 
demolition of nature stems, in part at least, from the dissociation between culture and nature, then it 
is difficult to see how this demolition could be countered by theories which arise out of and 
perpetuate this same dissociation."162 Furthermore, if Vogel is right, the use of the term 
anthropogenic (which is used to contrast the human, 'artificial' destabilisation of biospheric cycles 
from natural rates of change) must once again be logically incoherent as after all, humans are not 
disturbing or intruding in anything other than their constructions. One cannot help but imagine how 
enraptured the inappropriately named 'climate change skeptics' would be on hearing this particular 
implication of Vogel's thesis. 
A final brief criticism involves the notions of physical suffering and pain. As bioethicists, 
ethologists and an assortment of other physiologists and evolutionary biologists (and likely most of 
the rest of us) accept that a great many creatures aside from ourselves are sentient. That the capacity 
to feel pleasure or pain and to be equipped with instinctual drives and “interests” to maximise the 
former and minimise the latter has been a very successful evolutionary strategy need only be noted 
in passing. What is of importance is that suffering seems to be persistently natural in the sense that 
it cannot (yet) be simply socially-constructed away. Of course, it barely needs to be stated that the 
159 Gehlen, (1965), 'A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspective on Technology', in Philosophy of Technology: The 
Technological Condition, edited by R.C. Scharff and V. Dusek, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 213. To give Kapp's 
work its full title: Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik: zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Cultur aus neuen 
Gesichtspunkten, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1877). 
160 See for example, J. Ortega y Gasset, (1939), 'Thoughts on Technology' in Philosophy and Technology, edited by C. 
Mitcham and R. Mackey, (Cambridge MASS: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 290-313. 
161 H. Rolston III, quoted in Kidner, op.cit. (2000), p. 345.
162 Kidner, ibid. (2000), p. 342.
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practice of medicine involves a technoscientific attempt (which is to say, an actual 'construction') by 
which suffering may be alleviated. Yet to confine the unmistakable noumenal clarity of intense pain 
to something we humans have constructed is, quite simply, a bizarre idea. As any sentient creature 
capable of experiencing its more severe variants is made well aware (consciously or instinctually), 
pain appears as the immanent fusion of signifier and signified. Of course, that which causes pain 
may well be a result of our actions, but then again, it also may not. As Vogel appears intent on 
arguing for the former, then it seems that the wind which snapped the branch that fell and hit 
Eugene on the head was an agential force. As 'natural causes', accidents, etc. appear to be ruled out, 
at the very least, the implications for insurance firms, courts of law – not to mention the design 
argument – appear considerable. 
Figuring out the conceptual status of severe pain or suffering or how it may be treated in a 
philosophically consistent manner generally arrives a posteriori to the fact. Just as technics was 
something long considered best in terms of the doing, and thus arguably neglected by philosophers 
other than for metaphorical use,163 suffering is for the sufferer something undergone immanently; it 
is a feeling, not a construct unique to language-bearing agents. In short, those who suffer generally 
suspend intellection and simply want it to stop, and it is in this way that Vogel appears to be putting 
the cart before the horse; nature is not something that comes after humans, but quite the opposite; 
nature is not constructed from our technical capacities – on the contrary – our technical capacities 
are constructed from it. Until only very recently has our species enjoyed the luxury of 
philosophising otherwise, as for the vast duration of human evolution, technical capacities 
comprised the chief means of adjusting, adapting, and coping with nature's (external, indifferent) 
dictates. Of course, one could counter from a full-blown idealist perspective that suffering is mind 
dependent, (or at least dependent upon nervous systems), yet it still must be accepted that suffering 
is not contingent or unique to human minds. Suffering seems to come from somewhere – or 
something else, and is obviously experienced by a great number of non-human species, as Vogel 
regularly acknowledges.164 Hence, the capacity to experience pain or pleasure seems far more 
widespread in life than scales, feathers or fur – and is not limited to beings capable of evincing 
distinctions between phenomenal and noumenal experience. Hence, the brute starkness of suffering 
appears very much like the sort of natural phenomenon Vogel wants to contend must be socially 
constructed – by humans only. Kidner goes further: 
163 See for example, G.W. Leibniz, (1714), Monadology, section 17, (Charleston, SC: Forgotten Books, 1898), p. 4.
164 See for example, Vogel, op.cit. (1996), pp. 153-154. 156-167.
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Social constructionism (...) can be seen as rooted within a broader reconstructive project 
which reconfigures both humanity and the nonhuman world according to an industrialist 
blueprint. The physical and ideological replacement of nature, understood as the larger order 
out of which we grow, by a reduced order based on industrialist rationality finds its academic 
counterpart in the doctrine that nature is a mere part-actor in the wider drama of human life 
and language.165
As has been discussed, with the exception of his fleeting comments to the effect that the question of 
technology and the environment is now a matter of survival, Marcuse's overall view of nature is 
arguably too problematic to suffice as the foundation of any (current) environmental ethics. It 
belongs to a future time in which humans acquire a "new sensibility", as the restoration of nature 
would appear contingent on this event. However, this is not to say that this overall prospect is 
incoherent, nor does it diminish its urgency. Despite the various confusions and antinomies of 
Marcuse's approach to nature – his conclusion: that radical changes in the directions and incentives 
of technical development and proliferation, arguably remains firm. Little short of a refusal of the 
capitalist logic of growth for the sake of growth and an end to the inanity of a culture that 
determines an individual's worth by their spending capacity and material acquisitions is required for 
such a change. However, despite Vogel's obvious environmental concerns, he does not appear to be 
interested in these particular factors. Indeed, in a rare moment of barely concealed frustration, he 
dismissively claims that "Marcuse's view" is one which 
...hates the world, the real world that is, although that hate is hidden behind a utopianizing 
metaphysics that claims to discern behind the real world a secret erotic one where lion and 
lamb no longer quarrel (...) The dream of total automation that never lies far below his words 
is the symptom of a wish that the real world would go away so that humans could spend all of 
their time in that other phantasy one.166  
To summarise, it has been argued that the major problem confronting Marcuse's hopes for the 
emergence of a new sensibility is that emphasis he placed on the supposed inherent teleological 
value of first nature and the optimism he afforded to human nature. Following his own concern with 
addressing the concrete practical reality of the impacts of the technological mode of production, the 
problems addressed above provide a cautionary warning that retains the major aspects of Marcuse's 
165 Kidner, op.cit. (2000), p. 346.
166 Vogel, op.cit. (1996), pp. 139-140. Given Vogel's overall thesis in Against Nature, one cannot help but wonder what 
constitutes the 'real world', and what may distinguish it from Marcuse's 'phantasy' one. 
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critique of capitalism and his philosophy of technology, but attempts to attenuate its more overtly 
optimistic proposals in line with modern environmental exigencies. Indeed, by the standards he 
himself set in the more pessimistic moments of One Dimensional Man, the idea that nature could 
come to be treated as a subject – valuable in its own right – and that technics could then become a 
poetic play motivated by sensuous, aesthetic principles seems highly improbable in concrete socio-
political praxis, riven as it is by denial and inaction. Nevertheless, the necessity for widespread 
change is hardly diminished, but needed more than ever. In the face of the social, economic, not to 
mention existential risks of the global environmental crisis, rapidly escalating technoscientific 
capacities, etc., neither the displaced convention of profit making, nor art, nor even theory or more 
knowledge appear to be required to face down the situation, but as Marcuse argues, an alteration in 
basic attitudes and sensibilities which can begin at the locus of the excessive consumption habits 
typical of the affluent nations and a far more cautious approach in regard to the deployment of the 




A Critique of Instrumental Theories of Technology 
In this chapter Marcuse's view of technics and technology will be critically contrasted with recent 
versions of two prevalent schools of thought on technological development or 'evolution', and the 
nature and functional status of specific technical artifacts. As it will be shown, each of these broad 
views of technics are structurally analogous with the debate concerning free will and determinism, 
and hence, may be presented in the form of an aporia:
    
1. Instrumental theories of technology – the artificing causes of (tokens of) technoscience are 
all agential.
2. Compatibilist theories of technology – agents and technoscientific systems and rationalities 
together constitute a co-evolutionary, ensemble system. 
3. Autonomous theories of technology – agents are isolated from causal explanations of 
modern technoscience. 
It will be argued here and in the subsequent chapter that division #2, which is exemplified by 
Marcusean philosophy of technology is preferable to #1 and #3 on both descriptive and practical 
grounds. Division #1 will be introduced in this chapter by briefly discussing the ancient distinction 
between organisms and artifacts posited by Aristotle, before moving to critically address two of the 
most well-known versions of the theory from contemporary philosophers of technology, Don Ihde 
and Andrew Feenberg. The formers' application of an analogue of the intentional fallacy to 
technical artifacts will take up the majority of the discussion,1 but it will also be argued that the 
latter's social constructivist-informed approach ends up in a similar and unsatisfactory position 
which under-rates the influence of the dominant incentives driving contemporary technical 
mediation. 
The subsequent chapter will critically address division #3 with specific reference to the so-called 
"technological singularity" and its concurrent contention that technical development consists in an 
1 See D. Ihde, 'The Designer Fallacy and Technological Imagination', in Philosophy and Design: From Engineering to  
Architecture, edited by P.E. Vermaas, P. Kroes, A. Light and S.A. Moore, (Netherlands: Springer, 2008), pp. 51-59.
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"evolutionary process", isolated from agent causation.2 As well as contrasting them with the revised 
Marcusean distinction between technics and technology posited earlier on an epistemological level, 
the practical implications of taking divisions #1 and #3 will also be noted, for if #3 is accurate and 
technical development is not under the control of agents, then there can obviously be little hope of 
redirecting production away from potential environmental calamity. Furthermore, if #1 is sound, 
then although technical artifacts remain firmly under the control of agents, this appears to strongly 
imply that it is the 'end-user' which takes priority in technical mediation and overlooks the original 
(social, political, and especially economic) incentives behind technical mediation. In Marcusean 
terms, such accounts therefore appear to remain focussed on the 'technical' and neglect the 
technological mode of production. The discussion will now begin by briefly presenting the 
instrumental approach to technology.
Organisms and Artifacts 
The discussion will begin by introducing the instrumental theory of technology with recourse to its 
first and most prominent discussion in the work of Aristotle as well as by noting Martin Heidegger's 
more recent discussions of the topic. Subsequently, the discussion will present and critically engage 
the so-called “designer fallacy” offered by Don Ihde, as well as the similar implications of 
Feenberg's social constructivist approach to technical mediation with aim of defending the 
Marcusean view. 
Arguably, the instrumental understanding of technology is the most common approach to the 
subject and tends to view technology as the totality of tools or technical artifacts, as well as 
implying their ultimate ethical neutrality. In short, as both the producers and users of technology, 
the instrumental theory contends that human agents are ultimately in control of technical artifacts, 
their development and proliferation, as well as playing originating, causal roles in their production. 
Martin Heidegger famously makes reference to this seemingly self-evident view in his essay, 'The 
Question Concerning Technology' as follows:
2 This term is owed to L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics Out of Control as a Theme in Political Thought,  
(Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1977). Arguably the most prominent and detailed account of technological 
singularity are Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, (London: Penguin, 2005) 
and The Age of Spiritual Machines, (London: Viking, 1999). 
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We ask the question concerning technology when we ask what it is. Everyone knows the two 
statements that answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other 
says: Technology is a human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For 
to posit ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manufacture 
and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and used things 
themselves, and the needs and ends that they serve, all belong to what technology is. The 
whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Technology itself is a contrivance – in 
Latin, an instrumentum.3  
Heidegger goes on to label this definition “the instrumental and anthropological definition of 
technology”, which can be traced at least as far back as Aristotle who distinguished arts 
(specifically techné or “craft knowledge”) from organisms in the Nichomachean Ethics on the basis 
of their origins; the former require pre-existing human agents, whereas the latter emerge through 
autopoietic means. In short, the role of the (human) agent is defined as the originating, external 
cause of the existence of artifacts, whereas the originating causes of organisms are internal to 
themselves. 
Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and the practise of an art is the 
study of how to bring into being something that is capable either of being or of not being, and 
the cause of which is in the producer and not in the product. For it is not of things that are or 
come to be of necessity that art is concerned, nor with natural objects (because these have 
their origin in themselves).4 
Without entering into the debate as to whether Aristotle did or did not accept that technics imitated 
nature or completed it,5 it should be noted that his distinction is not synonymous with the somewhat 
confused modern 'folk ontology' which tends to separate the artificial (as the activity of human 
agents) and the natural (which seems to serve as a general description of events aside from human 
3 M. Heidegger, (1954), 'The Question Concerning Technology', in Basic Writings, edited by D.F. Krell, (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1977), p. 288.
4 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, book 6, iv; 'Art or technical skill' (techné), (London: Penguin Classics, 1976), p. 
208. See also Aristotle's discussion in the Metaphysics, book VII, chapter seven, 1032a. It should be emphasised that 
by 'art' Aristotle means forms of human teleological, productive activity (techné), requiring what we would call 
'technical skill' or 'know-how'; so one can speak of the art of medicine, the art of astronomy, the art of the sculptor, 
etc. 
5 On this topic, see J. Schummer, 'Aristotle on Technology and Nature', in Philosophia Naturalis, 38, (2001), pp. 105-
120.  
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activity). Secondly, Aristotle was not restricting how things come to be to either art (i.e. teleological 
human productive activity) or nature only, but acknowledges the role of chance (tyche) in the 
former activity. Rather, he was pointing out that the origins of natural entities is internal to them, 
which contrasted with the origins of artifacts, which can only emerge as a result of external 
agencies.6 Technics is therefore contingent upon human activity, as it is by and for human ends that 
they owe their existence. 
Unless one is convinced that nature is a social construct,7 as a theory of the emergence of technical 
artifacts, Aristotle’s view seems difficult to disagree with. Even if many artifacts are produced by 
machines and increasingly automated processes today, at some past stage, human agents were 
causally responsible at certain definite times for the origin of each artifact, system or process that 
together constitute the overall scheme and at the least, the operators of the artifacts themselves 
continue to play varied roles in their performance. Furthermore, the view allows that the actual 
motives of the agents may not themselves address the 'intended' function of the artifacts they are 
producing; they may be tempted into their activity due to their overriding need to earn a wage for 
example. Yet this appears about as far as Aristotle’s distinction appears to go; although establishing 
grounds for the seemingly sensible contention that human agents are the necessary prior causes of 
technical artifacts, such an account is decreasingly accurate in terms of the actual lived experience 
of technical mediation in advanced industrial societies, and leaves other questions unanswered. For 
example, how many artifacts in an average affluent person’s home (including the home itself) are – 
on average – designed or produced by the owner or occupants? Of course, they were still ultimately 
produced by agents, themselves deriving their plans, materials and tools from still other individuals. 
But the division of labour has widened considerably since Aristotle's time, and this provides the first 
hint that its applicability in differing historical . If one takes a Marxian angle on the topic, the 
prevailing incentives behind the overwhelming majority of technical forays in Ancient Greece were 
largely conducted on the basis of their use-value. Of course money existed and certain technical 
tasks (creating tools as well as using them) would have been carried out for the coin, but it did not 
have the same widespread relevance in technical mediation as it does today. 
Aristotle's aim in the passages referred to above was to distinguish the fundamental causes of 
technical artifacts from organisms, not to address the experience of technical mediation on the part 
of end-users, and although not incorrect, this appears to be the major reason why it appears 
6 Aristotle also notes "of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously." See 
Metaphysics, book VII, chapter seven7, 1032a.
7 See the previous chapter. 
143
insufficient for a full-blooded account of technical mediation in the modern period. As one 
examines the length and complexity of the paths of innovation that have led to the modern technical 
network, the traditional distinction that held for such a long period between the producer and end-
user has become further and further distanced; rather than having anything much to do with the 
origins of any of the artifacts surrounding them – the experience of modern technical mediation 
consists in the end-user selecting, operating, keeping watch over, purchasing and consuming. The 
modern mass-production of spanners (say) does not merely occur on the basis of their use value, but 
also on their exchange value or profitability. In short, due to increases in automation, the increasing 
economisation of labour, mechanisation, mass-production, etc., the individual's experience of 
modern technical mediation tends to be participatory rather than causal. Of course, although certain 
agents are ultimately behind its workings, such is the level of sophistication of many modern 
technical artifacts and systems, when one breaks down or malfunctions, replacing it may be cheaper 
than repairs, and if opting for the latter, this would likely be carried out by a technical expert with 
certain relevant skills. However, this 'expert' can only ever have a certain amount of specialist 
technical skills, and aside from these, they are in the same position as the rest of the general 
population.
As the current discussion aims to emphasise distinctions between modern and pre-modern 
production incentives, the blanket claim that the human is the ultimate cause of the technical has 
limited explanatory value in regard to modern technical mediation. In both the context of the end 
user and the actual experience of modern productive work, its relevance as an account of modern 
technical mediation appears to have be more descriptive of Homo fabre rather than Homo 
economicus. Its implications at the species-level are not directly analogous to the modern 
experience of the technical, scientific, or engineering expert, let alone that of the modern participant 
in technics.
Although analysis of systems of mass production can eventually lead back to certain agents who are 
ultimately behind their construction as technics is a stratigraphic, sedimentary process; each edifice 
and system is – often quite literally – built on past innovations, and many artifacts – from 
microchips to aluminium smelters – could not emerge without them. Given the novel ubiquity of 
technics in the advanced industrial civilisations, individuals tend not to confront nature first-hand 
by constructively deploying it in order to alter and change nature in individual, local or regional 
contexts as was done for the vast duration of the past. They don't (generally) need to, as they live 
within the most sophisticated, advanced and globalised technical scheme so far as can be known. 
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That they must acclimatise themselves to it as if it were a second nature is perhaps one of the initial 
thoughts which motivate some to the conclusion that the modern technical phenomenon is 
autonomous.8 Without entering into this question here, with few exceptions, the technical activities 
and 'work' that tend to be carried out under the modern technological mode of production consists in 
labour for interests that are not directly the worker's own, but those of the owners of the company, 
the administrators of the institution, etc. As the incentives of their work shifts from the merely 
technical, to the economic – (in order to earn regular wages), workers are functionally integrated 
into the wider productive process. Despite the diversity of tasks available, as a result, labour and 
technical activity are removed even from instrumentality itself and become vehicles for earning a 
monthly pay packet. For both the workers and the owners of the means of production, use value 
itself comes to be colonised by exchange value.9 As Marcuse put it, "the concept 'wages' refers to 
the group 'wage-earners,' integrating all personal histories and special jobs into one concrete 
universal."10   
Aristotle's view relates to a time in which technical production was carried out in a more individual 
or localised manner, ideally that which befitted the scale of the pólis and the oikos. Pointing out that 
the instrumental incentives of human agents are ultimately behind the causal origins of technics 
therefore does not discern in a sufficiently fine-grained manner the extent to which modern 
technical mediation has come to recently, sharply differ from the long duration of its historical and 
pre-historical development.
The designer fallacy to be discussed below also arguably constitutes a version of the instrumental 
theory of technology, but it offers something of a flip-side to the Aristotelian account. Instead of 
drawing attention to the agent as the originating cause of the technical, it argues for an 
understanding of technical artifacts that draws concern away from the originating agents or interests 
to emphasise how artifacts come to be reappropriated by end-users in fashions unintended by their 
designers and producers. As it will be argued, although this has the effect of undermining the 
incentives and intentions behind artifacts and their production, the designer fallacy is not an 
autonomous theory of technology, indeed, it instead is formed in the wake of a constructivist 
reaction against such views of technical mediation, albeit, an arguably excessive one. Before this 
contention can be taken further, it should be understood that both the Aristotelian distinction 
8 See the following chapter. 
9 André Gorz discusses this tendency in detail in his Farewell to the Working Class, (London: Pluto Press, 1982). See 
also his Critique of Economic Reason, (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 39-50.
10 Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 116. 
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between organisms and artifacts and the designer fallacy are sub-classes or versions of the 
instrumental theory of technology, but the former can be distinguished from the latter on the basis 
that it approaches the causes of technics in esse, with the latter describing technics in terms of in  
fieri causes. On the surface of this distinction, the limitations of Aristotle's view are revealed once 
again if one is interested in exploring how technical artifacts come to be used (and indeed, how they 
come to 'use', determine or direct human agents), post construction and initial deployment, whereas 
the designer fallacy leaves the question of the how the designer / producer's incentives come to 
inform artifacts open, and thereby similarly ignores the extent to which technics come to play 
determining roles under certain modes or conditions of production. Furthermore, as versions of the 
instrumentalist approach, artifacts are considered as neutral tools that can, in Marcuse's words, 
either “revolutionize or retard a society” depending upon how they are used.11 As it will be argued, 
without taking into consideration the extent to which technics also play determining, controlling 
roles both in regard to their own development and upon human conduct, neither perspective offers a 
sufficiently accurate, nor practically useful account of modern technical mediation in the current 
context of its causal role in endangering the environment, and thereby, the human future. 
The "Designer Fallacy" and the Creative Reappropriation of Artifacts
If I had to say which was telling the truth about a society, a speech by a minister of housing or 
the buildings put up in his time, I should believe the buildings.12
Although the intentional fallacy has been widely criticised as a method of assessing literature,13 
various prominent philosophers of technology as well as sociologists of technology in the social 
constructivist school continue to apply a closely analogous approach in their discussions of 
technical artifacts and technology per se. What follows now aims to level various criticisms at two 
current representatives of the approach from a Marcusean perspective which will attempt to show it 
lacks sufficient attention to the primary incentives driving technical development and proliferation. 
11 Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 157.
12 Kenneth Clark in Episode 1 of the documentary series, Civilization, (BBC, 1969).
13 See for example, M. Wreen, 'Three Arguments against Intentionalism in Interpretation', in The Proceedings of the  
XXII World Congress in Philosophy, vol.1, (2008), pp. 283-287 and Z. Lindong, 'The Intentional Fallacy 
Reconsidered', in Canadian Social Science, vol.8, No 2, (March, 2012), pp. 34-39.
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The chapter will conclude by pointing out some general disanalogies between technics and artistic 
literature with the assistance of Marcuse's aesthetic theory. 
In his essay 'The Designer Fallacy and Technological Imagination', the contemporary 
phenomenologist and philosopher of technology, Don Ihde, contends that instead of investigating 
the intentions and motives of designers in technical mediation, what is required of a philosophy of 
technology is to take the “functionally multistable” nature of artifacts seriously.14 Whilst this 
constitutes only one aspect of Ihde's approach to technology, it is addressed for the reason that it is 
indicative of a general reticence amongst various philosophers of technology to address the primary 
incentive of modern technological development with sufficient seriousness. 
What Ihde means by functional multistability is that technical artifacts, once constructed, may be 
turned to functions aside from those that were originally 'designed in'. Andrew Feenberg has also 
emphasised various cases which – borrowing a term from the social construction of technology – he 
refers to as evidence of the “interpretive flexibility”15 of technical artifacts, which may lend 
themselves to various “creative appropriations” on the part of savvy and interested users.16 Thirdly, 
Langdon Winner has explored how technical systems and artifacts may contain “political” content 
beyond their more obvious utile ends.17 These discussions are well-known in philosophy of 
technology circles and are not just of theoretical or conceptual value; they arguably constitute 
genuine points of resistance to the often gloom-ridden accounts of technological domination, 
reductionism and determinism that lurk in the corpus of the “humanities philosophy of technology” 
and elsewhere.18 Instead of being determined by an oppressive, impersonal technoscientific 
framework or gestell,19 the accounts of Ihde and Feenberg appear to offer some hope for the 
preservation and extension of creative agency in a world increasingly penetrated and colonised by a 
rationality that – in the words of the latter – makes the fundamental question of democracy today 
14 See Ihde, op.cit. (2008).
15 Feenberg's use of “Interpretive flexibility” is owed to T. Pinch and W. Bijker, (1984), 'The Social Construction of 
Facts and Artefacts: or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology might Benefit Each Other', 
in Social Studies of Science, vol. 14, no. 3, (August, 1984), pp. 399-441.
16 See A. Feenberg,  Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1995a), chapter 7; and by the same author, Questioning Technology, (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 125-129.
17 Winner, 'Do Artifacts have Politics?', in The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High-
Technology, (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1986a), pp. 19-39. 
18 See C. Mitcham, Thinking through Technology: the path between engineering and philosophy. (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994). 
19 See Heidegger, op.cit. (1954).
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the “survival of agency in this increasingly technocratic universe”.20 The often simplistic 
reductionism of technological determinism is therefore hopefully averted, and the focus turns to 
how the end-user's interests play various undeniably formative roles in technical mediation. 
However – to borrow a computing metaphor – it will be contended here that taking such an 
approach to its logical extent comes to endanger its own relevance and explanatory value in 
considering how the (technical) hardware comes to be appropriated without recourse to the 
intentional (software) which played the formative role in its origination, and that the prioritisation 
of the whims of the end-user over the “designer” – or  more generally but accurately, the producer, 
may tend to side-line certain crucial considerations regarding the formative implications of the 
growth imperative which has been argued previously as constituting the major incentive guiding 
modern production per se. 
A preliminary caveat ought to be noted: it will not be the aim to argue here that the theory of 
functional multistability is factually incorrect; rather, it will be acknowledged that artifacts, both 
individually and in their totality, are often amenable to various forms of reappropriation. In short, it 
can be agreed that artifacts can be used for purposes other than what their designers or producers 
intended of them, within certain structural limits. To be sure, this is a necessary premise of 
Marcuse's concept of the “technological mode of production”, for this view entails that production 
as a whole must function in a double-sense; both 'internally' (i.e. through use value), as well as for 
the ancillary function of generating profits (i.e. exchange value). If the means of production 
advance and proliferate to the extent that their directive impetus can basically be commandeered by 
monetary incentives, what is arguably required in understanding some of the most pressing 
questions of technoscience is a view sensitive to both the incentives and the intentions of users and 
producers, participants and 'designers'. Therefore, rather than seeking to undermine the concept of 
functional multistability outright, what follows will attempt to establish grounds for suspicion that 
both instrumentalist theories (and later, autonomous theories) share a tendency to ignore or 
undermine the economic incentives and intentions that drive the development of modern 
technoscience and industry, and in so doing neglect its political content and dangerous 
environmental implications.
As Ihde notes, the designer fallacy is analogous to the well-established concept of the 'intentional 
fallacy' in literary criticism originally conceived by W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley. As they 
wrote in their essay, 'The Intentional Fallacy': “The design or intention of the author is neither 
20 Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 101.
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available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.”21 Ihde 
describes his technical analogue of this well-known literary approach as follows: 
In simple form, the “designer fallacy,” (…) is the notion that a designer can design into a 
technology, its purposes and uses. In turn, this fallacy implies some degree of material 
neutrality of plasticity in the object, over which the designer has no control. In short, the 
designer fallacy is 'deistic' in its 18th century sense, that the designer-god, working with plastic 
material, creates a machine or artifact which seems 'intelligent' by design – and performs in its 
designed way.22
The designer fallacy is hence “parallel” to its literary analogue. Just as the intentional fallacy and 
the New Criticism aimed to question and revise the well-worn custom of regarding a given author's 
intentions as playing a significant role in literary works and to shift the emphasis to what the reader 
brings to the interpretation of texts, Ihde contends that an analogue of the intentional fallacy is at 
least as implicit “in the history of technical design,”23 which leads him to “deconstruct the utility”24 
of the “cult of the individual designer” and the consequential emphasis on her intentions.25 For Ihde, 
the “designer-plastic material-ultimate use model” is over-emphasised, and the analysis of technics 
instead requires “...a description which recognizes much more complex relations between designers, 
technologies and the ultimate uses of technologies in variable social and cultural situations.”26 
Rather than being “more complex”, it will be the aim to argue here that a Marcusean approach can 
show that the designer fallacy and similar social-constructivist views of technical mediation are in 
fact, too simplistic.
Ihde argues that technical artifacts are functionally multistable; i.e. they are not reducible to the 
functions which their designer's intended, but come to be expressed in diverse and manifold 
fashions previously unenvisioned or unenvisionable to their original designers / producers. To 
expand his case, he emphasises the extent to which different instruments and artifacts come to be 
embedded in varying cultural contexts and as such are “field located”.27 Taking his example of the 
windmill, this that transcultural or transhistorical concepts of such devices (for example, a 
21 W.K. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley, (1946), 'The Intentional Fallacy', reprinted in The Verbal Icon: Studies in the  
Meaning of Poetry, (Lexington, The University of Kentucky Press, 1954), p. 3. (Emphasis added). 
22 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 51.
23 Ihde, ibid. (2008).
24 Ihde, ibid. (2008).
25 Ihde, ibid. (2008), p. 56.
26 Ihde, ibid. (2008), p. 54.
27 Ihde, ibid. (2008).
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definition of 'windmill' which claims it is an artifact which utilises vanes, blades, sails, etc. so as to 
harness the power of the wind in order to generate movement and motor-force), are little more than 
simplistic, ahistorical abstractions. Ihde details the functional trajectory of various incarnations of 
the pinwheel and windmill through the ages and the various uses they were put to, from sending 
prayers in ancient India, to milling in ninth century Mesopotamia, to their use by the Dutch and 
other Europeans in providing power for pumps in the same century. 
However, can it not be said at the outset that the designers of such devices (whether or not they 
themselves came to be their end-users, and regardless of the eventual use the device came to 
perform), had at least some intentions that were evidently fulfilled in their constructions? I.e. that 
they intended to create a windmill rather than some other artifact? Indeed, if we accept the 
definition of the function of windmills above, then by virtue of their designer's intentions, it appears 
windmills are generally discernible from (say) steam-hammers or vices regardless of the particular 
cultural use such devices are put to. If this is the case, surely this is no ahistorical abstraction, it is 
instead an indication that designer's intentions carry sufficient efficacy to at least define that x 
artifact will be a windmill and not a wheelbarrow. While it can obviously be granted that how a 
windmill or pinwheel comes to be used may not be exhausted by the intentions of its designer / 
producer, which is to say: the use of wind to turn vanes or blades does not determine that the device 
either grind wheat, shift water, or serve as an automated means of communicating with the divine, 
but if it doesn't have the basic properties previously described of windmills, it is hard to see how the 
device qualifies as such. Hence, there seems to be at least one (rather important) definitional aspect 
of windmills that separates them from toner cartridges or Volkswagens; an 'intention' that is 
ultimately founded in the designer / producer after all.
Of course, this is not to say that many (perhaps even all) technical artifacts can be used in ways that 
their designers may not have originally or “intentionally” designed the product to perform. For 
example: a vase may serve as a receptacle, capable of containing any number of substances and 
may be composed by any number of materials; used to display flowers, to accentuate the décor of 
an interior, or as a projectile hurled at an unwelcome intruder. Ihde provides various examples of 
functional multistability, and as the scope of potential technical reappropriation is a veritable 
Library of Babel, examples are not difficult to come by. He chooses a number of prominent, 
influential technical devices such as Thomas Edison's phonograph, Alexander Graham Bell's 
telephone, the typewriter, and the now well-known example of Robert Moses' Long Island bridges 
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originally owed to Langdon Winner.28 The first two inventions prompted the beginnings of 
capacities which are so common in the modern world as to be barely noticed, but only a short while 
ago they must have appeared almost magical: the capacity to record and play back audio, or to 
speak to people that could be located hundreds or thousands of kilometres away. Ihde tells how the 
recording machine gave rise to a number of consequences unintended by its designer, such as the 
emergence of the recording industry, the length of the pop-song, and of course, sweeping changes to 
musical performance practices and production. As he mentions, “the new machine calls for new 
practices, but in this case not 'intended' ones.”29 Feenberg makes similar remarks concerning the 
French Minitel system.30 The Minitels were originally intended as a kind of precursor to the internet 
which was freely distributed to users as an “adjunct” to the modern telephone in order to convey 
news and information in a similar manner as the early “bulletin boards” which made use of a telnet 
system and modem. Soon however, certain users realised they could use the Minitels to engage in 
the sort of largely anonymous on-line communication which has now become ubiquitous with the 
internet. Referencing McLuhanesque terminology, Feenberg writes: 
The design of the Minitel invited communications applications which the company's 
engineers had not intended when they set about improving the flow of information in French 
society. Those applications, in turn, connoted the Minitel as a means of personal encounter, 
the very opposite of the rationalistic project for which it was originally designed. The “cold” 
computer became a “hot” new medium.31
Thus far, the theory of functional multistability appears sound to the extent that it is a repetition of 
the theory of unintended consequences. The contention that technical artifacts can be turned to uses 
apart from those described in their instruction manuals seems hard to deny, and threatens to consign 
designers to a similar fate as that of the traditional image of the lone inventor bringing on a 
technical revolution.32 But can it be agreed that the designer fallacy “may well be the rule rather 
than the exception”?33 Perhaps rather than helping his case, Ihde's reference to Langdon Winner's 
example of Robert Moses' bridges on Long Island may in fact do the opposite. Winner's example 
aims to demonstrate that artifacts have political content and forms part of a debate within the field 
of the social construction of technology, however, unlike Ihde and Feenberg, Winner is highly 
28 Winner, op.cit. (1986b).
29 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 52.
30 See Feenberg, op.cit. (1995), chapter 7. 
31 Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 126. (Emphasis added).
32 See for example, J. Bourke, Connections, series 1, (BBC, 1978).
33 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 54.
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critical of the varied approaches he contends can be classed under this banner.34 Winner's article, 
'Do Artifacts Have Politics', initiated a debate over the extent to which the political views of Robert 
Moses came to be embodied and reinforced in the bridges over the parkways at Long Island, just 
east of Manhattan. The bridges served their functional purpose as bridges, but only, Winner 
contends, to a selected few. As he describes them, the bridges were designed in such a way as to 
function as a kind of socioeconomic and racial filter, which he argues originated in Moses' intention 
to inhibit certain types of traffic predominantly owned by individuals he deemed unsavoury. Winner 
writes that the “Automobile-owning whites of 'upper' and 'comfortable middle' classes (as Moses 
reputedly referred to them): 
...would be free to use the parkways for recreation and commuting. Poor people and blacks, 
who normally used public transit, were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot tall buses 
could not handle the overpasses. One consequence was to limit access to racial minorities and 
low-income groups to Jones Beach, Moses' widely acclaimed public park. Moses made 
doubly sure of this result by vetoing a proposed extension of the Long Island Railroad to 
Jones Beach.35
Winner explicitly notes in relation to evidence collected by one of Moses' biographers that the dual 
functional status of the bridges (as a means for affluent whites to get in and out, and to discourage 
non-affluent whites and the majority of the African American population from doing so) reflected 
Moses' “social class bias and racial prejudice.”36 It should be noted that the extent to which Moses 
himself was actually responsible for transmitting these intentions into his design – a claim which 
has been subjected to some criticism, is not of concern here.37 It need only be conceded that such 
actions were and are possible or feasible, or were enacted for a while. At the least, the first option is 
difficult to deny as Winner's example arguably shows that technical artifacts can embody and 
convey politico-ideological content and act as a means of bringing them into concrete social effect 
regardless of whether he is right or wrong about this particular case. Indeed, the opposite is an 
almost nonsensical prospect; any number of examples of technical artifacts, systems and processes 
throughout history were designed to reflect, embody or conjure any number of other political, 
34 See for example, Winner, 'Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty', in Philosophy of  
Technology: The Technological Condition, edited by V. Dusek and R.C. Scharff, (London: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 
233-242.
35 Winner, op.cit. (1986), p. 23. 
36 Winner, ibid. (1986).
37 See for example B. Joerges, 'Do Politics Have Artifacts?' in Social Studies of Science, vol. 29, no. 3 (June 1999), pp. 
411-431.
152
emotive, religious, aesthetic or ideological responses, impulses, instincts, or other impressions in 
the observer or participant. According to Winner, the bridges on Long Island merely went one step 
further by not merely functioning to purvey a certain ideological / political view (as, say, a statue or 
purely aesthetic work may), but by functioning to bring about a particular social effect in concrete 
practical terms. Precisely such intentions have efficacy in technical domains as diverse as the 
architect's brief on the one hand, and the motivation of the archaeologist on the other. Yet just how, 
it might be asked, does such content come to be embodied in technical artifacts in the first place? 
Surely (in conformance with the thoughts of Marcuse) the only answer is that they were transferred 
into them by their designers, producers and builders. Ihde notes that due to the Eisenhower 
Interstate development requiring bridges to be built higher so as to let through trucks carrying 
ballistic missiles during the cold war, Moses' plans were thwarted. Yet rather than invalidating 
Winner's thesis, it adds to its legitimacy: at the time the authorities simply changed their intentions 
which were then concretely reflected in certain changes in design. This does not preclude the 
contention that the bridges served the purpose Winner claimed they served at least for a while, or 
that they could have served their purpose in theory even if they were never constructed. As Ihde 
mentions in a footnote: “it was pointed out that there is a difference between initial designer intent, 
and subsequent design modification, but the argument I am making is that in neither case is there 
simple designer control over outcomes”,38 these presumably being left up to the end-users. In other 
words, for Ihde, the 'meaning' of the artifact is ultimately subject to the end-user's reappropriation / 
interpretation. Yet for example, to say to the architect that her intentions and strivings to invoke a 
particular aesthetic, mood or atmosphere in the mind of the observer, or to order the movement of 
people in such and such a fashion within a given structure in fact has little or no bearing on how the 
building will be interpreted or used appears to consign much of the former's intentions (and those of 
a great number of other technical fields) to folly. Ihde appears to acknowledge this implication 
when he notes that some may “worry that this recognition may be demotivating”,39 and it may well 
be that the building, once used for x task may later be used for something very different later on. 
However, does this imply that the designer's original intentions never had any efficacy and ought to 
be overlooked? How exactly could the commuters subject to the social filter of the Long Island 
bridges creatively appropriate the bridges for their own ends? Questions such as this therefore leave 
one slightly puzzled as to why Ihde makes note of Winner's example at all for the reason that the 
purpose of the argument of the latter appears to have been that it was Moses' intention that the 
38 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 53.
39 Ihde, ibid. (2008), p. 59.
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bridges serve as a mechanism of segregation. As he writes, “It turns out (…) that some two hundred 
or so low-hanging overpasses on Long Island are there for a reason. They were deliberately  
designed and built that way by someone who wanted to achieve a particular social effect.”40 
In the context of the current prerogatives of discussion, it may also be arguable that the designer 
fallacy tends to underestimate the extent to which certain broader incentives dominate the intentions 
that drive, guide and limit modern technical design (not to mention production per se), as well as 
the extent to which the process of design itself has altered as a consequence. To return to an earlier 
example, it was noted that there are reasons to conclude that the modern context of technical 
production presents novel difficulties that blur the traditional conceptions of H. fabre or the notion 
of “man the maker”, and the nature and significance of design itself has similarly altered. For the 
majority of human evolution, and in some technically “underdeveloped” cultures still extant today, 
design and construction were and are carried out by selected members of the community. In 
prehistoric times, even though each individual tended to have their own specialisations or functional 
roles, the scope of the toolkit appears to have been small, mobile, and able to adapt to locally 
available resources and conditions.41 Once again, in stark contrast, modern technical mediation in 
the advanced industrial nations could not be further removed from the environment of evolutionary 
adaptiveness. To reiterate: very few individuals in advanced industrial society are “designers”, let 
alone builders or makers, as these fields have largely been efficiently divided into fields of 
specialisation and expertise. A fitter and turner or construction engineer are highly unlikely to also 
design microchips, and designers of microchips may only have rudimentary knowledge of diesel 
engines or agricultural techniques. Furthermore, much of the work of design is not for one's own 
direct interests and needs, but is mediated by – and  integrated within – a wider ensemble of 
interests. The design of elaborate or complex technical artifacts and systems such as passenger jets 
or automated assembly lines are hardly carried out by one person, or a few, but by masses of 
assorted experts organised into teams of specialisation, as well as with recourse to any number of 
other forms of technical apparatus and knowledge scattered around the globe. The human role in 
modern production can therefore be described as one of piecemeal contribution to wider productive 
schemes (from mining operations and factories to research departments, call centres and 
universities). 
40 Winner, op.cit. (1986), p. 23. (Emphasis added). 
41 See for example B. Fowler, Iceman: Uncovering the Life and Times of a Prehistoric Man found in an Alpine  
Glacier, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 105-106. See also the discussion of Ötzi in T. Taylor, The 
Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution, (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2010).
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However, despite the dilution of the role of the designer in the modern period into a number of more 
specialised vocations, this does not warrant throwing out all recourse to their intentions and how 
they may affect artifacts. Even those who do play major active roles in design (i.e. not usually the 
designers themselves, but the overarching interests that pay their wages and provide their briefs), 
have very definite, visible intentions and incentives that they naturally endeavour to fulfill. 
Although design still obviously plays a significant role in production, in Marcusean terms, it cannot 
be considered fundamentally descriptive of the contributory performances the individual per se 
plays under the technological condition of production, but is largely relevant from a merely 
technical perspective. Arguably then, to the extent that Ihde is stretching the analogy of the “death 
of the author”42 to a technical context in order to show how traditional notions of the lone designer 
and / or inventor are devoid of explanatory value, then this can be readily accepted. However, Ihde 
is arguably going further than this by advocating that the incentives and intentions of designers are 
of little explanatory value at all in accounting for artifacts or technics in general, and that a more 
complex conceptual approach appears to be required. 
...it should appear by now that the 'designer fallacy' may well be the rule rather than the 
exception. While it may be the case that some technologies have come into being and 
performed as 'intended' by their designers (I admit, I can think of none which have served 
solely in this way), there would seem to be none which cannot be subverted to other, to 
unintended, or unsuspected uses and results.43
However, this seems to depend on a number of other factors, such as the stage of development the 
artifact under analysis has reached, whether its primary function can be agreed upon, etc. For 
example, if one was asked of the function of the Saturn V rocket they would probably reply 
something to the effect that it served as a means of transporting individuals and equipment into 
space and the moon. Today of course, the vehicle is no longer used for this purpose and it exists 
only in the form of test sections and replicas set up in various displays across the U.S., yet whether 
or not the heads of the design team – Wernher von Braun and Arthur Rudolph – ever intended it to 
'function' in this latter fashion seems neither here nor there. Instead, it seems their intentions (and 
those of the other designers, scientists, government officials, NASA employees, etc.), was to design 
a vehicle that functioned for the purpose noted above, which it performed marvellously. It may well 
have served peripheral purposes such as inspiring the American public to become more interested in 
42 See R. Barthes, (1977), 'The Death of the Author', in Image, Music, Text, (New York: Noonday Press, 1989), pp. 
142-148.
43 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 55.
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space, or perhaps also to gain a propaganda advantage over the Soviet Union, or – if one believed 
President J.F. Kennedy – simply because the task was a challenge, but if these peripheral outcomes 
can be referred to as 'functions' at all, they are contingent upon the successful performance of its 
primary or internal functionality; the function that its designers and builders were employed to 
build into it in the first place.   
Advocates of the designer fallacy may reply that Saturn V is actually a type of rocket, and an 
account similar to Ihde's discussion of the windmill could be provided which may note that in the 
long and diverse history of propulsion technics, some cultures used rockets as forms of 
entertainment, others as weapons, and still others as means of transport. Hence, the rocket appears 
to be a functionally multistable device after all. However, such a reply seems so general as to elide 
the historico-cultural sensitivity which appears to strongly motivate Ihde and Feenberg's views. 
Saturn V was after all not merely a 'rocket' in the generic sense, but a very specific type of rocket, 
which functioned in a way guided missiles and fireworks do not, namely as a vehicle. Of course, 
vehicles come in highly diverse forms and perform a myriad of functions also, some intended, and 
no doubt many unintended, but is pursuing this long and complex entanglement really necessary in 
order to understand the function of such an artifact as Saturn V?  
Leaving this topic aside, the potential applications and uses of technical artifacts (and, indeed, 
natural objects) are extremely wide in scope. For example, a dedicated 'Space Invaders' arcade 
cabinet could be used as a makeshift bar if it was turned on its side, elevated somewhat and affixed 
with beer and cider taps. A car could be used as a projectile (as indeed they are when they are used 
for the purpose of "ram-raiding"), and a washing-machine could be used to mix gravy or concrete 
(although most probably only for a short time). But what of the original imperatives, intentions and 
incentives that led to the production of these devices in the first place? If the implication of the 
designer fallacy is valid, these are barely worthy of consideration, and critical analysis should 
instead be directed to the interventions of the end-user. Again, one appears to be led to the 
somewhat questionable contention that washing-machines and rocket-ships just happened to emerge 
for reasons and intentions that were not particularly interesting and lend little explanatory value, 
with the decision to wash clothes or blast astronauts into space only arising later. The designer 
fallacy therefore seems to be advocating an approach to the analysis of technical artifacts which 
views them as if they were mushrooms which grow in the night, and that in order to understand 
them, the investigator ought be careful to limit their inquiry into how they were prepared and 
served. Both unfortunately and somewhat ironically, this appears to leave this particular take on the 
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instrumental theory of technology in a somewhat analogous position to autonomous theories of 
technology: by avoiding the very human interests and economic incentives which play such a 
formative role in modern technoscientific mediation, the primary motivational influences in play are 
obscured. The designer fallacy and similar accounts of technics therefore appear more appropriate 
as discussions of uses that happen to be compatible with the artifact in question, rather than paying 
due consideration to the reasons the artifact came to exist in the first place. Hence, that the 
properties and forms of spare computer parts or indeed natural, unworked objects such as rocks 
makes them functionally compatible for use as doorstops, paperweights, or projectiles were they to 
be reappropriated for such ends does not appear to be pointing out anything especially significant. 
Furthermore, it appears to sideline any reference to the fairly certain contention that the mass-
production of such artifacts may be guided by an ancillary function, namely; the intention to 
maximise profits. 
Disanalogies Between Art, Text and Technics
As the designer fallacy is intended as a technical analogue of the intentional fallacy in literature, 
presumably there must be strong similarities between the works each fallacy aims to address, 
namely literary texts and technical artifacts. However, there appear to be a number of significant 
disanalogies between these two classes of entity, and if these disanalogies can be shown to be 
sufficiently salient, presumably it can be conjectured that what may apply to one may not apply to 
the other. 
Although it may be used in the critique of non-fiction works, perhaps the most obvious difference 
between the designer fallacy and the intentional fallacy is that – specifically adhering to Wimsatt 
and Beardsley's original definition – the latter appears to be aimed at works of literature; novels, 
drama, plays, short-stories, poetry and fiction; in short, art.44 Whilst it can be acknowledged that 
those still under the influence of postmodernist / poststructuralist philosophy extend the so-called 
"death of the author" to works of non-fiction, as the intentional fallacy is the chief analogue of 
44 See Wimsatt and Beardsley, op.cit. (1946), p. 3. Contemporary commentators on the intentional fallacy appear to 
concur: "From Eliot to the deconstructionists we find that there has been a persistent attempt to banish the author in 
the name of achieving impersonality and objectivity or even 'free play' of meaning in a work of art." See S. Das, 
'The Reader and the Death of the Author', in Twentieth Century Literary Criticism, 5th ed., (New Delhi: Atlantic, 
2005), p. 69.
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Ihde's designer fallacy, the stronger anti-foundationalist accounts will be passed over here. 
As they may come to be subjectively apprehended and beautiful or aesthetically striking in one way 
or another contingent upon one's taste or preferences, technical artifacts are not necessarily 
originally designed to fulfil artistic visions, but instrumental wants and needs, whether they be 
genuine or artificially stimulated. Can it be said in a similar manner that artworks are instruments? 
This leads to such philosophical questions as 'what is art?' which are also well beyond the scope of 
this thesis, however, it can be ventured that – although they obviously require tools, technical skills 
and media for their instantiation and are classifiable to this extent as 'technical artifacts' – in their 
'essence', works of art are not necessarily intended to function as tools or artifacts themselves but 
their product. With the exception of forms of art which require physiological capacities alone (such 
as singing and dancing), technics serve as a way to produce or create an artistic experience. 
Marcuse's own discussions of art are arguably of some assistance in this context. The boundary 
between artistic works and technical objects may often be hazy, however, as noted in the previous 
chapter, they were significant enough for Marcuse to believe they offered vision and imagination 
sufficiently distinct from technological rationality to become a productive, guiding force in the 
liberated society.45 Furthermore, the arts could reveal "truths" that were unencumbered, contained or 
directed by the dominant mode of production, and to this extent could stand opposed to the given as 
a force of critique: 
The world intended in art is never and nowhere merely the given world of everyday reality, 
but neither is it a world of mere fantasy, illusion, and so on. It contains nothing that does not 
also exist in the given reality, the actions, thoughts, feelings and dreams of men and women, 
their potentialities and those of nature. (...) As fictitious world, as illusion (Schein), it contains 
more truth than does everyday reality. For the latter is mystified in its institutions and 
relationships, which make necessity into a choice, and alienation into self-realization. Only in 
the "illusory world" do things appear as what they are and what they could be. By virtue of 
this truth (which art alone can express in sensuous representation) the world is inverted – it is 
the given reality, the ordinary world which now appears as untrue, false, as deceptive reality.46 
Once again, Marcuse's point in this passage is typically bipolar and controversial, and no doubt 
intuitively difficult to accept. After all, what is clear is that he is arguing that the so-called “world of 
45 See Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978). 
46 Marcuse, ibid. (1978), p. 54. 
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illusion” – not the concrete given of everyday reality – is that which reveals "truth", as it centres 
attention on what he took to be the basic essence of human and non-human nature; to be able to live 
in accord with one's own potential, a potential which had in past times been expressed in the 
aesthetic dimension and in the second dimension of critical reason.47 This is obviously the complete 
inverse of the idea that art reflects the given reality, that it is for example, in Iris Murdoch's words: 
"...a selfless gazing at and recording of what is there."48 Once again, Marcuse distinguishes his 
critique of art from other Marxist critics insofar as he not only recognised “...art in the context of 
the prevailing social relations, and ascribes to art a political function and a political potential.” But 
as he immediately adds, 
...in contrast to orthodox Marxist aesthetics I see the political potential of art in art itself, in 
the aesthetic form as such. Furthermore, I argue that by virtue of its aesthetic form, art is 
largely autonomous vis á vis the given social relations. In its autonomy art both protests these 
relations, and at the same time transcends them. Thereby art subverts the dominant 
consciousness, the ordinary experience.49
Marcuse believed that the "ordinary experience" of capitalism and technological rationality made 
art all the more important, but had undercut and artificially suspended the actualisation of the 
potentials that remained visible within it and thereby the likelihood of their embodiment in a future 
society. In short, in the "one-dimensional society", the Freudian "reality principle" held firm. Hence, 
as he found no recourse for social liberation in either a revolutionary uprising by workers or 
oppressed minorities,50 nor in ethics or metaphysics,51 Marcuse came to place emphasis on the 
liberatory qualities of the aesthetic dimension, especially within the literature of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, which he contended may also apply to the other arts.52 Again, regardless as to 
whether or not this approach was sound or successful, one can see Marcuse's reasons for opting for 
such a strategy, as arguably, when subjected to industrialisation and commodification (not only in 
the consumer-capitalist society), the work of art tends to become either sequestered, 
commandeered, diluted, or mediocratised by ratings and focus-group-led marketing strategies. In 
other words, it becomes subject to instrumentalisation and technological rationality. 
47 See Marcuse, (1941), 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in Technology, War and Fascism: The 
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 1, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 41-65.
48 Iris Murdoch, quoted in R. Hoggart, Mass Media in a Mass Society, (London: Continuum, 2004), p. 193.
49 Marcuse, op.cit. (1978), p. ix.
50 See for example, Marcuse, (1965b), 'Repressive Tolerance', in R.P. Wolff, B. Moore Jnr. & H. Marcuse, A Critique 
of Pure Tolerance, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 111-112.
51 See for example, Marcuse, op.cit. (1964), p. 151.
52 Marcuse, op.cit. (1978), pp. ix-x.
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Marcuse's view of the role of art in the creation of the new society also reveals crucial differences 
between art and technics. For example, in the advanced capitalist societies, instances of authentic 
art – to the extent that they are either not receptive to or actively militate against commercialisation 
– tend to retreat to the "higher culture"; they are of interest largely to those who pursue "art for art's 
sake". Secondly, art is easily co-opted and instrumentalised. Those forms of art which can be 
effectively utilised within the consumer-capitalist framework – even many forms of expression that 
at least claim or appear to be overtly anti-commercial – have long been put to good economic use 
just because of the allure of 'resistance' and 'rebellion', particularly amongst the young. Such 
proclivities are absorbed into marketing strategies aimed once again at getting consumers to identify 
with product lines and part with their money. Hence, "alternative" or "fringe" forms of music or art 
appears to be oxymoronic to the extent that they can be profitably exploited; graffiti is turned to the 
purposes of marketing and branding; and music is reduced to the music "industry". Any such 
sentiment, ideology or desire that can be seized upon and economicised – just because it may 
appear resistant or radical to the status quo – is especially receptive to co-optation and "repressive 
desublimation."53  
Returning to Ihde, he appears to give most priority to examples of technical uses that no mortal 
designer could ever envision or predict in anything other than a speculative manner, but in so doing 
obscures the (genuine, concrete) intentions that may have constituted the original ground from 
which the secondary uses (i.e. profit-making) emanated from. For example, he notes that the 
original innovators of powered flight could not have envisioned that this capacity would then lead 
to any number of other uses (in war, recreation, sport, the transportation of zoo animals, etc.). But 
why stop at the original innovation of powered flight? One might as well contend that the designers 
or producers of the timber from the 'giant spruce' (Picea sitchensis) which was used to construct the 
1903 Wright Flyer could not have envisioned that it could one day lead to the construction of a 
flying vehicle, but surely in all fairness no one would call this a lack of imagination on their part. 
Rather, they may have had a vague idea that wood could be used for all sorts of different purposes, 
and whether they could discern them is again, beside the point.  
The designer fallacy therefore appears to be an overreaction to the perception that the “designer-
intent model of technological development” has dominated the understanding of technics in an 
53 See Marcuse, op.cit. (1965b).
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almost dictatorial fashion.54 Once again, although it is not altogether incorrect, if the benefits of 
Ihde's theory are that it will lead to a “more cooperative, mutually co-critical approach”55 to design 
and production, arguably these goals are outweighed by its costs, the major one being not merely a 
diminution of significance, but a clear call for the disappearance of concern with the intentions and 
motives of the designer agents / agencies in understanding technical mediation. Yet even though it 
can be admitted that the original design intentions are not necessarily always carried out on the part 
of the end-user, surely it must be acknowledged that many of them are. Consider purchasing a 
washing machine or refrigerator that does not work (i.e. it fails to perform the internal function for 
which it was designed). The typical purchaser of a washing machine (unless they are a collector or 
enthusiast) is hardly going to be happy with reappropriating the device as a bench. Indeed, this is 
the reason that such artifacts usually come with a “replacement guarantee” if it does not perform its 
specific function adequately, as well as a manual which describes how to operate the machine to its 
(designed) specifications. Secondly, Ihde does not mention the extent to which specific values other 
than the strictly utile also come to feature in design or in the sheer number of artifacts. Although his 
article rightly draws focus to how various innovations come to be embedded and instantiated in 
different cultures and how certain artifacts opened up possibilities for further innovations, in 
undermining the designer's intentions, the designer fallacy arguably does not appear capable of 
acknowledging ulterior motives which may dominate the reasons for production. On this basis, one 
cannot help but wonder whether Ihde accepts that economic incentives (or 'intentions') play any role 
at all in modern technoscientific mediation worthy of philosophical investigation.  
In a Marcusean context, the designer fallacy gives undue priority to the end user in its approach to 
understanding technology. Indeed, it largely passes over the reasons why such artifacts as washing 
machines are constructed in the first place, which must include the profit motivation to be viable at 
all. To put this another way, Ihde's theory neglects to acknowledge that technical artifacts – in the 
affluent societies – are also commodities. Passing over this fact may serve to provide a veneer of 
political impartiality, but it also disallows the designer fallacy's capacity to account for technology 
in any sort of full-blooded fashion, and so would appear inadequate to address the sort of questions 
Marcuse was posing in regard to modern technics. However, this is not due to specifically Marxian 
aspects of his thought, but for a much more basic reason – specifically – a presumption about the 
nature of technical production Marcuse's theory shares with a great deal of other thinkers. Contra to 
the designer fallacy, Marcuse argues that the interests of the designers and producers of technics are 
54 Ihde, op.cit. (2008), p. 55.
55 Ihde, ibid. (2008), p. 59.
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reflected in artifacts themselves, their number and diversity, as well as the routines, processes and 
actions that are (or were) associated with them. One need not be at all sympathetic to Marxian 
thought to share something very close to this contention. Indeed, that the various interests of past 
civilisations can – to varying degrees of accuracy – be 'read' from the examples of production they 
leave behind is a basic premise guiding such scholarly disciplines as archaeology, 
palaeoanthropology, etc. The only difference between this basic contention and Marcuse's claim that 
the rationality and ideology of the dominant interests of society are transmitted through the vehicle 
of technics is that Marcuse is not interpreting societies of the past, but of his present. As Feenberg 
wrote:  
...Marcuse is not merely complaining about a system he doesn't like. He is imagining how it 
will appear to a backward glance rooted in the wider context of values evolved over past 
centuries and destined to achieve realization in future ones. The obsolescence of that system 
will be obvious in this hypothetical future, justifying the obstinacy of those who persisted in 
critique through these difficult times.56 
Ihde makes reference to the similarities between the designer fallacy and the theory of unintended 
consequences, and one of the most prominent and potentially dangerous examples of these are the 
environmental "externalities" of human technical mediation.57 Although of course, there is a great 
deal more to be learned from the impacts of humanity on the biosphere, arguably there is sufficient 
knowledge concerning the impacts of a variety of polluting, dangerous, or otherwise dubious 
technical capacities that their continuation can no longer be authentically referred to as 
"unintended". However, as the designer fallacy advises that searching for designer intentions is an 
exercise in folly, its explanatory value in terms of addressing such wider questions concerning 
technical mediation as a whole appears limited for the reason that it ignores the role that profit-
motives have played and continue to play as the major incentives driving production. Although Ihde 
has pointed out in other works that he considers environmental questions of foundational 
significance in the philosophy of technology, such topics do not feature at all in his discussion of the 
designer fallacy.58 Perhaps this is because – again, like Feenberg – Ihde appears concerned to 
distance himself from the "rhetoric of alarm" that each philosopher associates with a supposedly 
56 Feenberg, 'Commentary I', in Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society', in Capitalism, Nature,  
Socialism 3:3, p. 40. 
57 Ihde mentions this theory specifically in relation to the E. Tenner's Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the 
Revenge of Unintended Consequences, (New York: Vintage, 1997).
58  Ihde, Bodies in Technology, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 123. 
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discredited neo-Malthusianism.59 Without pursuing this topic here, the time seems well overdue for 
a rhetoric of radical caution inspired by the peculiar novelty of modern technical civilisation which 
should be amongst the primary tasks for a philosophy of technology to analyse. Although once 
again, both Ihde and Feenberg address environmental issues at length, calling for an understanding 
of artifacts which emphasises the end-user at the expense of the designer / producer's intentions 
arguably has the effect of drawing critical attention away from the historically, evolutionary 
peculiar economic imperatives propelling the vast majority of production in the modern epoch.   
In this chapter I have argued that although neither the Aristotelian approach to technics nor the 
designer fallacy can fairly be claimed to be outright false, for reasons specific to each approach, 
they are not sufficient to warrant the ascent of the instrumental theory as a full-blooded approach to 
the analysis of modern technical mediation. While the designer fallacy correctly draws attention to 
the fact that technical artifacts are functionally multistable and calls for a more complex approach in 
understanding the forces and influences which (in some cases) destabilise the notion of a sole 
designer or inventor building her intentions into artifacts, it has been argued that it is too quick to 
move from this generally sensible proposition to the conclusion that the theorist ought bypass the 
intentions of the agencies behind the production of artifacts per se. If this is the case, then the 
designer fallacy appears to be doing little more than repeating self-evident, conventional wisdom; 
that artifacts may be used in ways previously not considered by the producer or built into their 
designs. While drawing attention to the end-user's functional priorities is warranted, this is only half 
the story, and ought not come at the expense of ignoring the most influential incentives which 
strongly feature in the intentions behind the designers of modern production overall, incentives 
which Marcuse's approach takes with the utmost seriousness. 
The next class of approaches to technical mediation go further than the designer fallacy and 
represent the opposite end of the agent-technics question. Not merely aiming to undermine the 
status of the designer in technical mediation, autonomous theories of technology undermine both 
the end-user and the producer. In short, autonomous theories render the status and efficacy of 
human agency in technical mediation to an impotent status, and so it is to these theories that the 
discussion now turns. 
59  See for example, Ihde, ibid. (2001), pp. 115-117. Another critique of supposedly neo-Malthusian thinkers such as 




A Critique of Autonomous Theories of Technology
A new device merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter.1
Although Marcuse's philosophy of technology is still considered deterministic in some circles, this 
chapter will argue that he resisted the contention that technology is autonomous and suggest that 
later attempts to argue for such autonomy have problems which suggest his scepticism was well-
founded. It will conclude by showing that Marcuse offered a middle-road between the instrumental 
and autonomous views by offering a philosophy of technology compatible with both.
The theory that technological development is an autonomous phenomenon may at first strike one as 
odd. Nevertheless, the view persists in many domains, and is often tacitly implied in a great deal of 
social theory. As well as branding him as a pessimist, reductivist, and elsewhere as a radical 
utopian, various commentators continue to mistakenly describe Marcuse's philosophy of technology 
as a form of technological determinism, which is a version of the autonomous theory,2 and it must 
be acknowledged that in some places, it is not difficult to see why. For example, in commenting on 
the encroaching “total administration” of the masses with recourse to the “technological apparatus 
of production, distribution and communication”, Marcuse contended that, due to its scale and 
“rationality”: “...individuals, and even groups of individuals, are powerless against it.”3 
Nevertheless, as one of his chief expositors has written: “any critique of Marcuse as a technological 
1  L. White Jnr., Medieval Technology and Social Change, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 28.
2 Various academics continue to cast Marcuse as a technological determinist or at least, "associate" him with the view. 
See for example, S. Wyatt, 'Technological Determinism is Dead; Long Live Technological Determinism', in E.J. 
Hackett, et al, (eds.), The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, third ed., (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT 
Press, 2008),  p. 169. Others have also incorrectly label him a "technological reductivist", "abandoning" his earlier 
concern with the individual. See for example, M. Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of  
Herbert Marcuse, (New York: The Free Press, 1980). Douglas Kellner has listed previous thinkers who similarly 
misconstrued Marcuse's approach in his response to Schoolman: 'Schoolman on Marcuse', in New German Critique,  
no.26, "Critical Theory and Modernity", (Spring-Summer, 1982), p. 195.
3 Marcuse, (1965c), 'The Containment of Social Change in Industrial Society', in Toward A Critical Theory of Society:  
The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.2, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 82.
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determinist, technocrat, or technophobe is both obsolete and extremely misleading.”4 This can be 
shown with recourse to various examples in which he made his position clear in a thoroughly 
unadulterated fashion, and through his criticisms of those he contended saw technics as a self-
governing force. For example, despite the similarities of their approaches, Marcuse was strongly 
critical of the Heideggerian view of technology, which he contended left technics “reified, 
hypostatized as Fate”, and treated them as if they were “...forces in themselves, removed from the 
context of power relations in which they are constituted and in which determine their use and 
function.”5 Clearly frustrated by those who considered his view to be deterministic, in An Essay on 
Liberation, Marcuse asked: 
Is it still necessary to state that not technology, not technique, not the machine are the engines 
of repression, but the presence, in them, of the masters who determine their number, their life 
span (planned obsolescence), their power, their place in life, and the need for them?6
 
Marcuse's point is that the problems he thought endemic to the function of technics under capitalism 
are not a result of anything inherent in technics, economics, or technological rationality per se, but 
in their prevailing direction under the consumer-capitalist status quo. “In Marcuse's view, the most 
striking feature of advanced industrial society is its ability to contain all social change and to 
integrate all potential agents of change into one smoothly running, comfortable and satisfying 
system of domination.”7 That the ensemble of capitalism and technological rationality was such a 
“smoothly running” and “comfortable” system was not the result of the autonomous dispensations 
of an external technological entity, nor the iron fists of technocratic dictators, but are arguably best 
understood with recourse to the collective consequences of an incentive which, once widely 
4 Kellner, op.cit. (1982), p. 195.  
5 'Heidegger's Politics: Interview with Dr. Herbert Marcuse by Harold Keen', in Heideggerian Marxism, edited by R. 
Wolin and A. Abromeit, (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 168.
6 Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969b), p. 12. Marcuse put his position unequivocally in a 
letter to the New York Times criticising the view of Charles Reich, who wrote in his Greening of America that “no 
one is in control” of the prevailing rationality Marcuse had been criticising. As the latter wrote: “Nobody in control 
of the armed forces, the police, the National Guard? Nobody in control of the outer space program, of the budget, 
the Congressional committees? There is only the machine being tended to? But the machine not only must be tended 
to, it must be designed, constructed, programmed, directed. And there are very definite, identifiable persons, groups, 
classes, interests which to this controlling job, which direct the technical, economic, political machine for the society 
as a whole. They, not their machine, decide on life and death, war and peace – they set the priorities. They have all 
the power to defend it – and it is not the power of the machine but over the machine: human power, political power.” 
Marcuse, (1970a), 'Charles Reich – A Negative View', in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers of  
Herbert Marcuse, vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 48. It should be noted 
that Reich's own views on the matter appear ambiguous: “The revolution must be cultural. For culture controls the 
economic and political machine, not vice-versa. The machinery turns out what it pleases and forces people to buy. 
But if the culture changes, the machine has no choice but to comply.” See C. Reich, The Greening of America, (New 
York: Bantam, 1978), p. 329.   
7 D. Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 243.
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accepted by the populace, came to provide the major motivation and direction of production. 
Marcuse's perhaps overly-optimistic hope was that at some stage the hitherto “repressed” second 
dimension of critical reason may allow individuals to begin to view technology, society, and politics 
critically, opening the possibility for them to begin to recognise the iniquities he saw in the system 
and take steps to alter them. To be sure, Marcuse indicated that his use of the concept of repression 
is not intended in the “technical, psychoanalytic sense”, but in a broader manner, to emphasise the 
extent to which the end of technological rationality had been artificially subverted and contained. Its 
opposite: “Authentic technological rationality” (would be) “characterized by the unrestricted 
reduction of socially necessary labor, of toil, and of repression.”8 
Marcuse viewed technics as a medium by which not only instrumental ends could be enacted, but a 
means by which political or ideological content, aesthetic or ethical values could be embodied 
within as well as transferred through and imposed upon the populace, with the origins of this 
transferral ultimately being founded in “vested interests”. Unlike those in the public sphere who 
vocally denounce the reduction, reification, objectification, or alienation of humanity out of a false 
need to merely appear impartial and democratic, Marcuse instead took these features with the 
utmost seriousness. In characterising humans in terms of their essential potential to be other than 
what they are, they are free to construct a different sort of society when the technical means to do so 
emerge. Yet, the tragedy and danger Marcuse lamented in the one-dimensional individual and 
society was the apparent complacency and even happiness in the trade-off between increases in 
material affluence and authentic freedom, an arrangement which the modern consumer-capitalist 
society had “perfected”:  
...This society has achieved a condition in which individuals reproduce their own servitude: 
men themselves repel their own liberation. It is a voluntary servitude and, it seems a perfectly 
rational servitude, because in accepting the socially preformed and preconditioned needs and 
satisfactions, the individuals actually live better than before.9 
For Marcuse, this outcome was not conceived as a betrayal as such, but a dereliction of our 
aforementioned existential capacity to pursue our own potential and thereby, to exercise 
responsibility over technical mediation. If such a will to dereliction and abdication is active, (and it 
receives strong support from the contention that technology is autonomous), it seems but a short 
8 Marcuse, op.cit. (1965c), p. 83.
9 Marcuse, op.cit. (1965c), pp. 84-85.
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step away from the irrational rationalisation of satisfying ever increasing hedonistic desires in the 
face of seemingly far distant concerns of environmental breakdown. Artificial 'false needs' came to 
dominate everyday life not because they were the determined product of a self-governing process, 
but because – in their own free will – there are understandable reasons why the majority of 
individuals tend to choose them.10 In this sense, Marcuse appears to have once again following the 
position of Marx, who, despite much being made of his deterministic-sounding phrase concerning 
the hand-mill, also wrote: 
The alien being to whom labour and the product of labour belong, to whose service labour is 
devoted, and to whose enjoyment the product of labour goes, can only be man himself. If the 
product of labour does not belong to the worker, but confronts him as an alien power, this can 
only be because it belongs to a man other than the worker.11 
Marcuse's view is therefore resistant to both the idea that technology is autonomous as well as 
outright technological determinism not just because of his avidity for Marx, but – in a manner 
owing more to Aristotle – due to the emphasis he placed on human potential. It is this very potential 
that is ultimately objectively realised in the concrete forms of technical artifacts, systems, work-
relations, etc., but were considered by Marcuse to currently consist in a repressive arrangement in 
which technology appears to play the major causal role in social and individual affairs. It is this 
containment of potential which Marcuse insisted must be changed.12 In other words, limiting 
philosophical accounts of the technical phenomenon to either 'under control' or 'out of control' (i.e. a 
dichotomy consisting in division #1 and #3 as noted in the previous chapter), appears to be 
misleading. Without neglecting to notice that technics can play a determining role in social affairs 
(if the “vested interests” so dictate), the Marcusean approach stops well short of assuming it is an 
autonomous phenomenon, thereby providing space for agents – and indeed nations – to make 
practical, informed decisions regarding its development and proliferation, not just in piecemeal 
10 See Marcuse, ibid. (1965c), pp. 84-86, and 91. Once again, Marcuse's approach here echoes that of Lewis Mumford, 
who wrote: “Technics and civilization as a whole are the result of human choices and aptitudes and strivings, 
deliberate as well as unconscious, often irrational when apparently they are most objective and scientific: but even 
when they are uncontrollable, they are not external (…) he who does not see choice in the development of the 
machine merely betrays his incapacity to observe cumulative effects until they are bunched together so closely that 
they seem completely external and impersonal.” See Mumford, (1934), Technics and Civilization, (New York: 
Harcourt and Brace, 1963), p. 6.
11 Karl Marx, quoted in L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics Out of Control as a Theme in Political Thought,  
(Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1977), p. 40. (Emphasis added). 
12 Chapter 8 of Kellner op.cit. (1984), offers a more cohesive critique of the contention that Marcuse was a 
technological reductionist than space permits here. Amongst others, Kellner lists the Marxist-Leninist R. 
Steigerwald's Herbert Marcuses dritter Weg, (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1969), as well as various critical attacks in 
the volume edited by Jürgen Habermas, Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1968).
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terms, but as a whole. To this extent therefore, Marcuse's multidimensional view can be seen to 
accord with division #2: technics and humanity are interwoven in a causally reciprocal, or co-
evolutionary manner. It is this multidimensional element of his thought which on the one hand 
implies the simple assumption that technics can and ought to be brought under stricter control and 
regulation, and on the other hand – that the enormity of this task is so complex and radical as to 
“mean the collapse of the social and political institutions which are based on the permanent 
necessity of labor and of the struggle for existence.”13 
I now examine two examples of the autonomous theory of technology – technological determinism 
and the theory of technological "evolution" – as well as their recent fusion in the form of the 
'singularity hypothesis' in more detail. It will be argued that these theories have problems which 
suggest that Marcuse's "ambivalence theory" of technology – "the notion that technologies are 
neither neutral nor inherently deterministic but, rather, politically and socially inscribed and 
entangled within webs of social struggles"14 continues to be relevant to modern philosophers of 
technology and the environment.  
A Confusion of Theories: Autonomous Technology and Technological Determinism
Despite the theory of autonomous technology arguably informing the background of a variety of 
academic research projects, politico-economic policies and aspirations, as well as various “common 
sense” attitudes toward technology, sub-divisions of the theory are often passed over or subject to 
over-simplification. For the most part, the theory of “autonomous technology”15 is often (and 
arguably mistakenly) considered synonymous with technological determinism. For this reason, the 
discussion will briefly depart from Marcuse in order to delineate technological determinism and its 
own sub-groups, before moving on to critically attend to a more recent version of the autonomous 
theory; the evolutionary theory of technology. 
13 Marcuse, op.cit. (1965c), p. 84.
14 M. Vieta, 'Hope for Our Technological Inheritance? From Substantive Critiques of Technology to Marcuse's Post-
Technological Rationality', in Strategies of Critique, vol.1, no.2, (2010), abstract. 
15 The term is owed to Winner, op.cit. (1977). 
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According to Langdon Winner, theories of autonomous technology include all “...conceptions and 
observations to the effect that technology is somehow out of control by human agency”, and that it 
“governs its own course, speed and destination (...) independent of human direction.”16 The theory 
of technological determinism in its stronger formulations arguably comprises the most extreme 
example of the autonomous theory of technology, as it implies that technoscientific development is 
not only isolated from human control and is an independent historical actor, but that it plays the 
most influential and significant causal role in determining the lives of individuals and society at 
large.17 As D.B. Sicilia writes, technological determinism is closely related to its metaphysical 
counterpart, 'hard' or metaphysical determinism:
Like its close cousins – ethical, logical, theological, physical, psychological, and historical 
determinism – technological determinism is antithetical to human freedom. Just as the 
doctrine of theological determinism asserts the ineluctable, inevitable character of God, 
technological determinism holds that technology possesses a logic – the logic of efficiency – 
that acts independently of and determinatively upon human affairs.18 
Just as hard determinists claim that whatever one does is the result of prior causes, entailing that any 
sense or feeling of free will is illusory,19 technological determinists reproduce this view in a social 
context, presenting an image of the technical phenomenon which appears to have much in common 
with a natural force that must simply be abided with, and that human agents have no choice at all 
but to be swept up under its causal sway.20 However, rather than the this bluntly referring to the 
view that agents are simply determined by technology, or that “machinery and allied subhuman 
powers somehow function as the independent agencies in history”,21 the theory of technological 
16 Winner, ibid. (1977), pp. 13-16. 
17 See for example M. McLuhan, (1964), Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, (London: Routledge, 2007); 
Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology, (New York: Penguin, 2005); T. Friedman, The 
World is Flat, (New York: Picador, 2005); R. Heilbroner, (1967), 'Do Machines Make History?' in Scharff and 
Dusek, (eds.), Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 398-404; 
'Technological Determinism Revisited' in Does Technology Drive History? The Enigma of Technological  
Determinism, edited by M.R. Smith and L. Marx, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1994), pp. 67-78. For a 
discussion of technological determinism in a Marxian context, see B. Bimber, 'Three Faces of Technological 
Determinism', in Smith and Marx, ibid. (eds, 1994), pp.79-100.
18 D.B. Sicilia, 'Technological Determinism and the Firm', in Business and Economic History, 22, (Autumn, 1993), p. 
69.  
19 See for example the classical statement of hard determinism from P. d'Holbach, (1770), 'The Illusion of Free Will', in 
Reason and Responsibility: Readings in the Basic Problems of Philosophy, 9th ed., edited by J. Feinberg, (Belmont: 
Wadsworth, 1996), pp. 418-422.  
20 See M. Goldhaber, 'Is Technology Autonomous?', in Controlling Technology: Contemporary Issues, edited by W.B. 
Thompson, et al, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 195.
21 G.A. Cohen, quoted in Bimber, op.cit. (1994), p. 83.
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determinism is rather more variegated.22 For example, technological determinism (and autonomous 
theories in general) can take on both positive or negative, dystopian or utopian forms. Jacques Ellul 
tended not only to view technology as autonomous, but also intrusive, dehumanising and 
destructive,23 whereas optimists see human or social progress as both contingent upon and 
embodied within technical progress. The particular version of the autonomous theory of technics to 
be discussed below exemplifies this latter class of views. Moreover, one version of the view appears 
concerned with the nature of the development of technology; another aims to show how technology 
impacts upon and determines the social as well as the individual, and yet another can be applied as a 
methodological approach to history and society in general. 
The first approach claims that the course of technical development plays out in a deterministic 
fashion, with one innovation causing or opening up the grounds for the next. In the modern world, 
given that the vast majority of artifacts are increasingly produced by other artifacts and production 
machinery, future devices and systems are considered by the technological determinist to form parts 
of a closed, causal system which resembles ancestral inheritance. For example, it might be argued 
that the innovation of the steam engine determined the innovation of railway transport which in turn 
led to the requirement of time-tables, stations, more powerful engines, etc., each triggering the 
emergence of the next. Transport, communication – even  the economy itself – is therefore 
considered to have arisen "...from its technologies. It arose from the productive methods and legal 
and organizational arrangements that we use to satisfy our needs. It therefore issued forth from all 
these capturings of phenomena and subsequent transformations”.24 In a similar vein, Karl Marx's 
comment regarding the societies “given” by the hand mill and the steam mill has also been cited as 
evidence of the latter's supposed technological determinism.25 Simply stated, the second claim 
grants technics the status of the major determinant of civilisation as a whole, and that “...social 
progress is driven by technological innovation, which in turn follows an ‘inevitable’ course.”26 This 
approach is arguably the strongest form of technological determinism, but it is also remarkably 
common. Easily wedded to ideas of 'progress' and 'development', it lies latent in most levels of 
government policy, features as a background of many histories of technology and science, and 
22 Bimber, op.cit. (1994) discusses three forms of technological determinism which he calls "Norm-Based Accounts," 
"Unintended Consequences Accounts", and "Logical Sequence Accounts". Bimber argues that only the third account 
can be understood as genuinely deterministic.
23 See J. Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: Vintage, 1964). 
24 W. B. Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What it is and How it Evolves, (New York: The Free Press, 2009), p. 3.
25 See Heilbroner, op.cit. (1967) for a discussion of this passage from Marx, and Bimber, op.cit. (1994) for a refutation 
of the claim that Marx was a technological determinist. 
26 M.R. Smith, 'Recourse of Empire: Landscapes of Progress in Technological America', in Smith and Marx, op.cit.
(eds., 1994), p. 38.  
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drives business to pursue innovation. Thirdly, as a methodological approach, technological 
determinism is also regularly, tacitly presupposed in works which aim to address its impacts on 
society, individuals, or particular cultural groups, thereby tending to reduce each to the status of its 
effects. As Raymond Williams has noted, technological determinism and what he calls 
“symptomatic technology”, (the former view posits technology as the key cause of social changes, 
whereas the latter is a “symptom” of social change “that is otherwise determined”), are concepts 
that are deeply integrated into various forms of social thought: 
Each view can then be seen to depend on the isolation of technology. It is either a self-acting 
force which creates new ways of life, or it is a self-acting force which provides materials for 
new ways of life. These positions are so deeply established in modern social thought that it is 
very difficult to think beyond them. Most histories of technology, like most histories of 
scientific discovery, are written from their assumptions.27
Furthermore, as Winner has noted, the sociological approach inspired by Emile Durkheim appears 
to be built on the premise that, in the words of the latter, “Society is not a mere sum of individuals. 
Rather, the system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own 
characteristics”.28 What enables certain societies to persist over time is referred to as their 
“mechanical solidarity”, an approach which arguably has strong affinities with technological 
determinism.29 Some versions of the functionalist approach utilised by certain prominent 
anthropologists in the early to mid-twentieth century also appeared to adopt a similar analogy 
between the apparently functional operations of society and mechanical apparatus. The individual's 
place in a culture or social group was to be gauged in terms of how they are were allocated to play 
functional roles (or deviate from them) in terms of a structural whole.30 In either view, the sum of 
the parts appears to take on a dynamism and scale which appears to transcend its individual 
constituent's powers to alter or shape it.  
Whilst it may be granted that autonomous theories of technology have a certain appeal given the 
developed world's level of technological saturation, their central claim – the isolation of the 
technical phenomenon from human control – remains somewhat counter-intuitive. Of course, this 
hardly constitutes grounds for their invalidation, but the very oddness of the claim can easily be lent 
27 R. Williams, (1975), Television, 2nd ed., (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 6.
28 Emile Durkheim, quoted in Winner, op.cit. (1977), p. 62. 
29 J.J. Macionis, Sociology, (Toronto: Pearson, 2011), p. 97.
30 See for example R. Benedict, 'A Defence of Moral Relativism', from 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', in The 
Journal of General Psychology, 10, (1934), pp. 59-82. 
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to sensational effect. For example, Marshall McLuhan appeared to take delight in belittling those 
who held to variations of the instrumental view. As he wrote in his most famous essay: 
I am in the position of Louis Pasteur telling doctors that their greatest enemy was quite 
invisible, and quite unrecognised by them. Our conventional response to all media, namely 
that it is how they are used that counts, is the numb stance of the technological idiot.31 
McLuhan may have had the literary dexterity and prominence to make such phrases as “an Indian is 
merely the servo-mechanism of his canoe, as the cowboy of his horse or the executive of his 
clock”32 sound like rational prospects to a population dazzled by technoscientific advances, however 
like advocates of the designer fallacy, arguably his examples give undue priority to one side of the 
story at the expense of another. To expand: in the previous chapter it was argued that in placing 
excessive emphasis on the end-user, the designer fallacy and constructivist accounts of 
technological mediation tend to undermine the intentions, interests and incentives motivating design 
and production as a whole. Technological determinists such as McLuhan and Ellul are apparently 
committed to the exact opposite claim; as technology and 'technique' are considered autonomous, 
individual agents and their interests are removed from the scheme almost completely. Consider the 
following passage from Ellul:  
No technique is possible when men are free. When technique enters into the realm of social 
life, it collides ceaselessly with the human being to the degree that the combination of man 
and technique is unavoidable, and that technical action necessarily results in a determined 
result. (…) Technique must reduce man to a technical animal, the king of the slaves of 
technique. Human caprice crumbles before this necessity; there can be no human autonomy in 
the face of technical autonomy. The individual must be fashioned by techniques, either 
negatively (by the techniques of understanding man) or positively (by the adaptation of man 
to the technical framework), in order to wipe out the blots his personal determination 
introduces into the perfect design of the organization.33  
Ellul's position is therefore unambiguous; like the hard metaphysical determinist's rejection of free 
will as illusory, the instrumental view of technics is similarly deceptive. For Ellul, technical artifacts 
31 M. McLuhan, (1964), 'The Medium is the Message', in McLuhan, op.cit. (2007), p. 19.
32 See McLuhan, op.cit. (1964), p. 51
33 J. Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: Vintage, 1964), p. 138.
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are not our servants – on the contrary – the individual “is the servant of technique.”34 Although 
Ellul's theory is not ontological but sociological and historical, there may remain pockets of 
freedom, but when these come into contact with technique, they tend to evaporate into prescribed, 
pre-determined outcomes in which the individual is once again cast as the mere effect of 
technological causes. 
Summarising technological determinism, Winner notes that it “stands or falls on two hypotheses: 1. 
that the technical base of a society is the fundamental condition affecting all patterns of social 
existence; and 2. that changes in technology are the single most important sources of change in 
society.”35 If either view is correct in its description of advanced industrial society (or any other for 
that matter), then it would appear the possibility of the sort of redirection of production Marcuse 
was calling for is out of the question, as calls for more responsibility or less invasive or destructive 
forms of technics would presumably be superfluous due to their epiphenomenal status. Each claim 
relies upon the autonomy of technical development and its independence from the social. If true, 
humanity is – so to speak – merely along for the ride.
 
Prior to critically engaging the autonomous theory further, the concept of technological evolution 
view will now be addressed, as certain versions of it arguably represent another path to the 
autonomous theory of technology. 
Evolutionary Theories of Technology
Theories of technological evolution are not altogether new, but appear to have made something of a 
resurgence in recent times with the growing interest in transhumanism and the singularity 
hypothesis. Early intimations of the view can arguably be found in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein,36 
as well as Samuel Butler's 1863 article, 'Darwin Among the Machines' which contained the 
speculation that technical artifacts were a form of “mechanical life” undergoing constant 
evolution.37 The specific term “technological evolution” appears to have been coined by the Czech 
34 Ellul, ibid. (1964).
35 Winner, op.cit. (1977), p. 76.
36 M. Shelley, (1818), Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, (London: Penguin Classics, 1992).
37 It may be arguable that – instead of applying a biological frame of reference to machine development – Butler was 
actually doing the opposite. See S. Butler, Erewhon, (1872), chapters 23, 24 and 25, (London: Penguin Classics, 
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philosopher, Radovan Richta in his work Člověk a technika v revoluci našich dnů  ('Man and 
Technology in the Revolution of Our Day') published in 1963.38 More recent thinkers such as 
Bernard Stiegler, Belinda Barnet39 W. Brian Arthur,40 George Basalla,41 J.M. Ziman,42 and most 
prominently, Ray Kurzweil, have also used the term 'evolution' as their primary descriptor of 
technological development.43 Others have taken an alternative route, instead of deploying more 
traditional Darwinian principles to technical development have utilised theories with recourse to 
hypothesised units of cultural selection or 'memes'.44 Yet it would appear that any problems that 
apply to the latter theory would apply ipso facto to memetic theories of technology.45 
Rather than casting human society or individuals as the mere effects of technological causes, 
theories of technological evolution tend to reduce human agents to the status of the vessels of its 
transmission, playing a role loosely analogous to a selection mechanism. Winner summarises the 
view as follows: 
Since the theory focuses upon the evolving forms of technics in themselves, human beings 
come to be seen as the mere carriers of technology. Each generation bears and extends the 
technical ensemble and passes it on to the next generation. The mortality of human beings 
matters little, for technology is itself the immortal, and, therefore, the more significant part of 
the process (…) Mankind serves a function similar to that of natural selection in Darwinian 
theory. Existing structures in nature and the technical ensemble are the equivalent of a gene 
pool of a biological species. Human beings act not so much as participants as a selective 
1985), pp. 198-226
38 As yet there is no English translation. For a discussion of Richta's work on technology and its Marxian influence, 
see L Nový, J. Gabriel and J. Hroch, (eds.), Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century, chapter 13, (Washington D.C.: 
Paideia Press, 1994).
39 B. Stiegler, Technics and Time V1: The Fault of Epimetheus, translated by R. Beardsworth and G. Collins, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994); B. Barnet, ‘Do Technical Artefacts Evolve?’ in Technicity, edited by A. Bradley 
and L. Armand, (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006), pp. 103-114 and see also B. Barnet, 'Engelbart's Theory of 
Technical Evolution', Continuum Journal, vol.20, issue 4, (December, 2006), pp. 509-521.
40 Arthur, op.cit. (2009). It should be noted that, although the term 'evolution' features prominently in Arthur's book, he 
specifically distinguishes his approach from the Darwinian use of the term. See Arthur, ibid. (2009), p. 107
41 See G. Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
42  J.M. Ziman, Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003).
43 Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005).
44 See for example S. Blackmore, 'Evolution's 3rd Replicator: Memes, Genes, and Now What?', New Scientist 2719, 
(July 2009); A. Álvarez, 'Three Memetic Theories of Technology', Techné vol.9, no.2, (Winter, 2005). The 'meme 
meme' originally emerged in R. Dawkins, (1982), The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 97-117.
45 Critiques of memetic theory include K. Sterelny and P.E. Griffiths, Sex and Death: an Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Biology, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), p. 333; J. Gray, 'The Atheist Delusion', in The 
Guardian, (15 March, 2008); and J.T. Burman, 'The Misunderstanding of Memes: Biography of an Unscientific 
Object, 1976-1999', in Perspectives on Science, vol. 20, no. 1, (2012), pp. 75-104. 
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environment which combines and recombines these structures to produce new mutations, 
which are then adapted to a particular niche in that environment.46  
Although it will not be the aim here to completely dismiss the general claim that technology 
'evolves', put simply, the major problem with the claim is that the latter has long been considered 
amongst the paradigmatic examples of human agency, invention, planning and creativity, not the 
products of a blind selection process. To take a famous example, William Paley used the watch as a 
seemingly self-evident indication of agential design-work in order to draw an analogy with what 
appeared to the Natural Theologists as the equally methodically planned, teleological, and 
functional arrangements of natural organisms.47 It appears that on this basis, taking theories of 
technological evolution to their logical extent would have the side-effect of placing the relatively 
well-attested evidence of the distinction between Darwinian natural selection and technical 
development into question, as after the publication of The Origin of Species,48 it can be understood 
that human producers and users of technics are precisely not “blind watchmakers” but the very 
opposite.49 As this would also have the somewhat ironic side-effect devaluing Darwinian theory, it 
seems strange to call upon it as a description of technological development. However, as it will be 
explained in more detail below, this is not to say that there are not means by which the technical 
may be permitted to 'evolve'. To explain this further, a simple distinction will be required. 
Firstly, the term 'evolution' is used in both broad and narrow senses which are characterised by the 
presence, or lack of presence, of human agents in technical mediation. In regard to the former, it 
serves as a wide description of any process of development or change which appears to follow a 
specific direction, a definition which descends from the Latin ēvolūtiōn (“unrolling” or “opening”). 
On this definition, one can speak of the 'evolution' of the modern visual arts, computer games, 
battlefield strategies, marketplace competition, agricultural techniques, etc. In other words, this 
sense of the term classes evolution as fairly much synonymous with the concept of development. In 
its stricter or narrow sense, the term is used to describe the biological processes of development 
gathered under the New Synthesis, or Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace's theory of natural 
46 Winner, op.cit. (1977), pp. 57-58. (Emphasis added).
47 See W. Paley, (1802), Natural Theology, (London: Deward Publishing, 2010). Modern (biological as opposed to 
cosmological) design arguments arguably continue to proceed on the basis originally set down by Paley. See for 
example W.A. Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology, (Downer's Grove, ILL: 
Intervarsity Press, 1999), and M. Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution, (New York: 
The Free Press, 2006). For a recent collection of essays on the design argument, see Debating Design: From Darwin  
to DNA, edited by W.A. Dembski and M. Ruse, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
48 C. Darwin, (1859), On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992).
49 The term is owed to Richard Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker, (London: Penguin, 1986).
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selection in combination with the Mendelian theory of genetics. This amalgamated view remains 
the current paradigm of evolutionary biology.50 As an explanation of the development of biological 
processes, natural selection has proven its superiority to traditional teleological theories precisely 
because it represents an explanation of apparent design without the need to call on a designer, 
thereby explaining the various defects, suffering, or other content which pose significant 
explanatory problems in reference to an omnicompetent and maximally good designer.51 As natural 
selection is a non-agential phenomenon requiring neither planning, foresight, nor agency in the 
sense usually ascribed to human agents, its application to technical development appears to open up 
immediate and profound problems. In other words, for almost precisely the reason why Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was mistaken as a 
description of biological evolution, it would appear to be acceptable as a theory of technological 
evolution.52 
To borrow a useful classification from Andrew Feenberg, narrow evolutionary theories of technical 
development would arguably also count as “substantivist” in that they attribute “... a more than 
instrumental, a substantive, content to technological mediation”.53 By “substantive content”, 
Feenberg is specifically targeting the technological determinists, as well as the views of technology 
outlined by Martin Heidegger, Ellul and to some extent, Marcuse himself, whose theory of 
technology Feenberg claims – whilst certainly not deterministic – was “strongly influenced by 
substantivism.”54 He goes on to note that substantivist theories tend to render technology 
autonomous (or largely autonomous) from human choice, and from this isolated position causally 
shape, alter and determine human life. Hence, the charges of substantivism and autonomy arguably 
apply to both technological determinism as well as narrow evolutionary theories of technological 
development. 
To summarise, significant difficulties appear to emerge from the application of narrow views of 
evolution to technical development for the reason that they appear to undermine or ignore the role 
of human agency in its production and use which rationalises their allocation into the third division 
noted in the previous chapter. The theory of natural selection entails that an organism's success or 
50 See E. Mayr, What Evolution Is, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2002), p. 270.
51 See F.J. Ayala, 'Design Without a Designer: Darwin's Greatest Discovery', in Dembski and Ruse, op.cit. (2004), pp. 
55-80.
52 See J. Lamarck, (1809), Philosophic Zoologique: ou Exposition des Considérations Relative à l'histoire Naturelle  
des Animaux, vol.1, (Paris: Nabu Press, 2010). 
53 See Feenberg, Questioning Technology, (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 2.
54 Feenberg, ibid. (1999), p. 6.
177
failure is contingent upon the chances that beneficial mutations are selected for in its local 
environment; if so, they contribute to the prospect of the species' reproduction and flourishing, and 
if not they are deleterious to its survival.55 Whilst it may be the case that the sensory and 
physiological capacities of biological organisms are approached scientifically in the language of 
functionality or “design talk”, it is well understood that such “designs” did not come about with 
recourse to pre-given intentions or plans.56 Over the great passages of evolutionary time, and to the 
extent that agency can be conferred to non-humans, although evident, it is of minor significance in 
the overall process. Applying narrow views of evolution to technical development then not only 
appears to muddy the waters between agency and natural 'design', but also the Aristotelian 
distinction between organisms and artifacts,57 as well as the folk-epistemological distinction 
between the artificial and the natural, all of which are strongly contingent on the presence of human 
agency. Nevertheless, whilst there appear to be reasons to be sceptical of the claim that technology 
“evolves”, arguably the contention cannot be dispensed with entirely, but requires further 
qualification. It will now be useful to examine a specific version of the theory of technical evolution 
which has gained a significant following over the last decade in an attempt to show where narrow 
versions of the theory go wrong, and descend into a somewhat blunt and reductive determinism.  
Combining Evolution and Determinism: the Singularity Hypothesis
What follows aims to expand the initial criticisms of theories of technical evolution and 
determinism above by drawing focus to the theory of the technological “Singularity”, a theoretical 
point at which the rate of various forms of technoscientific advance are speculated to become so 
rapid as to equal, and potentially surpass human intellectual capacities. The particular version of the 
singularity hypothesis to be critically attended to here belongs to one of its most prominent 
advocates, the inventor and futurist, Ray Kurzweil, who, despite its fantastic sounding implications, 
has arguably offered the most sophisticated, elaborate and detailed version of the theory thus far.  
55 See for example S. Olsen, Mapping Human History: Genes, Race and Our Common Origins, (Boston: Mariner, 
2003), p. 23.
56 On the biologist's preponderance for “design talk”, see T. Lewens, Organisms and Artifacts: Design in Nature and 
Elsewhere, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 2005).
57 See the previous chapter of this thesis. 
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As Kurzweil contends, the singularity represents the culmination of a progressive historical process 
he refers to as the “Law of Accelerating Returns”. This law aims to describe “the inherent 
acceleration of the rate of evolution, with technological evolution as a continuation of biological 
evolution.”58 The Law of Accelerating Returns is founded in an apparently teleological tendency for 
information to improve its own dissemination with recourse to a narrow (i.e. non-agential) 
evolutionary process, and the singularity represents a point at which this process becomes too rapid 
to comprehend or predict. The literature on the singularity offers various interpretations of the 
concept: it may be set to occur soon – i.e. within decades – centuries, or not at all.59 It may promote 
radically positive qualitative changes, or it may be a mistake that could potentially severely disrupt 
or even end civilisation as a whole. No doubt, aside from questions of its credibility or probability, 
its eschatalogical implications, and even its parallels with myth and folklore, it seems natural that an 
idea with such potentially wide implications for theory and practise has often been greeted with 
dismissal and even derision, making it understandable that the academy has been slow to address 
the subject.60 Although philosophers have recently begun to investigate the implications of various 
forms of human enhancement,61 as David Chalmers recently wrote of the resistance of the academic 
philosophical community to the idea of the singularity: “I think this resistance is a shame, as the 
singularity idea is clearly an important one. The argument for a singularity is one that we should 
take seriously. And the questions surrounding the singularity are of enormous practical and 
philosophical concern.”62 
In most presentations of the singularity hypothesis,63 the term (if not the idea)64 is said to have arisen 
in a comment from the mathematician and information theorist, John von Neumann, who was 
quoted by Stanislaw Ulam as mentioning 
58 Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 7.
59 For three variations of the idea see E. Yudkowski, 'Three Major Singularity Schools', originally appearing on the 
website of the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (SIAI), (September, 2007).
60 There are some notable exceptions. See for example D. Chalmers, 'The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis', in 
The Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol.17, no.7, (2010), pp. 1-56; N. Bostrom, 'How long before 
Superintelligence?' in the International Journal of Future Studies, 2; H. Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to  
Transcendent Mind, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and D.R. Hofstadter, 'Moore's Law, Artificial 
Evolution, and the Fate of Humanity', in Perspectives on Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, edited by L. 
Booker, S. Forrest, M. Mitchell and R. Riolo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 163-196, and F. 
Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, (New York: Picador, 2003).
61 See for example The Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, 'Nanoscience and Nanotechnology', 
(July 2004), chapter 6, pp. 51-57; 'Making Perfect Life: Bio-Engineering (in) the 21st Century – Monitoring Report – 
Phase II, (09.2011), and 'Human Enhancement – Ethical Issues', European Parliament Science and Technology 
Options Assessment, (04.2012).   
62 Chalmers, op.cit. (2010), pp. 3-4.
63 See for example, J. Lanier, You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto, (London: Penguin-Allen Lane, 2010), p. 24.
64 As Bostrom points out, J.W. Goethe had already explored the implications of exponential replication – albeit in a 
magical, rather than technological context – in his 1797 poem, Der Zauberlehrling, (Berlin: Kindermann Verlag, 
2008). 
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The ever-accelerating progress of technology (…) gives the appearance of approaching some 
essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human affairs, as we know them, 
could not continue.65
The specific term “Technological Singularity” was coined by Vernor Vinge in 1993,66 and has since 
been described in detail and expanded on by a variety of futurologists, philosophers, transhumanist 
thinkers and others, with the most ardent devotees believing it will arise sometime in the early to 
mid-part of the current century.67 According to Kurzweil, the event represents the asymptote of 
supposedly “exponential” rates of technical development and replication which he contends can be 
seen to have been progressively unfolding since the very beginning of the universe. Specifically, he 
emphasises the recently rapid growth of computational power, our increasing understanding of 
genetics and nanotechnology,68 which he claims are approaching a 'singular' point of convergence.69 
Although various thinkers have provided warnings concerning the potentially disastrous 
implications of the singularity,70 Kurzweil himself does not accept that the concept is either utopian 
or dystopian.71 Nevertheless, more optimistic accounts of the future are very difficult to find, with 
65 Quoted in Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 10.
66 V. Vinge, 'The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Posthuman Era', in Vision-21:  
Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace, edited by G.A. Landis, (NASA Publication CP-
101290, March, 1993), pp. 115-126.
67 Kurzweil has predicted the occurrence of the singularity in 2045. See J. Martin, The Meaning of the 21st Century: A 
Vital Blueprint for Ensuring Our Future, (London: Eden Project Books, 2006), p. 192. See also L. Grossman, '2045: 
The Year Man Becomes Immortal', in Time Magazine, (February 10, 2011). It should be noted that various theorists 
who believe in the possibility of a singularity place the possible date much later. 
68 J. Garreau refers to them as the “GRIN” technologies; genetics, robotics, information and nanotechnologies. See his 
Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies – and What it Means to be Human,  
(New York: Broadway Press, 2005), pp. 4-8.
69 Convergence and "synergies" have featured heavily in explanations of technoscientific progress, innovation, as well 
as bases for futurist speculation. On the former, see W.S. Bainbridge and M.C. Roco (eds.), Managing Nano-Bio-
Info-Cogno Innovations, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010). On the latter see Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), Garreau, ibid.  
(2005), and for a slightly more sober analysis, M. Kaku, Visions: How Science Will Revolutionize the 21st Century,  
(New York: Anchor Books, 1998); Physics of the Future: How Science Will Shape Human Destiny and Our Lives by  
the Year 2100, (New York: Anchor Books, 2012).   
70 See for example, H. de Garis, The Artilect War: Cosmists vs. Terrans: A Bitter Controversy Concerning Whether  
Humanity should Build Godlike Massively Intelligent Machines, (Palm Springs: ETC Publications, 2005); Garreau, 
op.cit. (2005), pp. 133-185 and B. Joy, 'Why the Future Doesn't Need Us', in Wired, issue 8.04, (April, 2000). For a 
discussion of the positive and negative themes emanating from the singularity and transhumanist literature, see R.M. 
Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven and Hell in Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); N. Bostrom and M.M. Ćirković, Global Catastrophic Risks, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); M. Rees, Our Final Century? (London: Arrow Books, 2004), R. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk  
and Response, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) and J. Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics  
of Human Extinction, (London: Routledge, 1996). In The Doubter's Companion, J.R. Saul makes the following 
comment, apparently directly aimed at those who hold to the autonomous theory of technology: “Individuals who 
treat technology as an animated force capable of deciding the direction of society are engaged in the destruction of 
civilization.” See J.R. Saul, The Doubter's Companion: A Dictionary of Aggressive Common Sense, (London: 
Penguin, 1995), p. 281.
71 Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 7.
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Kurzweil's outlook making even Marcuse's vision of qualitative change and the end of labour under 
necessity seem quite meagre in comparison. The former writes of a near future in which 
exponentially increasing rates of technoscientific advance will not only spell the end of end of 
tiresome or repetitive labour, but vanquish poverty and disease entirely, even potentially leading to 
the possibility of immortality.72 It will allow humanity to end all environmental and pollution 
problems and consign current concerns over diminishing energy reserves to a quaint memory, and it 
will not just have a transformative effect on social relations but on the physiological and intellectual 
constitution of the human species itself. In short, the event of the singularity signals the advent of 
directed or volitional evolution in which human and machine will become ever-more unified.73 In 
Kurzweil's opinion, as the benefits of the singularity will be tantamount to irresistible, any 
reservations individuals may have about this “merger of biological and nonbiological intelligence” 
will be swept away in favour of living as “immortal software-based humans”, enjoying 
(presumably) “ultra-high levels of intelligence” which will then “...expand outward in the universe 
at the speed of light.”74 One of his most prominent critics, Bill Joy, writes of the appeal of the 
singularity hypothesis: 
Each of these technologies offers untold promise: The vision of near immortality that 
Kurzweil sees in his robot dreams drives us forward; genetic engineering may soon provide 
treatments, if not outright cures, for most diseases; and nanotechnology and nanomedicine can 
address yet more ills. Together they could significantly extend our average life span and 
improve the quality of our lives. Yet, with each of these technologies, a sequence of small, 
individually sensible advances leads to an accumulation of great power and, concomitantly, 
great danger.75
Despite the high-tech nature of the idea, searching for alternative sources that parallel its 
speculations inevitably lead to themes found in myth, religion, romantic folklore and most 
specifically science fiction,76 and Kurzweil himself appears quite happy to countenance the 
comparisons.77 The connection of technics and magic has been noted by a number of thinkers, but in 
72 Kurzweil, ibid. (2005), p. 371.
73 The concept of volitional evolution is owed to E.O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, (London: Abacus 
Science Greats, 1995), pp. 305-310.
74 Kurzweil, 'The Law of Accelerating Returns', (2001), p. 1.
75 Joy, op.cit. (2000), p. 5.
76 See N. Bostrom, 'A History of Transhumanist Thought', in The Journal of Evolution and Technology, v.14, (April, 
2005), pp. 6-10.
77 See Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), pp. 370-374, and see also Geraci, op.cit. (2010), pp. 139-145.
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the idea of the singularity, the exit of the latter appears to be complete.78 For example, Arthur C. 
Clarke's third law of prediction claims – not without some irony – that “any sufficiently advanced 
technology is indistinguishable from magic”.79 In other words, in an era when the recourse to 
salvation in the supernatural seems less and less tenable, the singularity hypothesis appears to offer 
a potential form of redemption in tune with modern science, materialism, functionalism, and 
methodological naturalism. Nevertheless, it may bear reminding that a casual perusal of examples 
from mythological and religious sources reveals a number of prominent warnings of the hubris of 
extending instrumental capacities to inordinate proportions, or for their own sake. 
For example, the motif of humans being forced to learn or subjected to divine punishment – whether 
through their accidents or mistakes, or on the basis of the impulsive, desirous excess supposedly 
typical of mortal beings – is very old indeed, as is the idea that some avenues of power are off-
limits per se and ought not be tampered with either technically or magically other than by an adept 
or by divine entities. The gods and natural forces appear to serve as continual checks to mortal 
arrogance and the sin of envy; Icarus flew too close to the Sun on waxen wings created by his 
father, the master craftsman Daedalus, despite the latter's warnings;80 in the Old Testament, the 
Israelite's construction of a Golden Calf during Moses' prolonged sojourn on Mount Sinai was 
doubly wrong, not simply because the Israelites involved themselves in the worship of other gods, 
but through their “fashioning of the idol with a tool” the sin of idolatry was made practically 
manifest.81 Prometheus' theft of fire from Mount Olympus so as to confer its instrumental value on 
human civilisation was overshadowed by the cruelty and severity of his punishment, an insight into 
one of the potential disadvantages of immortality not often noted by those already looking forward 
to “engineered negligible senescence”, immortality's technoscientific equivalent.82 Of course, not all 
of the mythological sources constitute warnings. Pygmalion's devotion to his craft was divinely 
rewarded by the sympathy and ingenuity of Aphrodite who magically animated the statue of his 
ideal partner he had lovingly sculpted into a real human female.83 And in an interesting parallel with 
modern threats of genetically engineered organisms and viruses, the Chimaera, “all lion in front, all 
78 For a discussion of the historical links between technics and magic, see Ellul, op.cit. (1964), pp. 24-32.
79 See A.C. Clarke, (1973), Profiles of the Future: An Enquiry into the Limits of the Possible, (New York: Indigo, 
2000). Michael Shermer has offered a revision of Clarke's third law: “any sufficiently advanced extra-terrestrial 
intelligence is indistinguishable from God”. See M. Shermer, 'Shermer's Last Law', in Scientific American, (January 
15, 2002).
80 Ovid, (2-8 AD), Metamorphoses, book VIII:183, 'Daedalus and Icarus', translated by S. Garth, J. Dryden, A. Pope, J. 
Addison and W. Congreve, (London: Forgotten Books, 2007), pp. 219-223.
81 The Holy Bible, (New International Version), Exodus 32:4.
82 See for example, A. de Grey and M. Rae, Ending Aging: The Rejuvenation Breakthroughs that Could Reverse  
Human Aging in Our Lifetime, (New York: St Martin's Press, 2007). 
83 Ovid, op.cit. (2-8 AD), book X, 'The Story of Pygmalion', pp. 287-289.
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snake behind, all goat between”, the mere vision of which was an omen of shipwrecks and natural 
disasters, ended up being dispatched by Bellerophon not just because he was astride the winged 
horse Pegasus, but due to his (technical) innovation of applying a leaden spear tip that would melt 
in the throat of the fire-breathing monster.84 In effect then, the singularity can be more or less 
understood as a means of filling the transcendental gap left by the rise of the modern sciences by 
deploying science and technology toward outcomes that were hitherto viewed as only attainable 
through magical or divine means. For this reason, some commentators have noted the potential of 
the concept to become even more influential than religion: 
It has the potential to transform human experience more powerfully than any prior ideology, 
religion, or political system ever has, partly because it can be so pleasing to the mind, at least 
initially, but mostly because it gets a free ride on the overwhelmingly powerful technologies 
that happen to be created by people who are, to a large degree, true believers.85
It was mentioned previously that the singularity consists in a prognosis – or in some cases, a series 
of prognoses – regarding the impacts of certain forms of technoscientific advance, and that these 
advances are claimed by Kurzweil to follow “exponential” rates of development. The latter is often 
combined with the technical tendency of replication, and together, the two principles can be highly 
seductive when applied to various forms of technical mediation. For example, although not 
necessarily resulting in exponential growth, the advent of Gutenberg's printing press serves as an 
early instance of the possibility of not only printing, but copying and replicating text, and as the 
historical and social import of this capacity are well attested, it need not be entered into here. 
However, a possible implication could be that the singularity may not be so singular after all. To 
explain, similar 'singularities' can be argued to have emerged recently with the advent of audio and 
visual technics such as analogue and digital recording devices, photography, and more recently still, 
computers and the internet, which have made it possible to copy, record, upload or download any 
image or sound capable of being rendered into data. That the consequences – both intended and 
unintended – of such capacities has been profound is a tremendous understatement; hence, if they 
can be applied to the expansion of intelligence itself, the scope and promise of the singularity 
hypothesis appears doubly profound. Take the example of the so-called “intelligence explosion” 
which may result from the creation of a genuinely “ultraintelligent machine”, one which  
84 Homer, The Iliad, 6.212, (London: Viking-Penguin, 1990), p. 201.
85 J. Lanier, 'One Half of a Manifesto', in 'The Third Culture', Edge Magazine, (2000).
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...can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man however clever. Since the design of 
machines is one of these intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even 
better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,’ and the 
intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last 
invention that man need ever make.86 
Without going into rival definitions of intelligence, the nature of consciousness and related issues 
concerning qualia, phenomenal content, or other topics in the philosophy of mind, for the current 
purposes it will be sufficient to grant that the pursuit of artificial intelligence is hardly quackery that 
can be simply ruled out.87 In any case, depending upon how one defines 'intelligence', (a significant 
problem in itself), machines have long appended and augmented human capacities. For example, 
what is a notebook (whether in its traditional paper or more recent computational incarnations) if 
not a form of memory prosthesis? Automated or “intelligent systems” have not only been used in 
assembly lines, but in the running of hospitals, mass-transit systems on land, sea and air, in 
controlling missile arrays and in an increasing number of other deployments. Such systems are used 
for reasons that are well understood; because they are not only capable of monitoring and 
processing far larger amounts of information more reliably and efficiently than any single individual 
or group. Other than the odd software upgrade and general maintenance, such systems do not suffer 
stress, nor do they require rest, weekends, or occupational health and safety standards. Hence, it 
would seem conceivable that – barring arbitrarily imposed constraints that could (somehow) be 
known to be a priori effective – an ultraintelligent machine could use its capabilities to either 
improve itself or design another, superior 'device', thus representing a potentially exponential rate of 
replication until certain physical, or again, arbitrarily assigned constraints were reached. If 
permitted, such an entity could theoretically come up with its own operational goals and – 
potentially – have its own agendas, which, theoretically at least, may be out of the reach of the non-
augmented human intellect. 
Philosophically and scientifically, Kurzweil's account of the singularity arguably derives from a 
thoroughly materialist (or in his words, “patternist”)88 metaphysical foundation in which order is 
86 I.J. Good, 'Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine', Advances in Computers, vol.6, (1965), p. 33. 
See Chalmers, op.cit. (2010) for an in-depth philosophical discussion of this contention. 
87 On AI, see S. Russell and P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 2003). For a historical account of the pursuit of AI, see M. Davis, 'Mathematical Logic and the Origin 
of Modern Computers', in The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century Survey, edited by R. Herkin, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 149-174.  
88 Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p.5; pp. 385-388.
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generated in a coherent and progressive manner across the entire gamut of material reality. This 
gradual (and now rapid) process arguably leads to a historicist account of the passage of time, from 
the very beginning of physics, chemistry, then life itself into the near and far future, propelled by a 
transhistorical evolutionary mechanism, The Law of Accelerating Returns, which aims to describe 
an over-arching process of continually increasing order, intelligence and (usually) complexity,89 
including, but not limited to the biological. The singularity therefore involves extrapolation from a 
number of hypotheses generally accepted across a number of modern scientific practises (for 
example, that some version of materialism is true, that the brain is exhaustive of the mind and that 
its functional operations appear to work in a computational fashion which can be simulated or 
reproduced, etc.). In brief, some other philosophical / ontological premises that most 
singularitarians would arguably agree with would also include the following: 
1. methodological naturalism;
2. substrate neutrality;
3. an “algorithmic” interpretation of biological evolution;90
4. technological development understood in 'narrow' evolutionary terms.
As discussion of the first three of these premises in any detail here would take us well beyond the 
scope of this thesis, their general validity or otherwise will not be attended to, except to note that 
singularitarians appear to invest a significant amount in the validity of each. This is not simply for 
the reason that each view is generally in continuance with the modern biological, chemical, 
cognitive and physical sciences, but because each view is arguably receptive to quantitative 
reduction to continually improving patterns of information, and that anything that tends toward its 
more efficient dissemination counts as progress or 'evolution'. 
Kurzweil's account of the singularity is highly contingent on The Law of Accelerating Returns, and 
this amounts to the ever-more efficient spread and constructive uptake of information.91 For 
Kurzweil, the totality of history is just the history of information, and he charts its growth through 
six distinct epochs of development: 
89 See Kurzweil, ibid. (2005), pp. 36-40.
90 Daniel C. Dennett emphasises this view in his Darwins's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life,  
(London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 48-51. 
91  See Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), pp. 35-110.
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1. Physics and chemistry: (information in atomic structures);
2. Biology: (information in DNA);
3. Brains: (information in neural patterns); 
4. Technology: (information in hardware and software designs); 
5. Merger of technology and human intelligence: (the methods of biology [including human 
    intelligence] are integrated into the [exponentially expanding] human technology base);
6. The universe wakes up: (patterns of matter and energy in the universe become saturated 
    with intelligent processes and knowledge).92
Kurzweil's argument begins with a detailed description of his “historical exponential” view, which 
he contrasts with what he refers to as the “intuitive linear” view of history. In his opinion, the 
disadvantage of the latter approach is that it only countenances steady, arithmetical rates of 
development. However, as Kurzweil attempts to show, information has arguably exploded 
exponentially during the course of history, hence the intuitive linear view does not do justice to the 
rapid rate of technoscientific advance and expansion.93 The Law of Accelerating Returns does not 
merely claim that technoscience advances exponentially, but that the rate of growth itself is subject 
to the exponential function. This allows Kurzweil to countenance such contentions that the current 
century will see not one hundred years of steady progression in technoscientific capacities, (in the 
context of the intuitive-linear view), but twenty thousand year's worth. On such a basis, a 
singularity scenario becomes virtually inevitable, assuming constant rates of inclining 
technoscientific advance without significant interruptions. To borrow from the Darwinian jargon, 
the Law of Accelerating Returns denotes a steady rate of advance more akin to phyletic gradualism 
as opposed to punctuated equilibrium,94 hence, in general, it implies that evolution (both biological 
and technoscientific) are “positive feedback processes”, in which previous innovations are built on 
and improved in subsequent iterations.95 
The Law of Accelerating Returns arguably involves an extension and generalisation from the basis 
of “Moore's Law”, originally proposed by Gordon E. Moore, a cofounder of the Intel corporation, 
who is said to have observed that in a period of approximately twelve months (he later extended it 
to twenty four); twice as many transistors could be placed onto an integrated circuit, thus doubling 
92  Kurzweil, ibid. (2005), p. 15.
93  See 'The Intuitive Linear View versus the Historical Exponential View', in Kurzweil, op.cit. (2001), pp. 1-2. 
94  The theory of “punctuated equilibrium” is owed to S.J. Gould and N. Eldredge, 'Punctuated Equilibria: an 
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism', in Models in Palaeobiology, edited by T.J.M. Schopf, (San Francisco: Freeman 
Cooper, 1972), pp. 82-115.
95  See Kurzweil, op.cit. (2001), p. 2.
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processor power every couple of years relative to cost.96 This particular paradigm is expected to 
conclude roughly in the early 2020s, by which time the limitations of matter itself will arguably put 
a halt to “cramming” any more transistors onto the silicon substrate as lithographically drawn 
transistors approach the atomic level of detail.97 Of course, this does not necessarily entail an end to 
the rate of the advance of computing power, as Kurzweil notes that paradigm shifts in computation 
have already occurred on numerous occasions.98 To back up his position, he cites such events as 
electromechanical systems being replaced by relays and then by vacuum tubes, moving on to 
transistors and now integrated circuits, which, when reaching the limits of their capacity, he expects 
will be supplanted and replaced by new and superior techniques, some of which are already in the 
testing stage.99 The limitations of particular technics and techniques represent no barrier to the 
believer in technoscientific progress, and therefore especially no barrier to the ardent 
singularitarian. Evolution by natural selection, the emergence of humanity, language and tool-use 
enables faster and faster rates of growth and advance in the dissemination of information in the 
form of computation, and as such capacities progress and proliferate into other fields, these too are 
claimed to become subject to the overarching, seemingly inexorable process of the Law of 
Accelerating Returns. 
Kurzweil's view of the development of technology is therefore situated in the context of a meta-
evolutionary process which both precedes and transcends human agency, which entails his view 
belongs to the narrow understanding of evolution mentioned above. The Law of Accelerating 
Returns rests on extrapolating from the supposedly exponential rates of computational development 
recently evident forward and backward in space-time to a position which recognises information 
processes in general as the cardinal telos of the universe. Human agency, or more specifically, the 
evolution of human intelligence, is merely another rung in a wider, non-agential evolutionary 
process, and on the surface, is apparently of significance only insofar as it serves as an intermediary 
vehicle by which information is made manifest in an ever more efficient and speedy manner. 
Humans therefore become merely the mechanisms of a selection process, lubricating the path to a 
supposedly inevitable singularity. In Marcusean terms, the singularity hypothesis can be read as the 
96 G. Moore, 'Cramming more Components onto Integrated Circuits', in Electronics, vol.38, no.8, (April, 1965). 
Incidentally, in a 2003 interview, Moore noted that the idea was initially owed to his Intel colleague, David House. 
See M. Kanellos, 'Moore's Law to Roll on for Another Decade', on Cnet, (February 10, 2003). As well as Kurzweil, 
the roboticist, Hans Morovec draws on Moore's law in a similar manner in his Mind Children: The Future of Robot  
and Human Intelligence, (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1988) and op.cit. (1998).
97 See Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 434.
98 Although he does not reference T.S. Kuhn specifically, it is clear Kurzweil (2005) ascribes at least loosely to the 
notion of paradigmatic shift the former outlined in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
99 See Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 67.
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ultimate extrapolation of technological rationality, not merely to the political condition of society 
and the regimentation of the individual, but to the physical and intellectual constitution of 
individuals themselves. In short, through its invocation of the combination of not merely a narrow 
evolutionary process, but a teleological meta-evolutionary process of which the former is a 
constituent, the singularity hypothesis ranks as one of the most elaborate, far-reaching formulations 
of the autonomous theory of technology. 
In summary, Kurzweil's theory appears to closely correspond with all three aforementioned 
applications of technological determinism and adds a Darwinian element. Technical development 
unfolds deterministically as it is part of a wider evolutionary process; it is the chief determining 
influence on the social and individual and stands to become even more closely integrated within 
them; and the entire view does not merely tacitly implicate technological determinism as a research 
methodology, it offers it as a complete explanatory account of the history and progress of the 
universe.
A Critique of the Singularity Hypothesis
Kurzweil's thesis and prognostications combine a vast edifice of philosophical, metaphysical, 
scientific and historical contentions which are open to a large number of counter arguments and 
criticisms. Although they cannot all be addressed here, some of the more prominent environmental 
and economic implications of his theory, as well as its apparent presentation of the evolution of 
technics as an autonomous phenomenon will now be contrasted with Marcuse's “compatibilist” 
position. 
Kurzweil's theory entails that a central principle of order is destined to progressively unfold as the 
universe becomes increasingly saturated with information. If it is the case that “the belief in 
historical destiny is sheer superstition”,100 and a mistake that “it is the task of the social sciences to 
lay bare the law of evolution of society in order to foretell its future”, then it appears Kurzweil's 
view is thoroughly historicist.101 Secondly, as the Law of Accelerating Returns tends to interpret 
100 K. Popper, (1957), 'Historical Note', in The Poverty of Historicism, (London: Routledge, 2004), p. ix.
101 As Popper continues: “...the idea that society, like a physical body, can move as a whole along a certain path and in 
a certain direction – is merely a holistic confusion.” See Popper, ibid. (1957), p. 105. 
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“...a historically specific phenomenon in terms of a transhistorical conceptual construction”, it is 
also fits well into the essentialist approach criticised by Feenberg, amongst others.102 Nevertheless, 
it is likely that Kurzweil would be satisfied with both criticisms. In his defence, he could simply 
appeal to the numerous graphs and charts he includes within his works which appear to depict a 
progressive inclination toward increasingly powerful forms of information processing, from rocks, 
to DNA, to brains. In formulating these graphs, Kurzweil utilised the work of, among others, 
Theodore Modis, who “attempted to develop a precise mathematical law that governs the evolution 
of change and complexity in the universe.”103 Unfortunately however, Modis himself has argued on 
various grounds that Kurzweil has either misrepresented his findings or extrapolated on them.104 
This is partly based on his opinion that Kurzweil is “possessed by the exponential function” and 
adds that “nothing in nature follows a pure exponential.”105 While this may be debatable, as may the 
somewhat ambiguous use of the word “nature” in this context, Modis' point appears to stand in 
relation to some technologies and the impacts that the revolutions in genetics, nanotechnology and 
information technology may have on them. For example, whilst it may be granted that certain 
information technologies such as Random Access Memory and harddrive storage capacities 
advance at exponential rates, this does not entail that the activities computers may become 
integrated within will then be drawn in to the Law of Accelerating Returns.106 For example, consider 
the domains of small and large business, retail, manufacturing, etc. Despite continuing to grow at 
relatively steady paces on a global scale, the coupling of such industries with computers has not 
resulted in exponential growth in profits or productivity, nor in rates of efficiency.107 This is of 
course not to say that computers have not greatly improved rates of growth or efficiency – as 
obviously – they have. It does imply however, that the rates are nowhere near “exponential”.   
Kurzweil's view of the nature of technical development remains strongly deterministic for the 
reason that it assumes information – in whatever form – evolves in a progressive manner. Various 
examples from the history of technology appear to speak strongly against this idea, and is instead 
prone to dead-ends, accidents, fits and starts. Marcuse's contention that technology (and the social 
102 See Feenberg, op.cit. (1999), p. 15. For a reply to Feenberg's account of technological essentialism, see I. Thomson, 
'What's Wrong with being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg', in Inquiry, vol.43, issue 4, 
(December, 2000), pp. 429-444.
103 T. Modis, 'Forecasting the Growth of Complexity and Change', in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
vol. 69, no. 4, (2002). 
104 See T. Modis, 'The Singularity Myth', in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol.73, no.2, (2006).
105 Modis, ibid. section 3., (2006).
106 This presumption has been labelled as the "ideology of technological determinism" by Paul Edwards in a discussion 
of "manager's frequent belief that productivity gains and social transformation will be automatic results of 
computerization." Quoted in Wyatt, op.cit. (2008), p. 174.
107 Interestingly, in the case of manufacturing, this situation could well alter in the near-future if the introduction of 
small-scale rapid prototyping takes off. This topic will be briefly noted below. 
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realm) are historically contingent entities can accommodate such a view, but Kurzweil's historically 
generic mechanism of the Law of Accelerating Returns does not fare as well in this context. Take 
for example the Ancient Greek innovations of the aeolipile and the earliest known predecessors of 
railway tracks.108 Far from determining certain advances in propulsion or railway transport, it 
appears neither led even indirectly to such applications. Without arguing that these particular 
technical instantiations are reducible to “information” (which, by Kurzweil's own standards, they 
appear to be), the latter invention could have led to at least rudimentary forms of railway travel far 
earlier than it did (excluding the variants which emerged in the dark ages, the modern railway did 
not arrive in Europe until two thousand years after the Greeks had used it as a means to transport 
boats across the Isthmus of Corinth).109 The innovation of railway tracks do not automatically beget 
innovations in steam-engines or other forms of motor-force which could then be used to power 
trains, despite the invention of the aeolipile apparently being testament to the contention that the 
basic principles of the steam power were already beginning to be worked out. Despite it being 
seemingly obvious to moderns where this technological potential could have gone, the aeolipile's 
use is generally considered to have been restricted to entertainment purposes only; specifically, as a 
“temple wonder”, and is not known to have ever been exploited as an engine used to provide motor 
power. Indeed, the rails mentioned previously are also said to have been used for entertainment, 
specifically in rolling sets and props on and off the stages of Greek theatre. In other words, despite 
two of the more crucial functional innovations of railway transport existing over two thousand years 
ago, they did not follow anything resembling a discernibly exponential rate of advance inevitably 
leading to Newcomen's steam engine and then on to bullet trains. Clearly, such innovations had to 
await  improvements in many other trajectories of technoscientific endeavour, not least those that 
led to the production of sufficient amounts of iron for the construction of tracks durable enough to 
contain the pressures involved in the workings of larger steam engines. In short, a myriad of other 
innovations or “connections” were required, and were – for whatever reason – interrupted for nearly 
two thousand years.110 At least in the context of such artifacts, there appeared to be no inexorable – 
let alone exponential – paths of technical development that their innovation opened up or called for. 
108 The invention of the aeolipile is commonly attributed to Hero of Alexandria in the first century AD, but was also 
described by Vitruvius (80 BC – 15 AD) who mentions and describes 'Æolipylæ' by name in his Der Architectura.  
See Vitruvius, (first century BC), Ten Books on Architecture, edited by I.D. Rowland and T.N. Howe, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter vi, paragraph 2. It should be noted that both figures may be drawing 
upon a much earlier work on pneumatics by Ctesibius [285-222 BC], however, it is unclear as to whether the latter 
was the inventor of the device either.
109 See R.M. Cook, 'Archaic Greek Trade: Three Conjectures 1. The Diolkos', in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 
99 (1979), pp. 152-155.
110 This term is owed to J. Burke's, Connections series, (London: BBC, 1978).
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The singularitarian may reply to these criticisms that theories such as Kurzweil's specifically focus 
on information-based innovations, those that involve the storage, presentation and transmission of 
data, which modern computers exemplify. As neither the aeolipile nor the railway track are 
classifiable as such, they are irrelevant as counter-examples. However, so broad is Kurzweil's view 
of what constitutes information and innovation that even language itself is regarded as merely a 
“slow” but nevertheless “very beneficial” example which assists in information transfer, a claim 
that sounds very much like the usual fusion of organisms and artifacts favoured by theorists of 
technological evolution and subscribers to the theory that nature is a social construct.111 Yet 
furthermore, the criticism above seems to apply to information-based technologies as well. Consider 
another example from Ancient Greece, the Antikythera Mechanism, now understood to have been 
constructed between 150 and 100 BC.112 Although for nearly a century after its recovery in 1900-
1901 its function was not known, recent analyses have shown that the device appears to have been 
used as a means to calculate astronomical movements on the basis of the Olympic calendar and the 
geocentric model. The earliest known example of a mechanical calculator (or 'computer'), the 
design and construction of the mechanism shows a degree of sophistication and accuracy that has 
been compared to that of nineteenth century Swiss clockwork.113 Needless to say, not even the 
Antikythera mechanism led inexorably, let alone exponentially to the advent of clockwork, 
calculating devices, nor computers in any form recognisable today. There is no link between it and 
(say) Charles Babbage's “Difference engine”, proposed (but not constructed) nearly two thousand 
years afterwards, for the Antikythera mechanism was unknown at the time. Even due to the ubiquity 
of modern computers, there seems to be little reason to conclude that they are completely resistant 
to the sort of events that halted any instrumental paths which may have led from the Antikythra 
mechanism. Indeed, a sufficiently large solar flare would be more than sufficient to render the vast 
majority of modern computers inoperable.114 In other words, to the extent that the Antikythera 
mechanism can be referred to as a computer, once again, its potential functional implications were 
interrupted not by solar flares, but by equally external, socio-historical, political events such as the 
decline of the influence of the Greeks, the burning of the Library of Alexandria, the rise of Roman 
and then Christian influences in Europe, etc. etc. In short, technical and scientific development does 
not appear to proceed in a causally deterministic manner, nor is it isolated from social factors which 
111 Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 260. On nature as a social construct, see the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
112 See M. Allen, 'Why is it so Important?', The Antikythera Mechanism Research Project, (June 17, 2008).
113 See B. Keim, 'World's First Computer Displayed Olympic Calender', Wired, (July 30, 2008). 
114 One expert has noted that such an event would entail potentially disastrous effects: “...without computers, the 
modern world would simply cease to function. Life as we know it would grind to a halt”. The comment is owed to 
Jonathan Eastwood, a research fellow in space and atmospheric physics at Imperial College, London, from an 
interview with A. Jha, 'Solar Storms Could Crash Computer Systems This Year, says Space Expert', The Guardian,  
(March 8, 2012). 
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shape it, and which it shapes. Indeed; that the rate of progress in the modern sciences over the last 
half a millennium has been so rapid appears to hinge upon their social organisation. 
Technologies – such as gunpowder, the printing press, the railroad, the telegraph and the 
Internet – can shape society in profound ways. But on the other hand, social systems – in the 
form of governments, the courts, formal and informal organisations, social movements, 
professional networks, local communities, market institutions and so forth – shape, moderate 
and redirect the raw power of technologies.115
In conformance with Marcuse's 'compatibilist' approach, to the extent that technics play causal roles 
in history and society, the reverse is also true. Humanity and technology appear inextricably linked 
in a novel form of “co-evolution”, each playing mutually beneficial – or detrimental – roles within 
the ensemble. One innovation may happen to trigger the potential for many others, but it appears 
such a causal link is merely sufficient rather than necessary, as any number of factors outside 
'technology proper' may intervene, distract, delimit or delay its progress. 
In a biological context, Kurzweil's view of 'evolution' obviously goes beyond Darwinism, indeed, it 
more closely resembles Teilhard de Chardin's widely criticised concept of the “Omega Point” more 
than natural selection.116 The biological is an integral facet of both thinker's views, and in both it is 
treated as an orthogenetic system; one propelled by “the mysterious inner force” that directs the 
entire scheme progressively toward ever more positive outcomes.117 Continuing with the biological 
analogy, this arguably implies Kurzweil's scheme constitutes a version of the theory of “directed 
variation” (sometimes referred to as “directed mutation”), a highly controversial idea which is 
largely ruled out as an explanation of variation amongst the large majority of modern evolutionary 
thinkers for the reason that – once again – 'direction' is something that agents alone are capable of, 
or capable of countenancing.118 As Daniel Dennett put it, the “fundamental idea” of (biological) 
evolution is that it is a “mindless, purposeless, algorithmic process”; any sense of agential direction 
in such a scheme is simply mistaken.119 Furthermore, although Darwinian thinkers have conceded 
that it could be possible in the short-term that evolution may be progressive, (with “short” here 
115 J.S. Brown and P. Duguid quoted in Garreau, op.cit. (2005), pp. 181-182.
116 See P.T. de Chardin, (1955), The Phenomenon of Man, (London: Fountain Books, 1977).
117 See G.G. Simpson, Life of the Past: An Introduction to Palaeontology, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 
p. 125. 
118 See for example M. Ridley, 'Variation Created by Recombination and Mutation is Random with Respect to the 
Direction of Adaptation', in Evolution, 3rd ed., chapter 4.8, (London: John Wiley and Sons, 2009), pp.88-89. See also 
Dennett, op.cit. (1995), pp. 320-324.
119 Dennett, ibid. (1995), p. 320.
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referring to fifty million years), over longer periods of five hundred million years or more, this is far 
less likely, and in any case, would be extremely difficult to decide.120 Other evolutionary theorists 
such as Mark Ridley go further, arguing that theories of directed variation should be dispensed with 
altogether: 
Various theories of evolution by “directed variation” have been proposed, but we must rule 
them out. There is no evidence for directed variation in mutation, in recombination, or in the 
process of Mendelian inheritance. Whatever the internal plausibility of these theories, they are 
in fact wrong.121
Given that the earliest archaeological evidence of anatomically modern humans is not much older 
than two hundred thousand years, Kurzweil's implicit contention that our species constitutes a 
“progression” in an evolutionary context appears to be a rather premature claim, if indeed it is 
coherent at all. In any case, it could be ventured that – to the extent that 'success' can be attributed to 
particular species in an evolutionary context – it equates to the endurance of the species in question 
rather than its intellectual capacities, which – if humans are anything to go by – may well turn out to 
be a detriment if their primary means of dealing with practical expediencies such as biospheric 
destabilisation are left up to the direction of deferred profit motives. Furthermore, although 
ultimately the technical is a product of the biological insofar as it would appear to require the 
emergence of agents prior to it, technology – as it has been defined here in accord with Marcuse's 
approach – is a social, cultural, agential phenomenon, not the product of a self-governing, 
historically abstracted principle of order. Indeed, there are strong disanalogies between the nature of 
technical mediation and biological processes... 
The basic topologies of biological and cultural change are completely different. Biological 
evolution is a system of constant divergence without subsequent joining of branches. 
Lineages, once distinct, are separate forever. In human history, transmission across lineages is, 
perhaps, the major source of cultural change.122 
Whilst it would be a mistake to consider that Kurzweil's view is merely an extrapolation of Natural 
Selection to a cosmic context, the Law of Accelerating Returns remains a blind process which 
nevertheless progressively tends toward a singular destiny. A similar emphasis has been placed upon 
120 'Of Mind and Matter: David Attenborough meets Richard Dawkins', The Guardian, (September 11, 2010).
121 M. Ridley, quoted in Dennett, op.cit. (1995), p .323.
122 S.J. Gould, quoted in Dennett, ibid. (1995), p. 355.
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the sense of historical inevitability in the works of many Marxist thinkers, however, it should be 
said that in comparison to Kurzweil's theory – even Marcuse's revisionary Marxism does not place 
anywhere near as much emphasis on the contention that history unfolds in an inexorable manner, 
determined by technics. Indeed, unlike a great many Marxian thinkers, Marcuse specifically resisted 
placing emphasis on a deterministic view of history or technology: 
Marxism as a theory is an analysis – political, sociological and economic – of capitalism, 
which comes to the conclusion that the capitalist system can preserve itself and develop only 
through increasing conflicts, waste of resources, destruction of resources, wars, and so on, and 
that the transition to socialism is the only solution in his philosophy.123 
Marcuse's revisionary take on the Marxian theory was receptive to updates in light of changing 
historical circumstances which allows for a significant degree of flexibility.124 In Kurzweil's view, 
and that of other thinkers who subscribe to various forms of 'hard' technological determinism, 
“history” itself appears as a self-improving, self-governing mechanism requiring no agential 
influences, and in which progress is defined with recourse to improvements in the efficiency of the 
distribution of various forms of technical systems and information, and as virtually everything can 
be broadly understood in terms of its informational content, it can therefore be included in the wider 
“historical-exponential” view. It is but a short step to reduce politics, economics, so-called “black-
swan events”, human relationships, desires and needs to the informational sine qua non, and then to 
argue that increases in intelligence will benefit them all.125 Hence, the improvement of intelligence 
by any technoscientific means possible is especially important to the singularitarian. 
Our sole responsibility is to produce something smarter than we are; any problems beyond 
that are not ours to solve ... There are no hard problems, only problems that are hard to a 
certain level of intelligence. Move the smallest bit upwards (in level of intelligence), and 
some problems will suddenly move from “impossible” to “obvious.” Move a substantial 
degree upwards, and all of them will become obvious.126  
The array of possible criticisms of this passage would appear to be so voluminous that they can only 
be briefly attended to here. Suffice to say, even in the possibility that such an intelligence was 
123 Marcuse, (1969c), 'Interview with Dr. Herbert Marcuse by Harold Keen', in The New Left and the 1960s: The  
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 128. 
124 See for example, Kellner, op.cit. (1984), p. 297.
125 See N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, (New York: Random House, 2007). 
126 E. Yudkowski, quoted in Kurzweil, op.cit. (2005), p. 35.
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created, one may well wonder why it would not be “vast and cool and unsympathetic”, even if it 
was an amplified version of our own.127 Of course, any comments on such issues can only be more 
or less informed speculation, however, like their tendency to pass over the historical interruptions 
of scientific and technical progress in silence, devotees of the singularity hypothesis arguably have 
a habit of ignoring or glossing over the significance of various peculiarities of human agency and 
intelligence that – whilst generally perceived as shortcomings, nonetheless may play a significant 
role in stimulating and motivating great works. For example – as was noted in the passage from 
Ellul above – in either a general or individual context, humans are precisely not machine-like in 
their rationality but prone to emotions, mood-swings, seemingly irrational addictions, mistaken 
impressions, distractions, flights of fancy, varying degrees of psychological malady – in short, that 
which singularitarians largely class as imperfections.128 But ought they be given up entirely? As 
various transhumanist philosophers have argued, there may well be compelling reasons for certain 
types of enhancements such as those that may help to improve our ethical conduct in a time in 
which technoscientific capacities can enable a few to carry out great harms.129 Yet despite the 
predictable criticisms that arise from any whiff of eugenics, it should be recalled that humans have 
always been extending themselves technically and improving their capacities, and recently this has 
extended to pharmacological means of augmenting cognition, memory retention, alertness, etc. 
through the use of “nootropics”.130 Nevertheless, it is arguably just from such physical and 
intellectual 'shortcomings' or deficiencies and the idiosyncratically human preponderance to 
cognitive abstraction that may have played such a formative role in spurring on the emergence of 
technics itself.131 To be sure: it is hardly the intention here to claim that such deficiencies are 
somehow sacred and should be left as they are – on the contrary – it is in easing or alleviating many 
of them that ties in both with Marcuse's conception of the “end of technological rationality”, as well 
127 H.G. Wells, (1898), The War of the Worlds, book 1, chapter 1, (Racine, WISC: Golden Press, 1978), p. 11.
128 As Ellen Ullman put it, “we're beings who are suffused with error, dripping with imperfection, drenched in 
inefficiency (…) Ray Kurzweil would improve us. I don't know about you, but it always makes me nervous when 
someone wants to improve the human race”. Quoted in Garreau, op.cit. (2005), p. 178.
129 See for example, J Savulescu, 'Unfit for Life: Genetically Enhance Humanity or Face Extinction', transcript of a 
lecture presented at the Festival of Dangerous Ideas, Sydney, (October 4, 2009).
130 See M.S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain: The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 
p. 184.  
131 For early accounts of technology as "organic projection" inspired by our physiological and sensory deficiencies, see 
E. Kapp, (1877), Grundlinien einer philosophie der technik: Zur entstehungsgeschichte der cultur aus neuen  
gesichtspunkten, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library); A. Gehlen, (1965), 'A Philosophical-Anthropological 
Perspective on Technology', in R.C. Scharff and V. Dusek, (eds.), Philosophy of Technology: The Technological  
Condition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 213-220, and J. Ortega y Gasset, (1939), 'Thoughts on Technology', in C. 
Mitcham and R. Mackey, (eds.), Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of  
Technology, (Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 290-313. For a more recent version of the thesis, T. 
Taylor, The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the Course of Human Evolution, (London: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2010). 
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as the goals of such well-established practises as modern medicine.132 It may well be an integral 
aspect of the “human condition” to turn our weaknesses into strengths, yet if human intelligence 
was markedly improved and combined with greatly extended life-spans, it seems the discussion of 
the singularity goes well beyond “human enhancement” and ventures into speculation concerning 
entities that are godlike compared with ourselves. In the current context, the unbridled enthusiasm 
for technological determinism inherent in the quote from Yudkowski cited above appears to ensure 
that all entities which are determined to assist in the development of the informational sine qua non 
are mere super-structural processes which can only accommodate and adjust themselves to the 
burgeoning base of opportunities opened up by technoscientific advance. The import Kurzweil and 
other singularitarians invest into this first principle therefore arguably tends to render whatever 
comes afterward or during – political, economic, ethical, personal – not merely a determined status, 
but an apolitical one; all entities theoretically or methodologically reducible to information 
processes are merely adrift in the wind of evolutionary progress of increasingly sophisticated 
patterns of information. 
There are few views that distance technics from human influence and responsibility as overtly as 
the singularity hypothesis, and, despite its other problems, it is arguably just this distancing that – 
were it to gain a significant foothold in the public mind – could lead to various practical problems 
such as a compounding and extension of the current uncritical apathy toward technical development 
that may arise from a 'faith' that it is following a determined, progressive, narrow evolutionary 
course, or that it shapes human agents but not the opposite: “...in technological aggression and 
destruction, the satisfying act is transformed from the human agent to the mechanical, electronic, or 
nuclear agent (…) consequence: the weakening of individual responsibility – the apparatus did it, or 
the machine did it. The instrument did it and not the person.”133 Hence, the major problem with 
theories of autonomous technology is not merely that they may be epistemologically incorrect in 
their description of technoscientific development, but that they appear potentially deleterious to the 
prospect of exercising responsibility and control over technical decisions at a time when such 
responsibility has emerged as a crucial concern. As it has been argued throughout this discussion, 
the environmental implications and limits to the growth of the dominant mode of production are 
now visible in a manner Marcuse could only have begun (and, to his lasting credit, did begin) to 
envision.134 The destabilisation of the biosphere which is the result of seemingly hypertrophic levels 
132 Marcuse, (1964), One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 5.
133 Marcuse, op.cit. (1965c), p. 91.
134 See for example, Marcuse, 'Ecology and the Critique of Modern Society', in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol.3, 
number 3, (1979), pp. 29-48; Counterrevolution and Revolt, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972a), chapter 2, pp. 59-78; 
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of industrial and technical production is a fundamentally concrete problem which carries profound 
implications both for individuals and societies and even the future of civilisation itself. It has not 
been the aim here to argue which particular threat will prove most decisive, nor to calculate the 
likelihood of their occurrence, but to highlight that element of Marcuse's thought which can be read 
as a radical caution in regard to the current direction of the technological mode of production which 
is not permitted in the scope of autonomous views of technology.  
Before concluding this chapter, another recent technical tendency – itself arguably a form of 
'singularity' due to its feature of utilising exponential replication – will be briefly noted. It was 
mentioned previously that Marcuse's search for potential liberatory groups which could play a role 
in initiating his great hope of qualitative social change ended in failure. As Marcuse himself 
admitted, there were no contemporary groups that could have carried out this goal, despite his 
positive acknowledgment of the efforts of the leftist student movements of the 1960s and the 
growth of feminism, amongst other groups and causes. In the second decade of the twenty first 
century, despite the growth of the anti-globalisation and environmental movements, and more 
recently highly technologically-savvy subversive organisations such as Wikileaks and Anonymous, 
there arguably remain no obvious agents of change that could lead the sort of "Great Refusal" 
Marcuse repeatedly advocated. However, these latter two groups, embodying as they do certain 
crucial technical tendencies, arguably reveal signs that technoscientific advancement – heavily 
encouraged under consumer capitalism – may contain radically democratising implications that 
Marcuse likely would have approved of. 
In his 1941 essay, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', Marcuse made the following 
claim: 
It has been frequently stressed that scientific discoveries and inventions are shelved as soon as 
they seem to interfere with the requirements of profitable marketing. The necessity which is 
the mother of invention is to a great extent the necessity of maintaining and expanding the 
apparatus.135
Although this may well be the case in some situations, recent innovations – specifically the spread 
of computation and the internet – arguably cast some doubts on Marcuse's point, for they are now so 
and (1972b) 'Ecology and Revolution', in The New Left and the 1960s: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse,  
vol.3, edited by D. Kellner, (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 173-176.
135 Marcuse, op.cit. (1941), p. 46.
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firmly integrated into so many aspects of society – especially, but not exclusively the affluent 
societies – that the proverbial horse appears to have bolted. I will briefly suggest that the search for 
liberatory forces may now be more profitably directed toward the tools rather than the particular 
groups and individuals using them. 
Up until recently, ratios of productive output have proceeded arithmetically. No matter how 
voluminous, modern mass-production does not attain exponential rates of material output except in 
certain circumstances, when certain functional trajectories such as computation emerge. With the 
advent of cheap, accessible printing and later photography, recording devices, and still later, with 
the proliferation of digitisation and the internet, whenever the capacity of exponential replication 
was opened up by particular technical innovations it brought transformative social effects with it. To 
reiterate an example used in the previous chapter, the modern world is almost unimaginable without 
the influence of printed text, and in a century from now, it is at least conceivable that something 
similar may be said of contemporary forms of information technology. Yet, as with any 
transformative innovations, their instantiation brings with them both intended and unintended 
consequences. To acknowledge as much is trivial; however, a certain class of technoscientific 
tendencies remain of particular interest in the context of qualitative social change: those that are 
harmful only insofar as they pose problems to traditional exchange relations.  
A final conceptual distinction will be required: call a desk or lap-top computer, media player, or any 
other similar computational device capable of storing, downloading or reproducing data or 
information a 'material' replicator of 'immaterial' substances.136 Note that 'immaterial' is not intended 
here in the strictly Cartesian sense of the term, but as a purely conceptual means to separate the 
types of media contained / replicated by a 'material' medium. The parts which go together to form a 
modern desk-top, lap-top, tablet, 'smart-phone' or other computer devices would therefore constitute 
the material (hardware) medium in which the immaterial (software) would be produced, 
reproduced, played, executed, etc. Such forms of innovation incorporate the feature of potentially 
exponential replication. For example, as is widely practiced today, one person may copy or create a 
file, upload it to the internet, and allow many others to do the same thing, hence rapidly creating a 
large number of copies which are aptly referred to as viral in their spread. Yet as mass-produced 
artifacts, the material media carrying out these functions are currently produced at arithmetic rates 
136 Note that devices capable only of 'playing' or 'executing' the given input – such as cassette players without the 
record function – are not applicable in this context. Secondly, although they are capable of reproducing ('dubbing') 
data from one cassette to another, to do so still requires the (material) cassette. For this reason also then, they are not 
directly analogous to modern digital computers which decreasingly rely on discs / CDs, etc., but larger and larger 
forms of hardware storage and more recently, cloud-based servers. 
198
only. 
As any theorist concerned to define technology would be unlikely to deny its augmentional role in 
extending and externally embodying human sensory, physiological, and other capacities, it is 
unsurprising to note that the advent of the internet and the penetration of computers has been no 
exception to this rule, particularly in regard to the capacity for sharing. Today, with a fraction of 
time and know-how, sharing and duplicating immaterial media is remarkably quick and simple, as 
well as being increasingly widely accessible and affordable. However, this still historically new and 
novel capacity tends to be greeted with hostility on the part of the status quo, for the reason that 
savvy users are not only beginning to disturb, but bypass traditional exchange relations altogether. 
Many industries, particularly those which draw profits from producing books, music, film and 
television programs – indeed, any industry whose products can be digitised – have begun to be 
disrupted, and in response, aspects of the new augmentation of sharing opened up by modern 
information technology has been labelled "piratical".137 As such, the traditional music and 
entertainment industries have opted for a broadside of lawsuits and efforts to strengthen law and 
government policy in such domains such as copyright, intellectual property and digital rights 
management, the actual impacts of which appears to have been to frighten the unwary rather than 
solve the problem of piracy if, indeed, it is ultimately solvable at all.138 
Here is a clear example of how the Marcusean “end of technological rationality” is being subverted 
on the basis of the lost profits of traditional industries: the profit motive can be seen to not merely 
accompany, but override the newfound capacity for sharing opened up by recent technical 
advances, hence, all efforts are deployed to deny or limit sharing to the public. Yet the sharing of 
'immaterial' media is one thing, quite another is the capacity to download and produce material  
goods. When one considers the potential implications of affordable three dimensional printing, 
especially devices which are capable of manufacturing copies of themselves,139 the tendencies 
137 To be sure: this is not to say that all file-sharing has been condemned as piratical, but those forms which evade 
copyright regulations and other forms of intellectual property rights. For an introduction to the topic, see J. Clough, 
Principles of Cybercrime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).   
138 For example, Digital Rights Management (DRM) has been widely criticised from a number of perspectives, not 
least because it does not appear to work. As one expert commentator put it: trying to make digital files uncopyable 
was like "trying to make water not wet." See B. Schneier, 'Quickest Patch Ever', in Wired, (9 July, 2006). 
139 Such devices, known as "universal constructors" were initially conceived by John von Neumann. See his Theory of  
Self-Reproducing Automata, edited and completed by A.W. Burks, (Urbana and London: University of Illinois Press, 
1966). On more recent – and successful deployments of such devices, see U. Pesavento, 'An Implementation of von 
Neumann's Self-Reproducing Machine', in Artificial Life Journal, vol.2, issue 4, (1995), pp. 337-354; W.R. Buckley, 
'Signal Crossing Solutions in von Neumann Self-replicating Cellular Automata', in Automata-2008: Theory and 
Applications of Cellular Automata, edited by A. Adamatzky, et al,(Frome: Luniver Press, 2008), pp. 453-502 and D. 
Mange, A. Stauffer, L. Peparaolo, and G. Tempesti, 'A Macroscopic View of Self-replication', in Proceedings of the 
IEEE, vol.92, issue:12, (December, 2004), pp. 1929-1945. 
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discussed above in relation to immaterial software piracy may move to at least some aspects of the 
material realm of 'traditional' manufacturing and production.140 The potential implications of this 
topic are extensive, yet despite promising recent signs, any commentary upon them can only be 
speculative, so I will not attend to them in detail here, suffice to say that change from within 
technoscience itself – the very potential offered by its advance in such forms as the internet – are 
now thoroughly entrenched in modern society and highly unlikely to be removed. Although they 
have opened up opportunities for the sort of increased surveillance, monitoring, and control 
Marcuse had long criticised, in conformance with his multidimensional view of technology, they 
have also opened up means by which these very processes may be exposed to the scrutiny of the 
public. Again, Marcuse's point is a conservative one, and in tune with the conventional wisdom 
which acknowledges that available technology will be used for good and ill, but it contains the 
added caveat that “the more we seek to control, the more contingencies and treacheries proliferate 
within the very mechanisms of control”.141 Furthermore, these innovations are practical as they are 
available now – we do not need to pin our hopes either to the creation of greater-than-human 
intelligences, nor place all our faith in the market mechanism for radical social changes to occur. 
Aside from leveling various criticisms at the singularity hypothesis, it has been the aim of this 
chapter to show that the major problem with the view is its application of a non-agential, narrow 
form of evolutionary development to technoscientific mediation. This 'one-dimensional' strategy 
arguably fails because it neglects to account for the second human dimension in technical mediation 
which Marcuse's view – despite its pessimistic elements, and despite many accounts to the contrary 
– did not fail to countenance. 
140 Home fabricators, “3D printers”, and assemblers are a relatively recent and novel form of “desktop manufacturing” 
device which can construct or “print” a variety of objects by selecting a design from an online catalogue or database 
(or designing them manually in various Computer Aided Design programs (CAD), where they can then be added to 
the database if the user chooses). The end goal of some of these devices is artificially selected self-replication. It 
appears that the first 3D printer to have carried out this feat (with some assistance on the part of its user to assemble 
the device, which remains in conformance with its 'artificially selected' evolution) was the “Replicating Rapid 
Prototyper” (or “RepRap”), originally designed by a team led by Dr. Adrian Bowyer, formerly of the University of 
Bath. 





It has been argued in this thesis that the key to understanding the contemporary importance of 
Marcuse's philosophy of technology lies in its focus on the chief incentives which prevail in 
technological mediation.1 Overall, the thesis has aimed to articulate, augment, and reevaluate 
Marcuse's philosophy of technology with the goal of assisting in promoting its relevance as a 
critical approach to technical mediation in the modern period. Against those that have dismissed his 
view as either deterministic, overly pessimistic, or utopian, by tracing the origins of his critical 
theory of advanced industrial society and illustrating the Marxian influence in his thought, I have 
attempted to present Marcuse as a concrete philosophical utopian thinker who offered a cautionary 
warning in regard to the direction of modern technology, and as such, should not be summarily 
dismissed. 
The discussion was inspired in part by the often cited neglect of technology as a philosophical 
concern, but also by Marcuse's own conviction that, as well as being a theoretical endeavour, it must 
not be forgotten that philosophy has played, and ought still play a practical role in the critique of 
society as well as a means to speculate upon and envision avenues of positive, qualitative social 
change if the possibility emerges to seize it.2 As technology is surely amongst the most formative, 
novel and influential features of the human condition, philosophy must not only attempt to keep 
pace with the implications of its development, but understand its inextricable causal involvement in 
the course of current events as well as into the future. With this in mind, it has been argued that 
Marcuse's distinction between the technical and the technological remains useful when applied to 
the grounds shared by philosophers of technology and philosophers of the environment, and does 
not fail to take into consideration the dominant economic incentives driving its development. As 
Marcuse and other thinkers have understood in their own ways, a philosophy of technology – as 
well as accounts which aim to trace its social implications – must not mistake technology for mere 
1 Again, by "mediation" I mean the actual production of technical artifacts and the uses they are put to. 
2 See for example, Marcuse, (1929), 'On Concrete Philosophy', in Heideggerian Marxism, edited by J. Abromeit and 
R. Wolin, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), pp. 34-52.
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technics;3 technology is not simply the gamut of instruments, but a social force which must be 
viewed in a way which acknowledges its ensemble status; its inextricable connection to the 
environment, its anthropological foundations, as well as the changing incentives which have driven 
it to its current global proportions. Despite specific reservations about elements of his politics, as 
well as his perhaps excessive optimism in regard to the role art and nature could play in fostering a 
new technology, it has been the aim to show that Marcuse's philosophy of technology remains 
diverse and flexible enough to retain its usefulness, whilst avoiding the many stark dichotomies 
which continue to feature in discussions of technology – philosophical and otherwise.4 
In an effort to redeem the conceptual shortfalls in Marcuse's approach, emphasis was placed on the 
growth imperative and nature was considered in terms of its preconditional status, a position 
Marcuse appears to have briefly entertained, but which then took a turn toward an overly optimistic, 
not to mention confusing teleological account. Nevertheless, one need have no specific sympathies 
for the psychology of Freud, nor the politics of Marx to see that the question of technology is not 
merely one of appropriate designs, of "greening up the market", nor of so-called "sustainable 
development", but concerns the deeper attitudes and incentives that guide production overall, and 
decisions about the sort of world to pass on to our descendants. As Marcuse contended to the end, 
the social changes he believed were required would not be achievable with Popperian adjustments, 
but through radically revising the direction of technological development and deployment, away 
from the plunder of the natural world and the one-dimensional regeneration of the status quo of 
perpetual growth, to an arrangement more suited to an authentically liberated and sustainable future 
society.  
As Marcuse himself understood and deployed the Marxian theory as a basis for the critique of 
capitalism, it was the aim of this thesis to provide an account of his own approach in a similar spirit; 
offering criticisms where they were deemed necessary, and submitting refinements and suggestions 
which may extend it applicability to the context of the affluent societies which have seen four 
decades of development and proliferation since Marcuse's death. Although he correctly recognised 
that a philosophy of technology must also include an account of nature, this problematic aspect of 
Marcuse's view does not necessarily undermine his overall critique of the one-dimensional society 
and technological rationality, which can be read as a cautionary warning concerning our current and 
3 Aside from Heidegger's more famous ontic-ontological distinction between technics and technology, prior to this, 
Oswald Spengler had argued that "technics is not to be understood in terms of the implement." See his short 1931 
book, Man and Technics, (London: A.A. Knopf, 1932), p. 9.  
4 See chapter five of this thesis. 
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future use of the environment. In the final chapters I attempted to show that Marcuse offered a view 
of technology compatible with both instrumental and autonomous accounts of the topic. Marcuse's 
view implies that – to a certain extent – both instrumental and autonomous theories of technology 
are correct, yet accepting either in isolation is one sided and  misleading. As was described with 
reference to the concept of the “designer fallacy”,5 as well as in the discussions of the singularity 
hypothesis and autonomous theories of technological development,6 much contemporary thought on 
technology 'proper' appears either to treat the incentives behind its development as either only 
worthy of minor attention, or as self-governing, in which case its incentives would appear to be its 
own. As such, not only does each approach either over-emphasise or under-emphasise the role of 
agents in technical mediation, each also over-estimates the value of certain concepts of use: the 
designer fallacy approaches artifacts on the basis of how they come to be appropriated by end users 
as if the incentives and intentions of their producers was unworthy of concern, and in the context of 
deterministic views, it becomes more a question of how technology uses human agents. Both 
approaches therefore tend to neglect the historically novel extension of the modern growth 
imperative which propels and guides technical design and production in late twentieth early twenty-
first century advanced industrial societies. Yet as it was claimed, neither approach is entirely 
inaccurate: ultimately it is ourselves who will decide what to produce and how much, and we will 
decide how things will come to be used, even if this is not in conformance with a particular artifact's 
intended technical functions. Yet the majority of technical forays play out within the modern market 
mechanism, a 'device' or more specifically, a concatenation of devices which serve as an 
adjudicational means of deciding the success of a particular technical foray in competition with 
others. Under the sway of the market mechanism, a broadly evolutionary 'environment' determines 
which technical forays succeed and fail. Furthermore, this arguably rigidifies the contention made 
earlier that – in order to achieve success – products must perform their primary functions, but in the 
final analysis, they must also function as generators of profits.7 That technics can be permitted to 
'evolve', whilst still being ultimately under human control entails the usefulness of a view which can 
accommodate both contentions. It is for this reason that Marcuse's perspective remains a viable and 
5 See chapter six.
6 See chapter seven. 
7 So it is that strategies such as built in obsolescence can be deemed rational under a mode of production which has 
become thoroughly economicised. The question then arguably becomes: to what extent can the modern market 
mechanism be viewed as an evolutionary environment in which technical forays rise and fall? Pursuing this topic in 
sufficient detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, as the market has not only been likened to an 
evolutionary system by a number of theorists, and that many of the system's defenders contend it functions 
optimally when free of agential intervention, to what extent can it be said that production, no longer largely 
governed by use-values, can be said to 'evolve'? On the topic, see R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An Evolutionary 
Theory of Economic Change, (Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1984), and P.P. Saviotti, Technological  
Evolution, Variety, and the Economy, (Cheltanham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1996).
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consistent means by which to approach contemporary questions concerning technology and the 
environment.
The scope of this thesis has been modest; I have not aimed to provide a complete account of 
Marcuse's thought, and nor have I uncritically assumed the validity of every element of his oeuvre. 
Accordingly, certain issues which emerge in his work, specifically his prominent critique of the 
“false needs” produced and reproduced in order to sustain the status quo have only been noted in 
passing here as – despite their considerable interest for future research – the foundational issues 
which emerge from this topic are beyond the scope of this thesis. For similar reasons, I avoided 
discussion of Marcuse's revisionary take on Freud in order that my primary focus could remain on 
his view of technology. Overall, it has not been my intention to argue that Marcuse was 'right', but 
to show that the themes which emerged in his work deserve further attention from philosophers of 
technology and philosophers of the environment. 
As Marcuse well understood, technological development and economic growth are increasingly 
closely integrated and this implies that the rationality of technical development and use can no 
longer be viewed in isolation from the secondary profitable gains each artifact is produced to attain. 
The incentives behind the production and use of technical artifacts, systems and procedures are not 
merely technical in the Marcusean sense of the term, but in order to be viable must also serve an 
ulterior economic purpose; their functionality is determined by their success or failure as 
commodities in a commodity market, which is to say, the wants and needs satisfied by the results of 
productive activity serve a dual function. As Marcuse notes early in his discussions of technology, it 
is the "profit incentive" which "keeps the apparatus moving".8 This point may strike one as obvious, 
yet as various commentators have noted, the idea that the profit motive is an eternal, ‘natural’ state 
of affairs is actually a very recent phenomenon: 
The idea of gain, the idea that each man not only may, but should, constantly strive to better 
his material lot, is an idea that was quite foreign to the great lower and middle strata of 
Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and medieval cultures, only scattered throughout Renaissance and 
Reformation times, and largely absent in the majority of Eastern civilizations ... Not only is 
the idea of gain by no means as universal as we sometimes suppose, but the social sanction of 
gain is an even more modern and restricted development.9
8 Marcuse, (1941), 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in Technology, War and Fascism: The 
Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol.1., edited by D. Kellner, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 44. 
9 R. Heilbroner, (1953), The Worldly Philosophers, (London: Pelican, 1980), p. 20. The same point is made by W.C. 
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This historical shift in the chief incentives motivating the majority of technical mediation arrives at 
a crucial moment: when a large proportion of scientific experts are claiming that the growing 
human impact on the biosphere is now sufficiently perceptible that it poses a danger to eco-systems, 
countless species, crucial biospheric cycles, and thereby to the continual flourishing of civilisation 
itself. Yet as was noted in chapter four of this thesis, the major solution to this and other problems 
which have arguably resulted just from growth-motivated technological and industrial expansion is 
more growth-motivated technological expansion, or as Marcuse understood it, the perpetual 
reproduction of the consumer-capitalist mode of production. Modern technical mediation appears to 
be configured in such a manner as to defer immediate practicality in favour of  pursuing 
inexhaustible profit gains. 
The modern epoch appears marked by growing knowledge of the side-effects of our technological 
success. As this knowledge increases, the time in which the consequences of our often predatory 
technological forays can be called "unintended" diminishes. The expectation that the consumer-
capitalist society's vision of the Good Life can increase into perpetuity not only undercuts means of 
political and social change, in the roughly four decades since Marcuse's death, it now also appears 
to defy the laws of entropy.10 Whilst continuing to rationalise seemingly ever-increasing material 
appetites, whilst tolerating a small number of individuals whose material affluence is comparable to 
the annual revenues of some nation states, whilst enlarging waste, exterminating unprecedented 
numbers of non-human life, placing all faith in the capacity of "business as usual" to now actively 
address such issues appears highly incautious. In contrast, from the perspective of Marcuse's 
concrete philosophical utopianism, there are existing means of social change available now. 
Although they cannot escape the system entirely, individuals retain the capacity to affect certain 
forms of change, and this involves one of the most difficult attitudes for affluent societies to put into 
action, namely; a refusal to continue to participate in ever-escalating materialism, waste and 
Neale: "There are today very few places indeed where there is no money, where people do not regard money as 
important. However, in the tribal and peasant societies of Africa and Asia, some or even most of the food people eat, 
the houses they live in, and the clothing they wear is not bought but produced and used within a small group, often a 
kin or village group, or by the members of peasant families. In medieval Europe little of the staple foodstuffs was 
sold in markets before the tenth and eleventh centuries, and even thereafter most of the food consumed in the 
countryside was consumed by the producing peasant families. In the ancient Near East the produce of farmers and 
artisans was contributed to the city temple and distributed from the temple to the members of the temple community, 
by rules of duty and of right rather than by sale and purchase. Even in the United States much of the food of small- 
farm families was supplied directly from their own produce well into the twentieth century." See W.C. Neale, 
Monies in Societies, (San Francisco: Chandler and Sharp, 1976), p. 23.
10 On this topic specifically, see N. Georgescu-Roegen, (1971), The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, (Lincoln: 
Iuniverse, 1999). For a definition of the 'false needs' generated by consumer-capitalism in order to perpetuate itself, 
see Marcuse, ibid. (1964), p. 7.
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environmental destruction. However, as Marcuse repeatedly argued, such an attitude of refusal, an 
attitude which questions the rationality of a growth imperative which appears to admit of no limits, 
constitutes exactly that which the status quo militates to contain, and it has become highly proficient 
in doing so.11 
Coupled with its arguably entropy-defying features and its lack of caution in regard to the 
environmental base on which it depends, a certain pessimism regarding the capacity of modern 
affluent societies to arrange technology in a way to deal with looming biospheric problems appears 
warranted. When increasingly bound to the convention of profit making, the former technical or 
practical orientation of the means of production appears to diminish; the incentives behind 
production and labour alter and shift. In Marcusean terms, the end of technological rationality 
becomes stymied and stalled, and despite the undeniable success of this arrangement in the 
twentieth century, from lifting individuals out of poverty, spreading education, health and 
communication and making a comparative few very wealthy indeed, there are increasing signs 
technical mediation has also taken on irrational forms.12 Marcuse focussed specifically on the 
encroach of this incarnation of technological rationality in its control and regimentation of 
individuals as opposed to their liberation, yet it appears that the very same rationality also leads to 
the treatment of the environment as a peripheral concern, second to economic growth rather than its 
precondition. In a complete inversion of the recommendations of Aristotle and Epicurus, to name 
but two ancient examples, monetary acquisition appears to have become the end of the 
technological means.13 Yet money appears to be an end without an end; a situation implied in the 
silence of the vested interests regarding the possible end of the system they administer and promote, 
which, it appears, functions merely to 'move forward'. 
Hence, if Marcuse's recommendations to allow technics to be restored to its appropriate ends 
appears utopian, it must be noted that a continuation of 'business-as-usual' into perpetuity appears at 
least equally so. In light of this contention, it has been argued that Marcuse shows that the 
technological mode of production – the fusion of technological rationality and consumer-capitalism 
– calls for radical caution and a level of responsibility which attempts to match its greatly increased 
11 See Marcuse, ibid. (1964), esp. chapters 2 and 3.
12 Arguably the chief example of this irrational rationality is the reversal of the contingency relation between 
economics and the environment. 
13 See Aristotle, Politics, book 1.9., translated by B. Jowett, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 452. 
Epicurus noted that, as money is a human convention which admits of no intrinsic maximum, one can never have to 
much, despite "nature's wealth being limited and easily won." See Epicurus, 'Leading Doctrines' 15, in The 
Philosophy of Epicurus, translated by G.K. Strodach, (Evanston, ILL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 54.  
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powers, a level of responsibility which will not likely emanate from views of technical mediation 
which remain mired in rigid dichotomies between 'artificial' and 'natural'; 'instrumental', or 
'autonomous', or that fail to give sufficient consideration to its dominant incentives. As Marcuse's 
view continues to be dismissed as pessimistic by some, "ideological",14 and hopelessly utopian by 
others, the aim of this thesis has been to correct the record in certain limited respects.
 
14 For example, in a popular sociological textbook, M. Haralambos and M. Holborn accuse Marcuse of merely having 
a personal "distaste" of the given society, before dismissively laying the charge that his critique is "ideological". See 
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